tor-commits November 2017

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Don't run IPv6-only v3 single onion service tests using chutney
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 176bfe1bede5a4669edba8003d66b913fd3a7de7 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 16:51:04 2017 +1100 Don't run IPv6-only v3 single onion service tests using chutney Part of #23820. --- src/test/include.am | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 50cee693a..7300b8541 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -42,8 +42,10 @@ TESTS += src/test/test src/test/test-slow src/test/test-memwipe \ TEST_CHUTNEY_FLAVORS = basic-min bridges-min hs-v2-min hs-v3-min \ single-onion-v23 # only run if we can ping6 ::1 (localhost) +# IPv6-only v3 single onion services don't work yet, so we don't test the +# single-onion-v23-ipv6 flavor TEST_CHUTNEY_FLAVORS_IPV6 = bridges+ipv6-min ipv6-exit-min hs-v23-ipv6 \ - single-onion-v23-ipv6 + single-onion-ipv6 # only run if we can find a stable (or simply another) version of tor TEST_CHUTNEY_FLAVORS_MIXED = mixed+hs-v23

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit a4f34c1106c5cd14ce3eda3877d41ff2f76ff0dd Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 16:48:02 2017 +1100 Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points Diagnostics for #23820. --- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/hs_client.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index c8c9b4e56..a23edc36a 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service, memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload)); } +/* Return a string constant describing the anonymity of service. */ +static const char * +get_service_anonymity_string(const hs_service_t *service) +{ + if (service->config.is_single_onion) { + return "single onion"; + } else { + return "hidden"; + } +} + /* For a given service, the ntor onion key and a rendezvous cookie, launch a * circuit to the rendezvous point specified by the link specifiers. On * success, a circuit identifier is attached to the circuit with the needed @@ -370,7 +381,15 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service, &data->onion_pk, service->config.is_single_onion); if (info == NULL) { - /* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point. */ + /* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point. + * If you're running an IPv6-only v3 single onion service on 0.3.2 or with + * 0.3.2 clients, and somehow disable the option check, it will fail here. + */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, + "Not enough info to open a circuit to a rendezvous point for " + "%s service %s.", + get_service_anonymity_string(service), + safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto end; } @@ -392,17 +411,19 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service, } } if (circ == NULL) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching rendezvous circuit to %s " - "for service %s", + log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching a rendezvous circuit to %s " + "for %s service %s", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)), + get_service_anonymity_string(service), safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto end; } log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit launched to %s with cookie %s " - "for service %s", + "for %s service %s", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)), safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) data->rendezvous_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN)), + get_service_anonymity_string(service), safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); tor_assert(circ->build_state); /* Rendezvous circuit have a specific timeout for the time spent on trying diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index 93a913b34..581aa478e 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -727,15 +727,24 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) const hs_descriptor_t *desc; const hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *enc_data; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + /* Calculate the onion address for logging purposes */ + char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; tor_assert(service_pk); desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_pk); + /* Assume the service is v3 if the descriptor is missing. This is ok, + * because we only use the address in log messages */ + hs_build_address(service_pk, + desc ? desc->plaintext_data.version : HS_VERSION_THREE, + onion_address); if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(service_pk, desc)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to randomly select an introduction point " - "because descriptor %s.", - (desc) ? "doesn't have usable intro point" : "is missing"); + "for service %s because descriptor %s. We can't connect.", + safe_str_client(onion_address), + (desc) ? "doesn't have any usable intro points" + : "is missing (assuming v3 onion address)"); goto end; } @@ -763,6 +772,10 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) if (ei == NULL) { /* We can get here for instance if the intro point is a private address * and we aren't allowed to extend to those. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to select introduction point with auth key %s " + "for service %s, because we could not extend to it.", + safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)), + safe_str_client(onion_address)); continue; } @@ -791,14 +804,20 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) * set, we are forced to not use anything. */ ei = ei_excluded; if (options->StrictNodes) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction points are in the ExcludeNodes set " - "and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service %s is in the " + "ExcludeNodes set and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); extend_info_free(ei); ei = NULL; + } else { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service " + "%s is unusable or we can't extend to it. We can't connect.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); } end: smartlist_free(usable_ips); + memwipe(onion_address, 0, sizeof(onion_address)); return ei; }

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Stop users configuring IPv6-only v3 single onion services
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit cc072b6fbfee7208f41309b76badec65adbca8ee Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 16:49:00 2017 +1100 Stop users configuring IPv6-only v3 single onion services They are not yet implemented: they will upload descriptors, but won't be able to rendezvous, because IPv6 addresses in link specifiers are ignored. Part of #23820. --- src/or/hs_config.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_config.c b/src/or/hs_config.c index 5f9282ea7..fa5c1ab17 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_config.c +++ b/src/or/hs_config.c @@ -424,11 +424,19 @@ config_generic_service(const config_line_t *line_, } } - /* Check if we are configured in non anonymous mode and single hop mode - * meaning every service become single onion. */ - if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && - rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) { + /* Check if we are configured in non anonymous mode meaning every service + * becomes a single onion service. */ + if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) { config->is_single_onion = 1; + /* We will add support for IPv6-only v3 single onion services in a future + * Tor version. This won't catch "ReachableAddresses reject *4", but that + * option doesn't work anyway. */ + if (options->ClientUseIPv4 == 0 && config->version == HS_VERSION_THREE) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "IPv6-only v3 single onion services are not " + "supported. Set HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 0 and " + "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 0, or set ClientUseIPv4 1."); + goto err; + } } /* Success */

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Changes file for 23820
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit a2bc979d9d498954e1a2955ce917781caed80634 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 17:25:16 2017 +1100 Changes file for 23820 --- changes/bug23820 | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug23820 b/changes/bug23820 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e920d049 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug23820 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (IPv6, v3 single onion services): + - Remove buggy code for IPv6-only v3 single onion services, and reject + attempts to configure them. This release supports IPv4, dual-stack, and + IPv6-only v3 hidden services; and IPv4 and dual-stack v3 single onion + services. Fixes bug 23820; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Merge branch 'ticket23820_032_01_squashed' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 3aab8307a57c668c24dae17b94f780b3f6783c67 Merge: 8687d9cf4 a2bc979d9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 10:19:29 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'ticket23820_032_01_squashed' into maint-0.3.2 changes/bug23820 | 5 ++++ src/or/hs_circuit.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/or/hs_client.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++--- src/or/hs_common.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- src/or/hs_config.c | 16 ++++++++--- src/or/hs_service.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/test/include.am | 4 ++- 7 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into release-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit aed642a4b277ec46bd40913735ae82c0baf10f5a Merge: 588be5b02 6a9a118f9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 10:22:35 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into release-0.3.2 changes/bug23820 | 5 ++++ src/or/hs_circuit.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/or/hs_client.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++--- src/or/hs_common.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- src/or/hs_config.c | 16 ++++++++--- src/or/hs_service.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/test/include.am | 4 ++- 7 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.2] Tweak a comment for a minor but important distinction
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 6a9a118f9077c02ce60052275dcede88d9fd2aa3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 2 10:22:32 2017 -0400 Tweak a comment for a minor but important distinction --- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index a23edc36a..ee952f4d6 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls)); smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); - /* ed25519 ID is only included if the node has it. */ + /* ed25519 ID is only included if the extend_info has it. */ if (!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ei->ed_identity)) { ls = link_specifier_new(); link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_ED25519_ID);

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[tor/master] Changes file for 23820
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

1 0

[tor/master] Remove buggy IPv6 and ed25519 handling from get_lspecs_from_extend_info()
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

commit 77ed99b1a79e61146d9e3b9f51aac4fd1c2f5b03 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 26 16:30:24 2017 +1100 Remove buggy IPv6 and ed25519 handling from get_lspecs_from_extend_info() The previous version of this function had the following issues: * it didn't check if the extend_info contained an IPv6 address, * it didn't check if the ed25519 identity key was valid. But we can't add IPv6 support in a bugfix release. Instead, BUG() if the address is an IPv6 address, so we always put IPv4 addresses in link specifiers. And ignore missing ed25519 identifiers, rather than generating an all-zero link specifier. This supports v3 hidden services on IPv4, dual-stack, and IPv6, and v3 single onion services on IPv4 only. Part of 23820, bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. --- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index e1e513c5f..c8c9b4e56 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -533,7 +533,10 @@ retry_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ) } /* Using an extend info object ei, set all possible link specifiers in lspecs. - * IPv4, legacy ID and ed25519 ID are mandatory thus MUST be present in ei. */ + * legacy ID is mandatory thus MUST be present in ei. If IPv4 is not present, + * logs a BUG() warning, and returns an empty smartlist. Clients never make + * direct connections to rendezvous points, so they should always have an + * IPv4 address in ei. */ static void get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) { @@ -542,7 +545,11 @@ get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) tor_assert(ei); tor_assert(lspecs); - /* IPv4 is mandatory. */ + /* We require IPv4, we will add IPv6 support in a later tor version */ + if (BUG(!tor_addr_is_v4(&ei->addr))) { + return; + } + ls = link_specifier_new(); link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_IPV4); link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_addr(ls, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&ei->addr)); @@ -560,15 +567,15 @@ get_lspecs_from_extend_info(const extend_info_t *ei, smartlist_t *lspecs) link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls)); smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); - /* ed25519 ID is mandatory. */ - ls = link_specifier_new(); - link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_ED25519_ID); - memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_ed25519_id(ls), &ei->ed_identity, - link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); - link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); - smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); - - /* XXX: IPv6 is not clearly a thing in extend_info_t? */ + /* ed25519 ID is only included if the node has it. */ + if (!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ei->ed_identity)) { + ls = link_specifier_new(); + link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, LS_ED25519_ID); + memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_ed25519_id(ls), &ei->ed_identity, + link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); + link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(ls)); + smartlist_add(lspecs, ls); + } } /* Using the given descriptor intro point ip, the extend information of the @@ -1053,6 +1060,14 @@ hs_circ_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ, * object which is used to build the content of the cell. */ setup_introduce1_data(ip, rend_circ->build_state->chosen_exit, subcredential, &intro1_data); + /* If we didn't get any link specifiers, it's because our extend info was + * bad. */ + if (BUG(!intro1_data.link_specifiers) || + !smartlist_len(intro1_data.link_specifiers)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to get link specifiers for INTRODUCE1 cell on " + "circuit %u.", TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->n_circ_id); + goto done; + } /* Final step before we encode a cell, we setup the circuit identifier which * will generate both the rendezvous cookie and client keypair for this

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[tor/master] Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Nov '17

02 Nov '17

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tor-commits November 2017