August 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor-messenger-build/master] Bump version to 0.2.0-beta
by sukhbir＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit 497e1fb658377f51f373ced0b69e3f63d1db4dde Author: Sukhbir Singh <sukhbir(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 29 15:57:31 2016 -0400 Bump version to 0.2.0-beta --- ChangeLog | 2 +- rbm.conf | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index c52645b..81f01c2 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Tor Messenger 0.1.0b7 -- +Tor Messenger 0.2.0-beta -- * All Platforms * Use the THUNDERBIRD_45_3_0_RELEASE tag on mozilla-esr45 * Use the THUNDERBIRD_45_3_0_RELEASE tag on comm-esr45 diff --git a/rbm.conf b/rbm.conf index f2084c5..f45309f 100644 --- a/rbm.conf +++ b/rbm.conf @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ output_dir: "out/[% project %]" pkg_type: build var: - tormessenger_version: '0.1.0b6' + tormessenger_version: '0.2.0-beta' build_id: '[% sha256(c("var/build_id_txt")).substr(0, 6) %]' build_id_txt: | [% c("version") %]

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[tor/master] Authorities reject descriptors without ntor keys
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit 33da2abd0571a4c4e21d5841bab1be336bca3a5a Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jul 6 16:50:48 2016 +1000 Authorities reject descriptors without ntor keys Before, they checked for version 0.2.4.18-rc or later, but this would not catch relays without version lines, or buggy or malicious relays missing an ntor key. --- changes/reject-tap | 4 ++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85fffc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/reject-tap @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major bug fixes (circuit building): + - Authorites should not trust the version a relay claims (if any), + instead, they should check specifically for an ntor key. + Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 64ebde6..ef3a305 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -255,6 +255,22 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg, return FP_REJECT; } + /* dirserv_get_status_impl already rejects versions older than 0.2.4.18-rc, + * and onion_curve25519_pkey was introduced in 0.2.4.8-alpha. + * But just in case a relay doesn't provide or lies about its version, or + * doesn't include an ntor key in its descriptor, check that it exists, + * and is non-zero (clients check that it's non-zero before using it). */ + if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey == NULL || + tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + log_fn(severity, LD_DIR, + "Descriptor from router %s is missing an ntor curve25519 onion " + "key.", router_describe(router)); + if (msg) + *msg = "Missing ntor curve25519 onion key. Please upgrade!"; + return FP_REJECT; + } + if (router->cache_info.signing_key_cert) { /* This has an ed25519 identity key. */ if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH ==

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[tor/master] Client & HS make sure every hop in every non-HS path supports ntor
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit febd4ab0e5304a129fb2757949b9a452e7cce162 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jul 7 16:04:26 2016 +1000 Client & HS make sure every hop in every non-HS path supports ntor When a client connects to an intro point not in the client's consensus, or a hidden service connects to a rend point not in the hidden service's consensus, we are stuck with using TAP, because there is no ntor link specifier. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 1 + src/or/onion.c | 4 +- 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index d6c5c85..c309a8d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ circuit_rep_hist_note_result(origin_circuit_t *circ) } while (hop!=circ->cpath); } -/** Return 1 iff at least one node in circ's cpath supports ntor. */ +/** Return 1 iff every node in circ's cpath definitely supports ntor. */ static int circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(const origin_circuit_t *circ) { @@ -373,16 +373,19 @@ circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(const origin_circuit_t *circ) cpath = head = circ->cpath; do { - if (cpath->extend_info && - !tor_mem_is_zero( - (const char*)cpath->extend_info->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, - CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) - return 1; + /* if the extend_info is missing, we can't tell if it supports ntor */ + if (!cpath->extend_info) { + return 0; + } + /* if the key is blank, it definitely doesn't support ntor */ + if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(cpath->extend_info)) { + return 0; + } cpath = cpath->next; } while (cpath != head); - return 0; + return 1; } /** Pick all the entries in our cpath. Stop and return 0 when we're @@ -390,41 +393,61 @@ circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(const origin_circuit_t *circ) static int onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) { - int n_tries = 0; - const int using_ntor = circuits_can_use_ntor(); + int r = 0; -#define MAX_POPULATE_ATTEMPTS 32 + /* onion_extend_cpath assumes these are non-NULL */ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(circ->build_state); - while (1) { - int r = onion_extend_cpath(circ); + while (r == 0) { + r = onion_extend_cpath(circ); if (r < 0) { log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed."); return -1; } - if (r == 1) { - /* This circuit doesn't need/shouldn't be forced to have an ntor hop */ - if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len <= 1 || ! using_ntor) - return 0; + } - /* This circuit has an ntor hop. great! */ - if (circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(circ)) - return 0; + /* The path is complete */ + tor_assert(r == 1); - /* No node in the circuit supports ntor. Have we already tried too many - * times? */ - if (++n_tries >= MAX_POPULATE_ATTEMPTS) - break; + /* Does every node in this path support ntor? */ + int path_supports_ntor = circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(circ); + + /* We would like every path to support ntor, but we have to allow for some + * edge cases. */ + tor_assert(circuit_get_cpath_len(circ)); + if (circuit_can_use_tap(circ)) { + /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to + * rend points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol + * does not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Tor2web clients + * and Single Onion Services. */ + return 0; + } - /* Clear the path and retry */ - circuit_clear_cpath(circ); + if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) == 1) { + /* Allow for bootstrapping: when we're fetching directly from a fallback, + * authority, or bridge, we have no way of knowing its ntor onion key + * before we connect to it. So instead, we try connecting, and end up using + * CREATE_FAST. */ + tor_assert(circ->cpath); + tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); + const node_t *node = node_get_by_id( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + /* If we don't know the node and its descriptor, we must be bootstrapping. + */ + if (!node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) { + return 0; } } - log_warn(LD_CIRC, "I tried for %d times, but I couldn't build a %d-hop " - "circuit with at least one node that supports ntor.", - MAX_POPULATE_ATTEMPTS, - circ->build_state->desired_path_len); - return -1; + if (BUG(!path_supports_ntor)) { + /* If we're building a multi-hop path, and it's not one of the HS or + * bootstrapping exceptions, and it doesn't support ntor, something has + * gone wrong. */ + return -1; + } + + return 0; } /** Create and return a new origin circuit. Initialize its purpose and @@ -806,9 +829,7 @@ circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, const extend_info_t *ei) { /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ - if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, - CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) && - circuits_can_use_ntor()) { + if (extend_info_supports_ntor(ei) && circuits_can_use_ntor()) { *cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; *handshake_type_out = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; return; @@ -2054,15 +2075,18 @@ count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *nodes) if (! node->is_running) // log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i); continue; + /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters + * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate + * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we + * should try to be smarter. */ if (! node->is_valid) // log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i); continue; if (! node_has_descriptor(node)) continue; - /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters - * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate - * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we - * should try to be smarter. */ + /* The node has a descriptor, so we can just check the ntor key directly */ + if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) + continue; ++num; } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); @@ -2351,6 +2375,14 @@ extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect) log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Could not choose valid address for %s", node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname); + /* Every node we connect or extend to must support ntor */ + if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Attempted to create extend_info for a node that does not support " + "ntor: %s", node_describe(node)); + return NULL; + } + if (valid_addr && node->ri) return extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname, node->identity, @@ -2436,3 +2468,13 @@ extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr) return 0; } +/* Does ei have a valid ntor key? */ +int +extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) +{ + tor_assert(ei); + /* Valid ntor keys have at least one non-zero byte */ + return !tor_mem_is_zero( + (const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); +} diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index 7f5fd51..73630b4 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ extend_info_t *extend_info_from_node(const node_t *r, int for_direct_connect); extend_info_t *extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info); void extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info); int extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr); +int extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei); const node_t *build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state); const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state); diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index 5495074..8a566af 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ **/ #include "or.h" +#include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "config.h" #include "cpuworker.h" @@ -438,8 +439,7 @@ onion_skin_create(int type, r = CREATE_FAST_LEN; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: - if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, - CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) + if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node)) return -1; if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest, &node->curve25519_onion_key,

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[tor/master] Clients no longer download descriptors for relays without ntor
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit a76d528bec970e500d3339d9e0f253bded17c338 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jul 6 17:32:57 2016 +1000 Clients no longer download descriptors for relays without ntor --- changes/reject-tap | 2 ++ src/or/networkstatus.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap index 5b79485..77ca63b 100644 --- a/changes/reject-tap +++ b/changes/reject-tap @@ -5,4 +5,6 @@ - Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key. - Authorites no longer trust the version a relay claims (if any), instead, they check specifically for an ntor key. + - Clients avoid downloading a descriptor if the relay version is + too old to support ntor. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index 0dfb8af..61753e5 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -2272,6 +2272,10 @@ client_would_use_router(const routerstatus_t *rs, time_t now, /* We'd drop it immediately for being too old. */ return 0; } + if (rs->version_known && !rs->version_supports_extend2_cells) { + /* We'd ignore it because it doesn't support ntor. */ + return 0; + } return 1; }

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[tor/master] Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit 24e8bb2d83666fddc5ba6c8f90665530807fac51 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jul 6 17:15:48 2016 +1000 Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key --- changes/reject-tap | 8 ++++++-- src/or/router.c | 4 ++++ src/test/test_dir.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap index 85fffc5..5b79485 100644 --- a/changes/reject-tap +++ b/changes/reject-tap @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ o Major bug fixes (circuit building): - - Authorites should not trust the version a relay claims (if any), - instead, they should check specifically for an ntor key. + - Tor authorities, relays, and clients no longer support + circuit-building using TAP. (The hidden service protocol + still uses TAP.) + - Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key. + - Authorites no longer trust the version a relay claims (if any), + instead, they check specifically for an ntor key. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index a671591..8d56f52 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -2753,6 +2753,10 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router, (const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf); + } else { + /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */ + log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key"); + goto err; } /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c index 8889ccc..c1485cc 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) const addr_policy_t *p; time_t now = time(NULL); port_cfg_t orport, dirport; + char cert_buf[256]; (void)arg; pk1 = pk_generate(0); @@ -135,6 +136,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) tor_addr_parse(&r1->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::"); r1->ipv6_orport = 9999; r1->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1); + /* Fake just enough of an ntor key to get by */ + curve25519_keypair_t r1_onion_keypair; + curve25519_keypair_generate(&r1_onion_keypair, 0); + r1->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_memdup(&r1_onion_keypair.pubkey, + sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); r1->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2); r1->bandwidthrate = 1000; r1->bandwidthburst = 5000; @@ -167,11 +173,6 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) &kp2.pubkey, now, 86400, CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); - char cert_buf[256]; - base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), - (const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded, - r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len, - BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); r2->platform = tor_strdup(platform); r2->cache_info.published_on = 5; r2->or_port = 9005; @@ -247,6 +248,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) strlcat(buf2, "hidden-service-dir\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "contact Magri White <magri(a)elsewhere.example.com>\n", sizeof(buf2)); + strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key ", sizeof(buf2)); + base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), + (const char*)r1_onion_keypair.pubkey.public_key, 32, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); + strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "reject *:*\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "tunnelled-dir-server\nrouter-signature\n", sizeof(buf2)); buf[strlen(buf2)] = '\0'; /* Don't compare the sig; it's never the same @@ -276,6 +282,10 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) "router Fred 10.3.2.1 9005 0 0\n" "identity-ed25519\n" "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2)); + base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), + (const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded, + r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "master-key-ed25519 ", sizeof(buf2));

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[tor/master] Clients avoid choosing nodes that can't do ntor
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit 579a80d4ae54ec03fd9b02c4a125b2943770c85d Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jul 7 12:58:47 2016 +1000 Clients avoid choosing nodes that can't do ntor If we know a node's version, and it can't do ntor, consider it not running. If we have a node's descriptor, and it doesn't have a valid ntor key, consider it not running. Refactor these checks so they're consistent between authorities and clients. --- changes/reject-tap | 3 +++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 ++++--- src/or/dirserv.c | 4 +--- src/or/networkstatus.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/routerlist.h | 3 +++ 7 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap index 77ca63b..7580018 100644 --- a/changes/reject-tap +++ b/changes/reject-tap @@ -7,4 +7,7 @@ instead, they check specifically for an ntor key. - Clients avoid downloading a descriptor if the relay version is too old to support ntor. + - Client code ignores nodes without ntor keys: they will not be + selected during circuit-building, or as guards, or as directory + mirrors, or as introduction or rendezvous points. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 13cc166..d6c5c85 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -820,8 +820,8 @@ circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, /** Decide whether to use a TAP or ntor handshake for connecting to ei * directly, and set *handshake_type_out accordingly. Decide whether, - * in extending through node to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or an - * EXTEND cell to do so, and set *cell_type_out and + * in extending through node_prev to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or + * an EXTEND cell to do so, and set *cell_type_out and * *create_cell_type_out accordingly. */ static void circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, @@ -837,7 +837,8 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, if (node_prev && *handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP && (node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node_prev) || - (node_prev->rs && node_prev->rs->version_supports_extend2_cells))) { + (node_prev->rs && + routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 0)))) { *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; } else { diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index ef3a305..ff50ca4 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -260,9 +260,7 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg, * But just in case a relay doesn't provide or lies about its version, or * doesn't include an ntor key in its descriptor, check that it exists, * and is non-zero (clients check that it's non-zero before using it). */ - if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey == NULL || - tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, - CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + if (!routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(router)) { log_fn(severity, LD_DIR, "Descriptor from router %s is missing an ntor curve25519 onion " "key.", router_describe(router)); diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index 61753e5..1223788 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -2272,8 +2272,10 @@ client_would_use_router(const routerstatus_t *rs, time_t now, /* We'd drop it immediately for being too old. */ return 0; } - if (rs->version_known && !rs->version_supports_extend2_cells) { - /* We'd ignore it because it doesn't support ntor. */ + if (!routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(rs, 1)) { + /* We'd ignore it because it doesn't support ntor. + * If we don't know the version, download the descriptor so we can + * check if it supports ntor. */ return 0; } return 1; diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index a49bf03..a888ebe 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -1171,14 +1171,35 @@ node_get_pref_ipv6_dirport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out) } } +/** Return true iff md has a curve25519 onion key. + * Use node_has_curve25519_onion_key() instead of calling this directly. */ +static int +microdesc_has_curve25519_onion_key(const microdesc_t *md) +{ + if (!md) { + return 0; + } + + if (!md->onion_curve25519_pkey) { + return 0; + } + + if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)md->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + /** Return true iff node has a curve25519 onion key. */ int node_has_curve25519_onion_key(const node_t *node) { if (node->ri) - return node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey != NULL; + return routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(node->ri); else if (node->md) - return node->md->onion_curve25519_pkey != NULL; + return microdesc_has_curve25519_onion_key(node->md); else return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 6ea9d8b..0801503 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -2260,6 +2260,11 @@ router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, int allow_invalid, continue; if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, need_guard)) continue; + /* Don't choose nodes if we are certain they can't do ntor */ + if (node->rs && !routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node->rs, 1)) + continue; + if ((node->ri || node->md) && !node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) + continue; /* Choose a node with an OR address that matches the firewall rules */ if (check_reach && !fascist_firewall_allows_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, @@ -5488,6 +5493,45 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const crypto_pk_t *identity_pkey, return r; } +/* Does ri have a valid ntor onion key? + * Valid ntor onion keys exist and have at least one non-zero byte. */ +int +routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(const routerinfo_t *ri) +{ + if (!ri) { + return 0; + } + + if (!ri->onion_curve25519_pkey) { + return 0; + } + + if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)ri->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Is rs running a tor version known to support ntor? + * If allow_unknown_versions is true, return true if the version is unknown. + * Otherwise, return false if the version is unknown. */ +int +routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(const routerstatus_t *rs, + int allow_unknown_versions) +{ + if (!rs) { + return allow_unknown_versions; + } + + if (!rs->version_known) { + return allow_unknown_versions; + } + + return rs->version_supports_extend2_cells; +} + /** Assert that the internal representation of rl is * self-consistent. */ void diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index 01f7644..4041a38 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -205,6 +205,9 @@ int routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const crypto_pk_t *ri, extrainfo_t *ei, signed_descriptor_t *sd, const char **msg); +int routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(const routerinfo_t *ri); +int routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(const routerstatus_t *rs, + int allow_unknown_versions); void routerlist_assert_ok(const routerlist_t *rl); const char *esc_router_info(const routerinfo_t *router);

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[tor/master] Add a stub for rend_service_allow_direct_connection
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit 19816f2f782568722964d35ee132af441a809db3 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Aug 17 17:47:24 2016 +1000 Add a stub for rend_service_allow_direct_connection It always returns 0. It should be replaced with the Single Onion version from #17178 when both are merged. --- src/or/rendservice.c | 8 ++++++++ src/or/rendservice.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index c50de83..2de0463 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -3897,3 +3897,11 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn, return -2; } +/* Stub that should be replaced with the #17178 version of the function + * when merging. */ +int +rend_service_allow_direct_connection(const or_options_t *options) +{ + (void)options; + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h index 4966cb0..1622086 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.h +++ b/src/or/rendservice.h @@ -131,5 +131,7 @@ void directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc, const char *service_id, int seconds_valid); void rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(const rend_data_t *rend_data); +int rend_service_allow_direct_connection(const or_options_t *options); + #endif

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/reject-tap-v6'
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit bbaa7d09a045130560a2f5da579671c5e02c9cd7 Merge: f46ce6e 19816f2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 29 15:02:11 2016 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/reject-tap-v6' changes/reject-tap | 15 ++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 10 --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 230 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 5 ++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 6 +- src/or/config.c | 2 +- src/or/dirserv.c | 14 +++ src/or/networkstatus.c | 6 ++ src/or/nodelist.c | 28 +++++- src/or/onion.c | 4 +- src/or/or.h | 3 - src/or/rendclient.c | 7 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 8 ++ src/or/rendservice.h | 2 + src/or/router.c | 4 + src/or/routerlist.c | 51 ++++++++++- src/or/routerlist.h | 3 + src/test/test_dir.c | 20 +++-- 18 files changed, 325 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/config.c index 31bf818,7478e60..6ab2fd8 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@@ -438,9 -438,9 +438,9 @@@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = V(UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards, BOOL, "1"), V(UseGuardFraction, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), V(UseMicrodescriptors, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), - V(UseNTorHandshake, AUTOBOOL, "1"), + OBSOLETE("UseNTorHandshake"), V(User, STRING, NULL), - V(UserspaceIOCPBuffers, BOOL, "0"), + OBSOLETE("UserspaceIOCPBuffers"), V(AuthDirSharedRandomness, BOOL, "1"), OBSOLETE("V1AuthoritativeDirectory"), OBSOLETE("V2AuthoritativeDirectory"), diff --cc src/or/routerlist.c index 1773f1d,0801503..74b8d1b --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@@ -2260,10 -2260,15 +2260,16 @@@ router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(s continue; if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, need_guard)) continue; - /* Choose a node with an OR address that matches the firewall rules, - * if we are making a direct connection */ + /* Don't choose nodes if we are certain they can't do ntor */ + if (node->rs && !routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node->rs, 1)) + continue; + if ((node->ri || node->md) && !node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) + continue; + /* Choose a node with an OR address that matches the firewall rules */ - if (check_reach && !fascist_firewall_allows_node(node, - FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, - pref_addr)) + if (direct_conn && check_reach && - !fascist_firewall_allows_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, pref_addr)) ++ !fascist_firewall_allows_node(node, ++ FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, ++ pref_addr)) continue; smartlist_add(sl, (void *)node);

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[tor/master] Client & HS ignore UseNTorHandshake, all non-HS handshakes use ntor
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit 10aa913accaf81d72dba6f1bcd9dcc128d9d8703 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Jul 8 14:46:00 2016 +1000 Client & HS ignore UseNTorHandshake, all non-HS handshakes use ntor Rely on onion_populate_cpath to check that we're only using TAP for the rare hidden service cases. Check and log if handshakes only support TAP when they should support ntor. --- changes/reject-tap | 18 ++++---- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 ----- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 4 ++ src/or/config.c | 2 +- src/or/nodelist.c | 3 ++ src/or/or.h | 3 -- src/or/rendclient.c | 7 ++- 8 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap index 7580018..8e616de 100644 --- a/changes/reject-tap +++ b/changes/reject-tap @@ -1,13 +1,15 @@ o Major bug fixes (circuit building): - - Tor authorities, relays, and clients no longer support - circuit-building using TAP. (The hidden service protocol - still uses TAP.) - - Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key. - - Authorites no longer trust the version a relay claims (if any), - instead, they check specifically for an ntor key. + - Tor authorities, relays, and clients only use ntor, except for + rare cases in the hidden service protocol. + - Authorities, relays and clients specifically check that each + descriptor has an ntor key. - Clients avoid downloading a descriptor if the relay version is too old to support ntor. - - Client code ignores nodes without ntor keys: they will not be - selected during circuit-building, or as guards, or as directory + - Client code never chooses nodes without ntor keys: they will not + be selected during circuit-building, or as guards, or as directory mirrors, or as introduction or rendezvous points. + - Circuit-building code assumes that all hops can use ntor, + except for rare hidden service protocol cases. + - Hidden service client to intro point and service to rendezvous point + connections use the TAP key supplied by the protocol. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index b5d6e87..fc021f6 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1468,16 +1468,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if "auto" (recommended) then it is on for all clients that do not set FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto) -[[UseNTorHandshake]] **UseNTorHandshake** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - The "ntor" circuit-creation handshake is faster and (we think) more - secure than the original ("TAP") circuit handshake, but starting to use - it too early might make your client stand out. If this option is 0, your - Tor client won't use the ntor handshake. If it's 1, your Tor client - will use the ntor handshake to extend circuits through servers that - support it. If this option is "auto", then your client - will use the ntor handshake once enough directory authorities recommend - it. (Default: 1) - [[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ + [[PathBiasNoticeRate]] **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ + diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c309a8d..70d1a10 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *routers); static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); -static int circuits_can_use_ntor(void); /** This function tries to get a channel to the specified endpoint, * and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right @@ -780,10 +779,13 @@ should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) tor_assert(circ->cpath); tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); - if (!circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key) - return 1; /* our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */ + if (!circuit_has_usable_onion_key(circ)) { + /* We don't have ntor, and we don't have or can't use TAP, + * so our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */ + return 1; + } if (public_server_mode(options)) { - /* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose. + /* We're a server, and we have a usable onion key. We can choose. * Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are * creating on behalf of others. */ return 0; @@ -808,28 +810,20 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ) && circ->build_state->desired_path_len == DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN; } -/** Return true if the ntor handshake is enabled in the configuration, or if - * it's been set to "auto" in the configuration and it's enabled in the - * consensus. */ -static int -circuits_can_use_ntor(void) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (options->UseNTorHandshake != -1) - return options->UseNTorHandshake; - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "UseNTorHandshake", 0, 0, 1); -} - /** Decide whether to use a TAP or ntor handshake for connecting to ei * directly, and set *cell_type_out and *handshake_type_out - * accordingly. */ + * accordingly. + * Note that TAP handshakes are only used for direct connections: + * - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and + * - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus. + * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */ static void circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, uint16_t *handshake_type_out, const extend_info_t *ei) { - /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ - if (extend_info_supports_ntor(ei) && circuits_can_use_ntor()) { + /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ + if (extend_info_supports_ntor(ei)) { *cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; *handshake_type_out = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; return; @@ -841,9 +835,13 @@ circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, /** Decide whether to use a TAP or ntor handshake for connecting to ei * directly, and set *handshake_type_out accordingly. Decide whether, - * in extending through node_prev to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or - * an EXTEND cell to do so, and set *cell_type_out and - * *create_cell_type_out accordingly. */ + * in extending through node to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or an + * EXTEND cell to do so, and set *cell_type_out and + * *create_cell_type_out accordingly. + * Note that TAP handshakes are only used for extend handshakes: + * - from clients to intro points, and + * - from hidden services to rend points. + * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */ static void circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, uint8_t *create_cell_type_out, @@ -854,18 +852,27 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, uint8_t t; circuit_pick_create_handshake(&t, handshake_type_out, ei); - /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ + /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ + + /* It is an error to extend if there is no previous node. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(node_prev); + /* It is an error for a node with a known version to be so old it does not + * support ntor. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)); + + /* Assume relays without tor versions or routerstatuses support ntor. + * The authorities enforce ntor support, and assuming and failing is better + * than allowing a malicious node to perform a protocol downgrade to TAP. */ if (node_prev && *handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP && (node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node_prev) || - (node_prev->rs && - routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 0)))) { - *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; - *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; - } else { - *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; - *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; - } + (routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)))) { + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; + } else { + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; + } } /** This is the backbone function for building circuits. @@ -2468,6 +2475,15 @@ extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr) return 0; } +/* Does ei have a valid TAP key? */ +int +extend_info_supports_tap(const extend_info_t* ei) +{ + tor_assert(ei); + /* Valid TAP keys are not NULL */ + return ei->onion_key != NULL; +} + /* Does ei have a valid ntor key? */ int extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) @@ -2478,3 +2494,46 @@ extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) (const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); } + +/* Is circuit purpose allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol? + * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because + * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */ +static int +circuit_purpose_can_use_tap_impl(uint8_t purpose) +{ + return (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND || + purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING); +} + +/* Is circ allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol? + * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because + * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */ +int +circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(circ->cpath); + tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); + return (circuit_purpose_can_use_tap_impl(circ->base_.purpose) && + extend_info_supports_tap(circ->cpath->extend_info)); +} + +/* Does circ have an onion key which it's allowed to use? */ +int +circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(circ->cpath); + tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); + return (extend_info_supports_ntor(circ->cpath->extend_info) || + circuit_can_use_tap(circ)); +} + +/* Does ei have an onion key which it would prefer to use? + * Currently, we prefer ntor keys*/ +int +extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei) +{ + tor_assert(ei); + return extend_info_supports_ntor(ei); +} diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index 73630b4..1244601 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -54,7 +54,11 @@ extend_info_t *extend_info_from_node(const node_t *r, int for_direct_connect); extend_info_t *extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info); void extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info); int extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr); +int extend_info_supports_tap(const extend_info_t* ei); int extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei); +int circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ); +int circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ); +int extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei); const node_t *build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state); const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state); diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 55be06c..7478e60 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards, BOOL, "1"), V(UseGuardFraction, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), V(UseMicrodescriptors, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), - V(UseNTorHandshake, AUTOBOOL, "1"), + OBSOLETE("UseNTorHandshake"), V(User, STRING, NULL), V(UserspaceIOCPBuffers, BOOL, "0"), V(AuthDirSharedRandomness, BOOL, "1"), diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index a888ebe..391b682 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -1196,6 +1196,9 @@ microdesc_has_curve25519_onion_key(const microdesc_t *md) int node_has_curve25519_onion_key(const node_t *node) { + if (!node) + return 0; + if (node->ri) return routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(node->ri); else if (node->md) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index af40cf7..e0a30e7 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4456,9 +4456,6 @@ typedef struct { char *TLSECGroup; /**< One of "P256", "P224", or nil for auto */ - /** Autobool: should we use the ntor handshake if we can? */ - int UseNTorHandshake; - /** Fraction: */ double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 64d3673..96f4edd 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -1351,8 +1351,13 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes)); intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i); + if (BUG(!intro->extend_info)) { + /* This should never happen, but it isn't fatal, just try another */ + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; + } /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ - if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { + if (!extend_info_supports_tap(intro->extend_info)) { const node_t *node; extend_info_t *new_extend_info; if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest))

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[tor/master] We no longer need to tag UseNTorHandshake as deprecated, since it is obsolete
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Aug '16

29 Aug '16

commit e3bf8854c81f46470d21f5e44cfa51b16e1d260b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 29 15:03:55 2016 -0400 We no longer need to tag UseNTorHandshake as deprecated, since it is obsolete --- src/or/config.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 6ab2fd8..98b3270 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -613,7 +613,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { "to accidentally lose your anonymity by leaking DNS information" }, { "TLSECGroup", "The default is a nice secure choice; the other option " "is less secure." }, - { "UseNTorHandshake", "The ntor handshake should always be used." }, { "ControlListenAddress", "Use ControlPort instead." }, { "DirListenAddress", "Use DirPort instead, possibly with the " "NoAdvertise sub-option" },

1 0