November 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Make should_set_md_dirserver_restriction() look at num filtered guards
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 96b69942a54e69e9f4d8aeb07bf9a5fb98892900 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 16 08:49:24 2017 -0500 Make should_set_md_dirserver_restriction() look at num filtered guards This seems closer to what the code intended. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 1cc24d8d6..dc02557b5 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1472,9 +1472,10 @@ guard_create_exit_restriction(const uint8_t *exit_id) return rst; } -/** If we have less than these many configured bridges, don't set dirserver - * restrictions because we might blacklist all of them. */ -#define TOO_FEW_BRIDGES_FOR_RESTRICTION 10 +/** If we have fewer than this many possible guards, don't set + * MD-availability-based restrictions: we might blacklist all of + * them. */ +#define MIN_GUARDS_FOR_MD_RESTRICTION 10 /** Return true if we should set md dirserver restrictions. We might not want * to set those if our network is too restricted, since we don't want to @@ -1484,20 +1485,17 @@ should_set_md_dirserver_restriction(void) { const guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info(); - /* Don't set a restriction if we are on a restricted guard selection */ - if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED) { - return 0; - } - - /* Don't set restriction if we are using bridges and have too few of those */ - if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE && gs->sampled_entry_guards) { - int num_sampled_guards = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); - if (num_sampled_guards < TOO_FEW_BRIDGES_FOR_RESTRICTION) { - return 0; + /* Compute the number of filtered guards */ + int n_filtered_guards = 0; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { + if (guard->is_filtered_guard) { + ++n_filtered_guards; } - } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); - return 1; + /* Do we have enough filtered guards that we feel okay about blacklisting + * some for MD restriction? */ + return (n_filtered_guards >= MIN_GUARDS_FOR_MD_RESTRICTION); } /** Allocate and return an outdated md guard restriction. Return NULL if no @@ -1508,6 +1506,8 @@ guard_create_dirserver_md_restriction(void) entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; if (!should_set_md_dirserver_restriction()) { + log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Not setting md restriction: too few " + "filtered guards."); return NULL; }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit fcdec00685608c85161116bdb7408f33094ea3fa Merge: 94dce246e 9c17a6d28 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 17 09:59:26 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' changes/bug23817 | 3 + src/or/directory.c | 82 ++++++++----------------- src/or/directory.h | 44 ++++++++++++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/entrynodes.h | 33 +++++++--- src/or/microdesc.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/microdesc.h | 4 ++ src/or/networkstatus.c | 3 + src/or/scheduler.c | 7 ++- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 10 files changed, 447 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/directory.h index 904bdfae4,5e6a91d3e..3aef60071 --- a/src/or/directory.h +++ b/src/or/directory.h @@@ -193,10 -235,9 +235,12 @@@ STATIC void warn_disallowed_anonymous_c STATIC int handle_response_fetch_hsdesc_v3(dir_connection_t *conn, const response_handler_args_t *args); + STATIC int handle_response_fetch_microdesc(dir_connection_t *conn, + const response_handler_args_t *args); +STATIC int handle_response_fetch_consensus(dir_connection_t *conn, + const response_handler_args_t *args); + #endif /* defined(DIRECTORY_PRIVATE) */ #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug23817_tests_032' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 9c17a6d28b4acf044f408a0c7211e051e238c797 Merge: 9fbc835f1 3a5ca47d8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 17 09:58:12 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug23817_tests_032' into maint-0.3.2 src/or/directory.c | 42 ------------- src/or/directory.h | 42 +++++++++++++ src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Make should_set_md_dirserver_restriction() look at num filtered guards
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 96b69942a54e69e9f4d8aeb07bf9a5fb98892900 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 16 08:49:24 2017 -0500 Make should_set_md_dirserver_restriction() look at num filtered guards This seems closer to what the code intended. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 1cc24d8d6..dc02557b5 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1472,9 +1472,10 @@ guard_create_exit_restriction(const uint8_t *exit_id) return rst; } -/** If we have less than these many configured bridges, don't set dirserver - * restrictions because we might blacklist all of them. */ -#define TOO_FEW_BRIDGES_FOR_RESTRICTION 10 +/** If we have fewer than this many possible guards, don't set + * MD-availability-based restrictions: we might blacklist all of + * them. */ +#define MIN_GUARDS_FOR_MD_RESTRICTION 10 /** Return true if we should set md dirserver restrictions. We might not want * to set those if our network is too restricted, since we don't want to @@ -1484,20 +1485,17 @@ should_set_md_dirserver_restriction(void) { const guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info(); - /* Don't set a restriction if we are on a restricted guard selection */ - if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED) { - return 0; - } - - /* Don't set restriction if we are using bridges and have too few of those */ - if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE && gs->sampled_entry_guards) { - int num_sampled_guards = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); - if (num_sampled_guards < TOO_FEW_BRIDGES_FOR_RESTRICTION) { - return 0; + /* Compute the number of filtered guards */ + int n_filtered_guards = 0; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { + if (guard->is_filtered_guard) { + ++n_filtered_guards; } - } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); - return 1; + /* Do we have enough filtered guards that we feel okay about blacklisting + * some for MD restriction? */ + return (n_filtered_guards >= MIN_GUARDS_FOR_MD_RESTRICTION); } /** Allocate and return an outdated md guard restriction. Return NULL if no @@ -1508,6 +1506,8 @@ guard_create_dirserver_md_restriction(void) entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; if (!should_set_md_dirserver_restriction()) { + log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Not setting md restriction: too few " + "filtered guards."); return NULL; }

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Merge branch 'bug23817_031' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 2cee26b16447c143333ffc16502ecc28b48060cd Merge: b98614f1a 96b69942a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 17 09:56:53 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug23817_031' into maint-0.3.2 changes/bug23817 | 3 ++ src/or/directory.c | 40 ++++++++++------ src/or/directory.h | 2 + src/or/entrynodes.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/or/entrynodes.h | 33 ++++++++++---- src/or/microdesc.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/microdesc.h | 4 ++ src/or/networkstatus.c | 3 ++ 8 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/directory.h index d26d83537,571c30a0f..b57b7b544 --- a/src/or/directory.h +++ b/src/or/directory.h @@@ -191,8 -166,10 +191,10 @@@ STATIC char *accept_encoding_header(voi STATIC int allowed_anonymous_connection_compression_method(compress_method_t); STATIC void warn_disallowed_anonymous_compression_method(compress_method_t); -struct response_handler_args_t; - +STATIC int handle_response_fetch_hsdesc_v3(dir_connection_t *conn, + const response_handler_args_t *args); + STATIC int handle_response_fetch_microdesc(dir_connection_t *conn, - const struct response_handler_args_t *args); ++ const response_handler_args_t *args); #endif /* defined(DIRECTORY_PRIVATE) */ diff --cc src/or/entrynodes.h index 9e1e72993,29de627de..49bb3e55c --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@@ -550,6 -557,16 +557,14 @@@ STATIC unsigned entry_guards_note_guard unsigned old_state); STATIC int entry_guard_has_higher_priority(entry_guard_t *a, entry_guard_t *b); STATIC char *getinfo_helper_format_single_entry_guard(const entry_guard_t *e); + -STATIC entry_guard_restriction_t * -guard_create_exit_restriction(const uint8_t *exit_id); ++STATIC entry_guard_restriction_t *guard_create_exit_restriction( ++ const uint8_t *exit_id); + -STATIC entry_guard_restriction_t * -guard_create_dirserver_md_restriction(void); ++STATIC entry_guard_restriction_t *guard_create_dirserver_md_restriction(void); + -STATIC void -entry_guard_restriction_free(entry_guard_restriction_t *rst); ++STATIC void entry_guard_restriction_free(entry_guard_restriction_t *rst); + #endif /* defined(ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE) */ void remove_all_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs); diff --cc src/or/networkstatus.c index 2660e6a32,36e62020e..f31529733 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@@ -2009,11 -2037,13 +2009,14 @@@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(con "consensus network status document (%s UTC). Tor needs an " "accurate clock to work correctly. Please check your time and " "date settings!", dbuf, tbuf); - control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, - "CLOCK_SKEW MIN_SKEW=%ld SOURCE=CONSENSUS", delta); + tor_asprintf(&flavormsg, "%s flavor consensus", flavor); + clock_skew_warning(NULL, delta, 1, LD_GENERAL, flavormsg, "CONSENSUS"); + tor_free(flavormsg); } + /* We got a new consesus. Reset our md fetch fail cache */ + microdesc_reset_outdated_dirservers_list(); + router_dir_info_changed(); result = 0;

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Intoduce unittest for skipping outdated dirservers.
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 7e52947d571c8038bfcd82e14f373f3c00924cbe Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Nov 6 15:45:42 2017 +0200 Intoduce unittest for skipping outdated dirservers. --- src/or/directory.c | 42 ------------- src/or/directory.h | 42 +++++++++++++ src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 43a03a2fd..66bdef236 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -1012,48 +1012,6 @@ directory_must_use_begindir(const or_options_t *options) return !public_server_mode(options); } -struct directory_request_t { - /** - * These fields specify which directory we're contacting. Routerstatus, - * if present, overrides the other fields. - * - * @{ */ - tor_addr_port_t or_addr_port; - tor_addr_port_t dir_addr_port; - char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - - const routerstatus_t *routerstatus; - /** @} */ - /** One of DIR_PURPOSE_* other than DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER. Describes what - * kind of operation we'll be doing (upload/download), and of what kind - * of document. */ - uint8_t dir_purpose; - /** One of ROUTER_PURPOSE_*; used for uploads and downloads of routerinfo - * and extrainfo docs. */ - uint8_t router_purpose; - /** Enum: determines whether to anonymize, and whether to use dirport or - * orport. */ - dir_indirection_t indirection; - /** Alias to the variable part of the URL for this request */ - const char *resource; - /** Alias to the payload to upload (if any) */ - const char *payload; - /** Number of bytes to upload from payload</b> */ - size_t payload_len; - /** Value to send in an if-modified-since header, or 0 for none. */ - time_t if_modified_since; - /** Hidden-service-specific information v2. */ - const rend_data_t *rend_query; - /** Extra headers to append to the request */ - config_line_t *additional_headers; - /** Hidden-service-specific information for v3+. */ - const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *hs_ident; - /** Used internally to directory.c: gets informed when the attempt to - * connect to the directory succeeds or fails, if that attempt bears on the - * directory's usability as a directory guard. */ - circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state; -}; - /** Evaluate the situation and decide if we should use an encrypted * "begindir-style" connection for this directory request. * 0) If there is no DirPort, yes. diff --git a/src/or/directory.h b/src/or/directory.h index b57b7b544..5e6a91d3e 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.h +++ b/src/or/directory.h @@ -183,6 +183,48 @@ typedef struct response_handler_args_t { const char *headers; } response_handler_args_t; +struct directory_request_t { + /** + * These fields specify which directory we're contacting. Routerstatus, + * if present, overrides the other fields. + * + * @{ */ + tor_addr_port_t or_addr_port; + tor_addr_port_t dir_addr_port; + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + const routerstatus_t *routerstatus; + /** @} */ + /** One of DIR_PURPOSE_* other than DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER. Describes what + * kind of operation we'll be doing (upload/download), and of what kind + * of document. */ + uint8_t dir_purpose; + /** One of ROUTER_PURPOSE_*; used for uploads and downloads of routerinfo + * and extrainfo docs. */ + uint8_t router_purpose; + /** Enum: determines whether to anonymize, and whether to use dirport or + * orport. */ + dir_indirection_t indirection; + /** Alias to the variable part of the URL for this request */ + const char *resource; + /** Alias to the payload to upload (if any) */ + const char *payload; + /** Number of bytes to upload from payload</b> */ + size_t payload_len; + /** Value to send in an if-modified-since header, or 0 for none. */ + time_t if_modified_since; + /** Hidden-service-specific information v2. */ + const rend_data_t *rend_query; + /** Extra headers to append to the request */ + config_line_t *additional_headers; + /** Hidden-service-specific information for v3+. */ + const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *hs_ident; + /** Used internally to directory.c: gets informed when the attempt to + * connect to the directory succeeds or fails, if that attempt bears on the + * directory's usability as a directory guard. */ + struct circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state; +}; + struct get_handler_args_t; STATIC int handle_get_hs_descriptor_v3(dir_connection_t *conn, const struct get_handler_args_t *args); diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index f9d981953..2aef5cbbf 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #define STATEFILE_PRIVATE #define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE #define ROUTERLIST_PRIVATE +#define DIRECTORY_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "test.h" @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" +#include "directory.h" #include "entrynodes.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "networkstatus.h" @@ -129,6 +131,14 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) n->rs->has_bandwidth = 1; n->rs->bandwidth_kb = 30; + /* Make a random nickname for each node */ + { + char nickname_binary[8]; + crypto_rand(nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary)); + base64_encode(n->rs->nickname, sizeof(n->rs->nickname), + nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary), 0); + } + /* Call half of the nodes a possible guard. */ if (i % 2 == 0) { n->is_possible_guard = 1; @@ -1800,14 +1810,14 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g); /* But if we impose a restriction, we don't get the same guard */ - entry_guard_restriction_t rst; - memset(&rst, 0, sizeof(rst)); - memcpy(rst.exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); - g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, &rst, &state); + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst; + rst = guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)g->identity); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g); done: guard_selection_free(gs); + entry_guard_restriction_free(rst); } static void @@ -1817,6 +1827,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) guards, we use a confirmed guard. */ (void)arg; int i; + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL); const int N_CONFIRMED = 10; @@ -1877,10 +1888,8 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) get_options_mutable()->EnforceDistinctSubnets = 0; g = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)+2); - entry_guard_restriction_t rst; - memset(&rst, 0, sizeof(rst)); - memcpy(rst.exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); - g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, &rst, &state); + rst = guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)g->identity); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, NULL); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g); tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, @@ -1906,13 +1915,13 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) // Regression test for bug 22753/TROVE-2017-006. get_options_mutable()->EnforceDistinctSubnets = 1; g = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 0); - memset(&rst, 0, sizeof(rst)); - memcpy(rst.exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); - g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, &rst, &state); + memcpy(rst->exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, NULL); done: guard_selection_free(gs); + entry_guard_restriction_free(rst); } static void @@ -2493,9 +2502,7 @@ test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_complete(void *arg) /* Once more, let circ1 become complete. But this time, we'll claim * that circ2 was restricted to not use the same guard as circ1. */ data->guard2_state->restrictions = - tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); - memcpy(data->guard2_state->restrictions->exclude_id, - data->guard1->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)data->guard1->identity); smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new(); int r; @@ -2604,9 +2611,7 @@ test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_pending(void *arg) } data->guard2_state->restrictions = - tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); - memcpy(data->guard2_state->restrictions->exclude_id, - data->guard1->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)data->guard1->identity); smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new(); int r; @@ -2674,6 +2679,112 @@ test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting(void *arg) tor_free(fake_state); } +static void +mock_directory_initiate_request(directory_request_t *req) +{ + if (req->guard_state) { + circuit_guard_state_free(req->guard_state); + } +} + +static networkstatus_t *mock_ns_val = NULL; +static networkstatus_t * +mock_ns_get_by_flavor(consensus_flavor_t f) +{ + (void)f; + return mock_ns_val; +} + +/** Test that when we fetch microdescriptors we skip guards that have + * previously failed to serve us needed microdescriptors. */ +static void +test_entry_guard_outdated_dirserver_exclusion(void *arg) +{ + int retval; + response_handler_args_t *args = NULL; + dir_connection_t *conn = NULL; + (void) arg; + + /* Test prep: Make a new guard selection */ + guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", + GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1); + + /* ... we want to use entry guards */ + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + options->UseEntryGuards = 1; + options->UseBridges = 0; + + /* ... prepare some md digests we want to download in the future */ + smartlist_t *digests = smartlist_new(); + const char *prose = "unhurried and wise, we perceive."; + for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + smartlist_add(digests, (char*)prose); + } + + /* ... now mock some functions */ + mock_ns_val = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_t)); + MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor, mock_ns_get_by_flavor); + MOCK(directory_initiate_request, mock_directory_initiate_request); + + /* Test logic: + * 0. Create a proper guard set and primary guard list. + * 1. Pretend to fail microdescriptor fetches from all the primary guards. + * 2. Order another microdescriptor fetch and make sure that primary guards + * get skipped since they failed previous fetches. + */ + + { /* Setup primary guard list */ + int i; + entry_guards_update_primary(gs); + for (i = 0; i < DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS; ++i) { + entry_guard_t *guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i); + make_guard_confirmed(gs, guard); + } + entry_guards_update_primary(gs); + } + + { + /* Fail microdesc fetches with all the primary guards */ + args = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(response_handler_args_t)); + args->status_code = 404; + args->reason = NULL; + args->body = NULL; + args->body_len = 0; + + conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(dir_connection_t)); + conn->requested_resource = tor_strdup("d/jlinblackorigami"); + conn->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC; + + /* Pretend to fail fetches with all primary guards */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards,const entry_guard_t *,g) { + memcpy(conn->identity_digest, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + + retval = handle_response_fetch_microdesc(conn, args); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(g); + } + + { + /* Now order the final md download */ + setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); + initiate_descriptor_downloads(NULL, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC, + digests, 3, 7, 0); + + /* ... and check that because we failed to fetch microdescs from all our + * primaries, we didnt end up selecting a primary for fetching dir info */ + expect_log_msg_containing("No primary or confirmed guards available."); + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + } + + done: + smartlist_free(digests); + tor_free(args); + if (conn) { + tor_free(conn->requested_resource); + tor_free(conn); + } +} + static const struct testcase_setup_t big_fake_network = { big_fake_network_setup, big_fake_network_cleanup }; @@ -2734,6 +2845,7 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry), BFN_TEST(select_and_cancel), BFN_TEST(drop_guards), + BFN_TEST(outdated_dirserver_exclusion), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_a_circuit, "c1-done c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_live_primary_guards, "c1-done c2-done"),

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Fix a wide comment
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 9fbc835f10e9fba6a9b0c6643a41aee9c8aa05c2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 17 09:57:15 2017 -0500 Fix a wide comment --- src/or/scheduler.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/scheduler.c b/src/or/scheduler.c index dabac386d..cbf51447b 100644 --- a/src/or/scheduler.c +++ b/src/or/scheduler.c @@ -258,9 +258,10 @@ select_scheduler(void) /* We should only log this once in most cases. If it was the kernel * losing support for kist that caused scheduler_can_use_kist() to * return false, then this flag makes sure we only log this message - * once. If it was the consensus that switched from "yes use kist" to - * "no don't use kist", then we still set the flag so we log once, but - * we unset the flag elsewhere if we ever can_use_kist() again. + * once. If it was the consensus that switched from "yes use kist" + * to "no don't use kist", then we still set the flag so we log + * once, but we unset the flag elsewhere if we ever can_use_kist() + * again. */ have_logged_kist_suddenly_disabled = 1; log_notice(LD_SCHED, "Scheduler type KIST has been disabled by "

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Fix a clang unitialized-var warning
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 3a5ca47d8f0b97da80199c7787b81c28c9247bb3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 7 19:40:52 2017 -0500 Fix a clang unitialized-var warning --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 2aef5cbbf..43cc39488 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -1729,6 +1729,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) /* Simpler cases: no gaurds are confirmed yet. */ (void)arg; guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL); + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; /* simple starting configuration */ entry_guards_update_primary(gs); @@ -1810,7 +1811,6 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g); /* But if we impose a restriction, we don't get the same guard */ - entry_guard_restriction_t *rst; rst = guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)g->identity); g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g);

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Merge branch 'bug23817_tests_032' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit 9c17a6d28b4acf044f408a0c7211e051e238c797 Merge: 9fbc835f1 3a5ca47d8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 17 09:58:12 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug23817_tests_032' into maint-0.3.2 src/or/directory.c | 42 ------------- src/or/directory.h | 42 +++++++++++++ src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into release-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Nov '17

17 Nov '17

commit cf92667b9ffb427f85584f95bc8fea389ab31885 Merge: 330ccb699 9c17a6d28 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 17 09:59:26 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into release-0.3.2 changes/bug23817 | 3 + src/or/directory.c | 82 ++++++++----------------- src/or/directory.h | 44 ++++++++++++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/entrynodes.h | 33 +++++++--- src/or/microdesc.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/microdesc.h | 4 ++ src/or/networkstatus.c | 3 + src/or/scheduler.c | 7 ++- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 10 files changed, 447 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)

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