November 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Merge branch 'ticket23820_032_01_squashed' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 3aab8307a57c668c24dae17b94f780b3f6783c67 Merge: 8687d9cf4 a2bc979d9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 10:19:29 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'ticket23820_032_01_squashed' into maint-0.3.2 changes/bug23820 | 5 ++++ src/or/hs_circuit.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/or/hs_client.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++--- src/or/hs_common.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- src/or/hs_config.c | 16 ++++++++--- src/or/hs_service.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/test/include.am | 4 ++- 7 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit a4f34c1106c5cd14ce3eda3877d41ff2f76ff0dd Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 16:48:02 2017 +1100 Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points Diagnostics for #23820. --- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/hs_client.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index c8c9b4e56..a23edc36a 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service, memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload)); } +/* Return a string constant describing the anonymity of service. */ +static const char * +get_service_anonymity_string(const hs_service_t *service) +{ + if (service->config.is_single_onion) { + return "single onion"; + } else { + return "hidden"; + } +} + /* For a given service, the ntor onion key and a rendezvous cookie, launch a * circuit to the rendezvous point specified by the link specifiers. On * success, a circuit identifier is attached to the circuit with the needed @@ -370,7 +381,15 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service, &data->onion_pk, service->config.is_single_onion); if (info == NULL) { - /* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point. */ + /* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point. + * If you're running an IPv6-only v3 single onion service on 0.3.2 or with + * 0.3.2 clients, and somehow disable the option check, it will fail here. + */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, + "Not enough info to open a circuit to a rendezvous point for " + "%s service %s.", + get_service_anonymity_string(service), + safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto end; } @@ -392,17 +411,19 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service, } } if (circ == NULL) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching rendezvous circuit to %s " - "for service %s", + log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching a rendezvous circuit to %s " + "for %s service %s", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)), + get_service_anonymity_string(service), safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto end; } log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit launched to %s with cookie %s " - "for service %s", + "for %s service %s", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)), safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) data->rendezvous_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN)), + get_service_anonymity_string(service), safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); tor_assert(circ->build_state); /* Rendezvous circuit have a specific timeout for the time spent on trying diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index 93a913b34..581aa478e 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -727,15 +727,24 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) const hs_descriptor_t *desc; const hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *enc_data; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + /* Calculate the onion address for logging purposes */ + char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; tor_assert(service_pk); desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_pk); + /* Assume the service is v3 if the descriptor is missing. This is ok, + * because we only use the address in log messages */ + hs_build_address(service_pk, + desc ? desc->plaintext_data.version : HS_VERSION_THREE, + onion_address); if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(service_pk, desc)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to randomly select an introduction point " - "because descriptor %s.", - (desc) ? "doesn't have usable intro point" : "is missing"); + "for service %s because descriptor %s. We can't connect.", + safe_str_client(onion_address), + (desc) ? "doesn't have any usable intro points" + : "is missing (assuming v3 onion address)"); goto end; } @@ -763,6 +772,10 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) if (ei == NULL) { /* We can get here for instance if the intro point is a private address * and we aren't allowed to extend to those. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to select introduction point with auth key %s " + "for service %s, because we could not extend to it.", + safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)), + safe_str_client(onion_address)); continue; } @@ -791,14 +804,20 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) * set, we are forced to not use anything. */ ei = ei_excluded; if (options->StrictNodes) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction points are in the ExcludeNodes set " - "and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service %s is in the " + "ExcludeNodes set and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); extend_info_free(ei); ei = NULL; + } else { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service " + "%s is unusable or we can't extend to it. We can't connect.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); } end: smartlist_free(usable_ips); + memwipe(onion_address, 0, sizeof(onion_address)); return ei; }

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[tor/master] Remove buggy IPv6 and ed25519 handling from get_lspecs_from_extend_info()
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 77ed99b1a79e61146d9e3b9f51aac4fd1c2f5b03 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 16:30:24 2017 +1100 Remove buggy IPv6 and ed25519 handling from get_lspecs_from_extend_info() The previous version of this function had the following issues: * it didn't check if the extend_info contained an IPv6 address, * it didn't check if the ed25519 identity key was valid. But we can't add IPv6 support in a bugfix release. Instead, BUG() if the address is an IPv6 address, so we always put IPv4 addresses in link specifiers. And ignore missing ed25519 identifiers, rather than generating an all-zero link specifier. This supports v3 hidden services on IPv4, dual-stack, and IPv6, and v3 single onion services on IPv4 only. Part of 23820, bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. --- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index e1e513c5f..c8c9b4e56 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -533,7 +533,10 @@ retry_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ) } /* Using an extend info object ei, set all possible link specifiers in lspecs. - * IPv4, legacy ID and ed25519 ID are mandatory thus MUST be present in ei. */ + * legacy ID is mandatory thus MUST be present in ei. If IPv4 is not present, + * logs a BUG() warning, and returns an empty smartlist. Clients never make + * direct connections to rendezvous points, so they should always have an + * IPv4 address in ei. */ static void get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) { @@ -542,7 +545,11 @@ get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) tor_assert(ei); tor_assert(lspecs); - /* IPv4 is mandatory. */ + /* We require IPv4, we will add IPv6 support in a later tor version */ + if (BUG(!tor_addr_is_v4(&ei->addr))) { + return; + } + ls = link_specifier_new(); link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_IPV4); link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_addr(ls, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&ei->addr)); @@ -560,15 +567,15 @@ get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls)); smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); - /* ed25519 ID is mandatory. */ - ls = link_specifier_new(); - link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_ED25519_ID); - memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_ed25519_id(ls), &ei->ed_identity, - link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); - link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); - smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); - - /* XXX: IPv6 is not clearly a thing in extend_info_t? */ + /* ed25519 ID is only included if the node has it. */ + if (!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ei->ed_identity)) { + ls = link_specifier_new(); + link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_ED25519_ID); + memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_ed25519_id(ls), &ei->ed_identity, + link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); + link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); + smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); + } } /* Using the given descriptor intro point ip, the extend information of the @@ -1053,6 +1060,14 @@ hs_circ_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ, * object which is used to build the content of the cell. */ setup_introduce1_data(ip, rend_circ->build_state->chosen_exit, subcredential, &intro1_data); + /* If we didn't get any link specifiers, it's because our extend info was + * bad. */ + if (BUG(!intro1_data.link_specifiers) || + !smartlist_len(intro1_data.link_specifiers)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to get link specifiers for INTRODUCE1 cell on " + "circuit %u.", TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->n_circ_id); + goto done; + } /* Final step before we encode a cell, we setup the circuit identifier which * will generate both the rendezvous cookie and client keypair for this

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[tor/master] Changes file for 23820
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit a2bc979d9d498954e1a2955ce917781caed80634 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 17:25:16 2017 +1100 Changes file for 23820 --- changes/bug23820 | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug23820 b/changes/bug23820 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e920d049 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug23820 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (IPv6, v3 single onion services): + - Remove buggy code for IPv6-only v3 single onion services, and reject + attempts to configure them. This release supports IPv4, dual-stack, and + IPv6-only v3 hidden services; and IPv4 and dual-stack v3 single onion + services. Fixes bug 23820; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 96461e859febc0b1b723f5257938b79562af7ef4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 14:15:39 2017 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- be/https-everywhere.dtd | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/be/https-everywhere.dtd b/be/https-everywhere.dtd index 4aed8d6fc..38ad1a5fb 100644 --- a/be/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/be/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable "Уключыць HTTPS Everywhere"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.blockUnencryptedRequests "Block all unencrypted requests"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.showCounter "Паказаць лічыльнік"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.viewAllRules "View All Rules"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.viewAllRules "Праглядзець усе правілы"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.generalSettings "General Settings"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.importSettings "Import Settings"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.import "Import"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.imported "Your settings have been imported."> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.export_settings "Export Settings"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.export_settings "Экспарт наладаў"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.reset_defaults "Скінуць да стандартных"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules "Stable rules">

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'buf_for_stringbuffer_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit a321f8f4af01b6ca2f1a809b9c484c9fdb40d177 Merge: 7700b99fe 508645b5a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 10:01:30 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'buf_for_stringbuffer_squashed' changes/ticket22342 | 3 ++ src/common/buffers.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/buffers.h | 7 +++ src/or/connection.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/connection.h | 1 + src/or/directory.c | 44 ++++++----------- src/or/geoip.c | 22 ++++----- 7 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] changes file for 22342
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 508645b5a4cd64a975d31614ad060f38dde84e82 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 09:59:53 2017 -0400 changes file for 22342 --- changes/ticket22342 | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket22342 b/changes/ticket22342 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53505509d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket22342 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Small changes to Tor's buf_t API to make it suitable for use as + a general-purpose safe string constructor. Closes ticket 22342.

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[tor/master] Refactor write_http_response_header_impl() to use buf_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 5240d02a110f280ab9071657a66dedfc617aef0c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 6 09:08:55 2017 -0400 Refactor write_http_response_header_impl() to use buf_t --- src/or/directory.c | 44 ++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 007235d10..9e1721a6a 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -3503,63 +3503,47 @@ write_http_response_header_impl(dir_connection_t *conn, ssize_t length, long cache_lifetime) { char date[RFC1123_TIME_LEN+1]; - char tmp[1024]; - char *cp; time_t now = time(NULL); + buf_t *buf = buf_new_with_capacity(1024); tor_assert(conn); format_rfc1123_time(date, now); - cp = tmp; - tor_snprintf(cp, sizeof(tmp), - "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nDate: %s\r\n", - date); - cp += strlen(tmp); + + buf_add_printf(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nDate: %s\r\n", date); if (type) { - tor_snprintf(cp, sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp), "Content-Type: %s\r\n", type); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_printf(buf, "Content-Type: %s\r\n", type); } if (!is_local_addr(&conn->base_.addr)) { /* Don't report the source address for a nearby/private connection. * Otherwise we tend to mis-report in cases where incoming ports are * being forwarded to a Tor server running behind the firewall. */ - tor_snprintf(cp, sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp), - X_ADDRESS_HEADER "%s\r\n", conn->base_.address); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_printf(buf, X_ADDRESS_HEADER "%s\r\n", conn->base_.address); } if (encoding) { - tor_snprintf(cp, sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp), - "Content-Encoding: %s\r\n", encoding); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_printf(buf, "Content-Encoding: %s\r\n", encoding); } if (length >= 0) { - tor_snprintf(cp, sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp), - "Content-Length: %ld\r\n", (long)length); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_printf(buf, "Content-Length: %ld\r\n", (long)length); } if (cache_lifetime > 0) { char expbuf[RFC1123_TIME_LEN+1]; format_rfc1123_time(expbuf, (time_t)(now + cache_lifetime)); /* We could say 'Cache-control: max-age=%d' here if we start doing * http/1.1 */ - tor_snprintf(cp, sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp), - "Expires: %s\r\n", expbuf); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_printf(buf, "Expires: %s\r\n", expbuf); } else if (cache_lifetime == 0) { /* We could say 'Cache-control: no-cache' here if we start doing * http/1.1 */ - strlcpy(cp, "Pragma: no-cache\r\n", sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp)); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_string(buf, "Pragma: no-cache\r\n"); } if (extra_headers) { - strlcpy(cp, extra_headers, sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp)); - cp += strlen(cp); + buf_add_string(buf, extra_headers); } - if (sizeof(tmp)-(cp-tmp) > 3) - memcpy(cp, "\r\n", 3); - else - tor_assert(0); - connection_buf_add(tmp, strlen(tmp), TO_CONN(conn)); + buf_add_string(buf, "\r\n"); + + connection_buf_add_buf(TO_CONN(conn), buf); + buf_free(buf); } /** As write_http_response_header_impl, but sets encoding and content-typed

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[tor/master] Refactor connection_write_to_buf_impl_(); add one that takes a buf_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 3b300151438304ff9b4612746478f4a6068e1cf7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 6 09:31:02 2017 -0400 Refactor connection_write_to_buf_impl_(); add one that takes a buf_t --- src/or/connection.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/connection.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index e2392b52e..5bf84a1fc 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -4045,6 +4045,68 @@ connection_flush(connection_t *conn) return connection_handle_write(conn, 1); } +/** Helper for connection_write_to_buf_impl and connection_write_buf_to_buf: + * + * Return true iff it is okay to queue bytes on conn's outbuf for + * writing. + */ +static int +connection_may_write_to_buf(connection_t *conn) +{ + /* if it's marked for close, only allow write if we mean to flush it */ + if (conn->marked_for_close && !conn->hold_open_until_flushed) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/** Helper for connection_write_to_buf_impl and connection_write_buf_to_buf: + * + * Called when an attempt to add bytes on conn's outbuf has failed; + * mark the connection and warn as appropriate. + */ +static void +connection_write_to_buf_failed(connection_t *conn) +{ + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + /* if it failed, it means we have our package/delivery windows set + wrong compared to our max outbuf size. close the whole circuit. */ + log_warn(LD_NET, + "write_to_buf failed. Closing circuit (fd %d).", (int)conn->s); + circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)), + END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + or_connection_t *orconn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + log_warn(LD_NET, + "write_to_buf failed on an orconn; notifying of error " + "(fd %d)", (int)(conn->s)); + connection_or_close_for_error(orconn, 0); + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "write_to_buf failed. Closing connection (fd %d).", + (int)conn->s); + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } +} + +/** Helper for connection_write_to_buf_impl and connection_write_buf_to_buf: + * + * Called when an attempt to add bytes on conn's outbuf has succeeded: + * record the number of bytes added. + */ +static void +connection_write_to_buf_commit(connection_t *conn, size_t len) +{ + /* If we receive optimistic data in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING + * state, we don't want to try to write it right away, since + * conn->write_event won't be set yet. Otherwise, write data from + * this conn as the socket is available. */ + if (conn->write_event) { + connection_start_writing(conn); + } + conn->outbuf_flushlen += len; +} + /** Append len bytes of string onto conn's * outbuf, and ask it to start writing. * @@ -4059,58 +4121,52 @@ connection_write_to_buf_impl_,(const char *string, size_t len, { /* XXXX This function really needs to return -1 on failure. */ int r; - size_t old_datalen; if (!len && !(zlib<0)) return; - /* if it's marked for close, only allow write if we mean to flush it */ - if (conn->marked_for_close && !conn->hold_open_until_flushed) + + if (!connection_may_write_to_buf(conn)) return; - old_datalen = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf); + size_t written; + if (zlib) { + size_t old_datalen = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf); dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn); int done = zlib < 0; CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = buf_add_compress(conn->outbuf, - dir_conn->compress_state, - string, len, done)); + dir_conn->compress_state, + string, len, done)); + written = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) - old_datalen; } else { CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = buf_add(conn->outbuf, string, len)); + written = len; } if (r < 0) { - if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { - /* if it failed, it means we have our package/delivery windows set - wrong compared to our max outbuf size. close the whole circuit. */ - log_warn(LD_NET, - "write_to_buf failed. Closing circuit (fd %d).", (int)conn->s); - circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)), - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); - } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { - or_connection_t *orconn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); - log_warn(LD_NET, - "write_to_buf failed on an orconn; notifying of error " - "(fd %d)", (int)(conn->s)); - connection_or_close_for_error(orconn, 0); - } else { - log_warn(LD_NET, - "write_to_buf failed. Closing connection (fd %d).", - (int)conn->s); - connection_mark_for_close(conn); - } + connection_write_to_buf_failed(conn); return; } + connection_write_to_buf_commit(conn, written); +} - /* If we receive optimistic data in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING - * state, we don't want to try to write it right away, since - * conn->write_event won't be set yet. Otherwise, write data from - * this conn as the socket is available. */ - if (conn->write_event) { - connection_start_writing(conn); - } - if (zlib) { - conn->outbuf_flushlen += buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) - old_datalen; - } else { - conn->outbuf_flushlen += len; - } +/** + * Add all bytes from buf to conn's outbuf, draining them + * from buf. (If the connection is marked and will soon be closed, + * nothing is drained.) + */ +void +connection_buf_add_buf(connection_t *conn, buf_t *buf) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(buf); + size_t len = buf_datalen(buf); + if (len == 0) + return; + + if (!connection_may_write_to_buf(conn)) + return; + + buf_move_all(conn->outbuf, buf); + connection_write_to_buf_commit(conn, len); } #define CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE(var, test) \ diff --git a/src/or/connection.h b/src/or/connection.h index 57b9a4a1d..d5b05998e 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.h +++ b/src/or/connection.h @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len, { connection_write_to_buf_impl_(string, len, TO_CONN(conn), done ? -1 : 1); } +void connection_buf_add_buf(connection_t *conn, buf_t *buf); /* DOCDOC connection_get_inbuf_len */ static size_t connection_get_inbuf_len(connection_t *conn);

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[tor/master] Refactor geoip_get_dirreq_history to use buf_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 8993159f3dcf458e1ac3df562e69cb2fc7c02927 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 6 09:37:16 2017 -0400 Refactor geoip_get_dirreq_history to use buf_t --- src/or/geoip.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 65d00b865..9f3ee7cea 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #define GEOIP_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "ht.h" +#include "buffers.h" #include "config.h" #include "control.h" #include "dnsserv.h" @@ -930,9 +931,9 @@ static char * geoip_get_dirreq_history(dirreq_type_t type) { char *result = NULL; + buf_t *buf = NULL; smartlist_t *dirreq_completed = NULL; uint32_t complete = 0, timeouts = 0, running = 0; - int bufsize = 1024, written; dirreq_map_entry_t **ptr, **next; struct timeval now; @@ -965,13 +966,9 @@ geoip_get_dirreq_history(dirreq_type_t type) DIR_REQ_GRANULARITY); running = round_uint32_to_next_multiple_of(running, DIR_REQ_GRANULARITY); - result = tor_malloc_zero(bufsize); - written = tor_snprintf(result, bufsize, "complete=%u,timeout=%u," - "running=%u", complete, timeouts, running); - if (written < 0) { - tor_free(result); - goto done; - } + buf = buf_new_with_capacity(1024); + buf_add_printf(buf, "complete=%u,timeout=%u," + "running=%u", complete, timeouts, running); #define MIN_DIR_REQ_RESPONSES 16 if (complete >= MIN_DIR_REQ_RESPONSES) { @@ -992,7 +989,7 @@ geoip_get_dirreq_history(dirreq_type_t type) dltimes[ent_sl_idx] = bytes_per_second; } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ent); median_uint32(dltimes, complete); /* sorts as a side effect. */ - written = tor_snprintf(result + written, bufsize - written, + buf_add_printf(buf, ",min=%u,d1=%u,d2=%u,q1=%u,d3=%u,d4=%u,md=%u," "d6=%u,d7=%u,q3=%u,d8=%u,d9=%u,max=%u", dltimes[0], @@ -1008,14 +1005,15 @@ geoip_get_dirreq_history(dirreq_type_t type) dltimes[8*complete/10-1], dltimes[9*complete/10-1], dltimes[complete-1]); - if (written<0) - tor_free(result); tor_free(dltimes); } - done: + + result = buf_extract(buf, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(dirreq_completed, dirreq_map_entry_t *, ent, tor_free(ent)); smartlist_free(dirreq_completed); + buf_free(buf); return result; }

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