June 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.8] Resolve bug18812 by logging fallback key changes at info level
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit 608c12baaf820c33246052e23fd0c65459ed1c5c Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 28 14:15:11 2016 +1000 Resolve bug18812 by logging fallback key changes at info level --- changes/bug18812 | 4 ++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug18812 b/changes/bug18812 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..793e110 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18812 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (bootstrap): + - When a fallback changes its fingerprint from the hard-coded + fingerprint, log a less severe, more explanatory log message. + Fixes bug 18812; bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha. Patch by teor. diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 19a1718..5c4461f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include "geoip.h" #include "main.h" #include "link_handshake.h" +#include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "reasons.h" @@ -1706,6 +1707,9 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, * - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match; * On clients: * - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning; + * - if we don't have updated relay fingerprints from a recent consensus, and + * a fallback directory mirror's hard-coded fingerprint has changed, log an + * info explaining that we will try another fallback. * * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned. * @@ -1740,19 +1744,43 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), (const char*)peer_id, DIGEST_LEN); base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + const int using_hardcoded_fingerprints = + !networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time(NULL), + usable_consensus_flavor()); + const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir( + conn->identity_digest); + const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir( + conn->identity_digest); int severity; + const char *extra_log = ""; if (server_mode(options)) { severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN; } else { - /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */ - severity = LOG_WARN; + if (using_hardcoded_fingerprints) { + /* We need to do the checks in this order, because the list of + * fallbacks includes the list of authorities */ + if (is_authority_fingerprint) { + severity = LOG_WARN; + } else if (is_fallback_fingerprint) { + /* we expect a small number of fallbacks to change from their + * hard-coded fingerprints over the life of a release */ + severity = LOG_INFO; + extra_log = " Tor will try a different fallback."; + } else { + /* it's a bridge, it's either a misconfiguration, or unexpected */ + severity = LOG_WARN; + } + } else { + /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */ + severity = LOG_WARN; + } } log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not " - "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.", - conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port, expected, seen); + "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.%s", + conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port, expected, seen, extra_log); entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1, time(NULL)); control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Refactor connection_or_client_learned_peer_id for bug18812
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit 14b1c7a66e6d186a40da99da773a692ef48b603c Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 28 14:12:18 2016 +1000 Refactor connection_or_client_learned_peer_id for bug18812 No behavioural change. Also clarify some comments. --- src/or/connection_or.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index ea49bdb..19a1718 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1698,9 +1698,14 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, * or renegotiation. For v3 handshakes, this is right after we get a * certificate chain in a CERTS cell. * - * If we want any particular ID before, record the one we got. + * If we did not know the ID before, record the one we got. * - * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get it, log a warning and return -1. + * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get the one we expected, log a message + * and return -1. + * On relays: + * - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match; + * On clients: + * - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning; * * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned. * @@ -1711,7 +1716,6 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, const uint8_t *peer_id) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN; if (tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) { connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, (const char*)peer_id); @@ -1736,6 +1740,15 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), (const char*)peer_id, DIGEST_LEN); base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + int severity; + + if (server_mode(options)) { + severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN; + } else { + /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */ + severity = LOG_WARN; + } + log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not " "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.",

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' into release-0.2.8
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit 87ea2b6655d43ab95becf681e26a2092db17161e Merge: 5b57f88 bc9a0f8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 28 11:22:39 2016 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' into release-0.2.8 changes/bug18812 | 4 ++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' into release-0.2.8
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit 5b57f88f6097e92a052cd8d381587cee1dea6006 Merge: cc6fcbd 0116eae Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jun 27 13:20:57 2016 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' into release-0.2.8 changes/bug19499 | 4 ++++ src/common/crypto.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ src/tools/tor-checkkey.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Bug19499: Fix GCC warnings when building against bleeding edge OpenSSL.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit 0116eae59a35e4303ca179d6b0fb0302a83e87a1 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Fri Jun 24 22:20:41 2016 +0000 Bug19499: Fix GCC warnings when building against bleeding edge OpenSSL. The previous version of the new accessors didn't specify const but it was changed in master. --- changes/bug19499 | 4 ++++ src/common/crypto.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ src/tools/tor-checkkey.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug19499 b/changes/bug19499 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5db49bb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug19499 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (build): + - Tor now again builds with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development branch + (tested against 1.1.0-pre6-dev). + diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 8d990d3..2b96324 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ struct crypto_dh_t { }; static int setup_openssl_threading(void); -static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn); +static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn); /** Return the number of bytes added by padding method <b>padding</b>. */ @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_ok(const crypto_pk_t *k) if (!k || !k->key) return 0; - BIGNUM *p, *q; + const BIGNUM *p, *q; RSA_get0_factors(k->key, &p, &q); return p != NULL; /* XXX/yawning: Should we check q? */ #else @@ -890,10 +890,10 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env) tor_assert(env); tor_assert(env->key); - BIGNUM *e; + const BIGNUM *e; #ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - BIGNUM *n, *d; + const BIGNUM *n, *d; RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d); #else e = env->key->e; @@ -919,11 +919,11 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b) if (an_argument_is_null) return result; - BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e; - BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e; + const BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e; + const BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e; #ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d; + const BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d; RSA_get0_key(a->key, &a_n, &a_e, &a_d); RSA_get0_key(b->key, &b_n, &b_e, &b_d); #else @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env) /* It's so stupid that there's no other way to check that n is valid * before calling RSA_bits(). */ - BIGNUM *n, *e, *d; + const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d; RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d); tor_assert(n != NULL); @@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) * recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure. */ - BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key); if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) { log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" @@ -2451,10 +2451,10 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) int bytes; tor_assert(dh); - BIGNUM *dh_pub; + const BIGNUM *dh_pub; #ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - BIGNUM *dh_priv; + const BIGNUM *dh_priv; DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); #else dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; @@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) * See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips. */ static int -tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn) +tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn) { BIGNUM *x; char *s; diff --git a/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c b/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c index 8e957c2..3e16fd0 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c @@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ main(int c, char **v) } else { rsa = crypto_pk_get_rsa_(env); - BIGNUM *rsa_n; + const BIGNUM *rsa_n; #ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d; + const BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); #else rsa_n = rsa->n;

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Make it clear that fallbacks include authorities
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit 812fd416eff4fa7326cbd4bd46ff0f5801b9034c Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 28 14:14:04 2016 +1000 Make it clear that fallbacks include authorities Comment-only change --- src/or/routerlist.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index d49814f..d7faf78 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1384,6 +1384,7 @@ router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(const char *digest) * key hashes to <b>digest</b>, or NULL if no such fallback is in the list of * fallback_dir_servers. (fallback_dir_servers is affected by the FallbackDir * and UseDefaultFallbackDirs torrc options.) + * The list of fallback directories includes the list of authorities. */ dir_server_t * router_get_fallback_dirserver_by_digest(const char *digest) @@ -1407,6 +1408,7 @@ router_get_fallback_dirserver_by_digest(const char *digest) * or 0 if no such fallback is in the list of fallback_dir_servers. * (fallback_dir_servers is affected by the FallbackDir and * UseDefaultFallbackDirs torrc options.) + * The list of fallback directories includes the list of authorities. */ int router_digest_is_fallback_dir(const char *digest)

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit d793a988cd9f3dca6b388857102ce7aabf7bbb9d Merge: 4e2a7cd bc9a0f8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 28 11:22:48 2016 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' changes/bug18812 | 4 ++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.8] whitespace fixes
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit bc9a0f82b3436dad2aa09c1b68c0c230751d48dd Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 28 11:14:42 2016 -0400 whitespace fixes --- src/or/connection_or.c | 2 +- src/or/routerlist.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 5c4461f..9730e1a 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1750,7 +1750,7 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir( conn->identity_digest); const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir( - conn->identity_digest); + conn->identity_digest); int severity; const char *extra_log = ""; diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 432c64d..49d7680 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ router_get_fallback_dirserver_by_digest(const char *digest) * or 0 if no such fallback is in the list of fallback_dir_servers. * (fallback_dir_servers is affected by the FallbackDir and * UseDefaultFallbackDirs torrc options.) - * The list of fallback directories includes the list of authorities. + * The list of fallback directories includes the list of authorities. */ int router_digest_is_fallback_dir(const char *digest)

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug18812' into maint-0.2.8
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit f87aa4555d06b2707e21df39d1bc7f14161a2cb4 Merge: 0116eae 608c12b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 28 11:12:51 2016 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug18812' into maint-0.2.8 changes/bug18812 | 4 ++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

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[translation/torbutton-abouttbupdatedtd_completed] Update translations for torbutton-abouttbupdatedtd_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 28 Jun '16

28 Jun '16

commit c4bc282475147bc3cd42c88288e571235c43ad52 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 28 15:18:45 2016 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-abouttbupdatedtd_completed --- eu/abouttbupdate.dtd | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/eu/abouttbupdate.dtd b/eu/abouttbupdate.dtd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f2178b --- /dev/null +++ b/eu/abouttbupdate.dtd @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +<!ENTITY aboutTBUpdate.title "Tor nabigatzailearen eguneraketa"> +<!ENTITY aboutTBUpdate.updated "Tor nabigatzailea eguneratu egin da."> +<!ENTITY aboutTBUpdate.linkPrefix "Eguneraketa honen inguruko azken informazioa lortzeko,"> +<!ENTITY aboutTBUpdate.linkLabel "ikusi ezazu gure webgunea"> +<!ENTITY aboutTBUpdate.linkSuffix "."> +<!ENTITY aboutTBUpdate.changeLogHeading "Aldaketen zerrenda:">

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