May 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Do not leak the 'tag' when trying to read a truncated ed25519 key file
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit ec81329339429182169c27f05c35e86ae9325267 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 12:52:29 2016 -0400 Do not leak the 'tag' when trying to read a truncated ed25519 key file Fix for bug 18956. --- changes/bug18956 | 5 +++++ src/common/crypto_ed25519.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug18956 b/changes/bug18956 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cf10e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18956 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (memory leaks): + - Fix a small, uncommon memory leak that could occur when reading a + truncated ed25519 key file. Fixes bug 18956; bugfix on 0.2.6.1-alpha. + + diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c index 6546115..c687a1b 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c @@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out, errno = EINVAL; } + tor_free(*tag_out); return -1; } @@ -472,6 +473,7 @@ ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out, errno = EINVAL; } + tor_free(*tag_out); return -1; }

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[tor/master] Mark some unreachable lines in crypto.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit c3953348794f1689d3e2fe595f5d0045cb6c1a11 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 13:47:33 2016 -0400 Mark some unreachable lines in crypto.c --- src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 56920c5..37477c5 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2639,6 +2639,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) } while (ret == -1 && ((errno == EINTR) ||(errno == EAGAIN))); if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(ret == -1)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START we can't actually make the syscall fail in testing. */ tor_assert(errno != EAGAIN); tor_assert(errno != EINTR); @@ -2646,6 +2647,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Can't get entropy from getrandom()."); getrandom_works = 0; /* Don't bother trying again. */ return -1; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } tor_assert(ret == (long)out_len); @@ -2699,10 +2701,13 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_fallback(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) n = read_all(fd, (char*)out, out_len, 0); close(fd); if (n != out_len) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * We can't make /dev/foorandom actually fail. */ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error reading from entropy source (read only %lu bytes).", (unsigned long)n); return -1; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } return 0; @@ -2815,7 +2820,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void) * functions. If one succeeds, we'll accept the RNG as seeded. */ rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll(); if (rand_poll_ok == 0) - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed."); + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed."); // LCOV_EXCL_LINE load_entropy_ok = !crypto_strongest_rand_raw(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (load_entropy_ok) {

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[tor/master] Test coverage on ed25519 load/store functions.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 148f0004e1c2092c856d8872b68dd76b048aa3b1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 13:02:27 2016 -0400 Test coverage on ed25519 load/store functions. --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 17ea0ae..b18f8ed 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -2487,6 +2487,54 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_fuzz_donna(void *arg) } static void +test_crypto_ed25519_storage(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = NULL; + ed25519_public_key_t pub; + ed25519_secret_key_t sec; + char *fname_1 = tor_strdup(get_fname("ed_seckey_1")); + char *fname_2 = tor_strdup(get_fname("ed_pubkey_2")); + char *contents = NULL; + char *tag = NULL; + + keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t)); + tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ,ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, 0)); + tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, + ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(&keypair->seckey, fname_1, "foo")); + tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, + ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, fname_2, "bar")); + + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pub, &tag, fname_1)); + tt_ptr_op(tag, OP_EQ, NULL); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&sec, &tag, fname_2)); + tt_ptr_op(tag, OP_EQ, NULL); + + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pub, &tag, fname_2)); + tt_str_op(tag, OP_EQ, "bar"); + tor_free(tag); + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&sec, &tag, fname_1)); + tt_str_op(tag, OP_EQ, "foo"); + tor_free(tag); + + /* whitebox test: truncated keys. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, truncate(fname_1, 40)); + tt_int_op(0, ==, truncate(fname_2, 40)); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pub, &tag, fname_2)); + tt_ptr_op(tag, OP_EQ, NULL); + tor_free(tag); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&sec, &tag, fname_1)); + tt_ptr_op(tag, OP_EQ, NULL); + + done: + tor_free(fname_1); + tor_free(fname_2); + tor_free(contents); + tor_free(tag); + ed25519_keypair_free(keypair); +} + +static void test_crypto_siphash(void *arg) { /* From the reference implementation, taking @@ -2738,6 +2786,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { ED25519_TEST(blinding, 0), ED25519_TEST(testvectors, 0), ED25519_TEST(fuzz_donna, TT_FORK), + { "ed25519_storage", test_crypto_ed25519_storage, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "siphash", test_crypto_siphash, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "failure_modes", test_crypto_failure_modes, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES

1 0

[tor/master] Treat absent argument to crypto_log_errors as a bug.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 98a590577a1064e2d0134a291c76a62fe6469a3c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 14:16:14 2016 -0400 Treat absent argument to crypto_log_errors as a bug. --- src/common/crypto.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 71cab24..24a9590 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -171,13 +171,9 @@ crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing) if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; if (!func) func = "(null)"; - if (doing) { - tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)", + if (BUG(!doing)) doing = "(null)"; + tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)", doing, msg, lib, func); - } else { - tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error: %s (in %s:%s)", - msg, lib, func); - } } }

1 0

[tor/master] Slight improvements to DH coverage.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit d88656ec066f9fe856230f95ff76bf97f31ed46e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 14:15:00 2016 -0400 Slight improvements to DH coverage. --- src/common/crypto.c | 9 +++++++++ src/test/test_crypto.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 37477c5..71cab24 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2269,10 +2269,13 @@ crypto_dh_new(int dh_type) return res; err: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * This error condition is only reached when an allocation fails */ crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "creating DH object"); if (res->dh) DH_free(res->dh); /* frees p and g too */ tor_free(res); return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } /** Return a copy of <b>dh</b>, sharing its internal state. */ @@ -2304,10 +2307,15 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) { again: if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * To test this we would need some way to tell openssl to break DH. */ crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key"); return -1; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * If this happens, then openssl's DH implementation is busted. */ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" "the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again."); /* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */ @@ -2315,6 +2323,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) BN_clear_free(dh->dh->priv_key); dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL; goto again; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } return 0; } diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 1437652..e89b94e 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static void test_crypto_dh(void *arg) { crypto_dh_t *dh1 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); + crypto_dh_t *dh1_dup = NULL; crypto_dh_t *dh2 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); char p1[DH_BYTES]; char p2[DH_BYTES]; @@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES); memset(p2, 0, DH_BYTES); tt_mem_op(p1,OP_EQ, p2, DH_BYTES); + + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, 6)); /* too short */ + tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES)); tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH_BYTES); tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh2, p2, DH_BYTES)); @@ -54,6 +58,12 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_int_op(s1len,OP_EQ, s2len); tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); + + /* test dh_dup; make sure it works the same. */ + dh1_dup = crypto_dh_dup(dh1); + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); + { /* XXXX Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught, * Check 0, 1, N-1, >= N, etc. @@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) done: crypto_dh_free(dh1); crypto_dh_free(dh2); + crypto_dh_free(dh1_dup); } static void

1 0

[tor/master] Cover all our DH code, and/or mark it unreachable.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 365d0fcc6db6a628c0ff118f2d5b03cebdcd4734 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 4 09:43:47 2016 -0400 Cover all our DH code, and/or mark it unreachable. --- src/common/crypto.c | 15 ++++++++++----- src/test/test_crypto.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 24a9590..9551435 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2165,9 +2165,14 @@ crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void) int r; /* If the space is occupied, free the previous TLS DH prime */ - if (dh_param_p_tls) { + if (BUG(dh_param_p_tls)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * + * We shouldn't be calling this twice. + */ BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); dh_param_p_tls = NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } tls_prime = BN_new(); @@ -2199,8 +2204,8 @@ init_dh_param(void) { BIGNUM *circuit_dh_prime; int r; - if (dh_param_p && dh_param_g) - return; + if (BUG(dh_param_p && dh_param_g)) + return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE This function isn't supposed to be called twice. circuit_dh_prime = BN_new(); tor_assert(circuit_dh_prime); @@ -2366,8 +2371,8 @@ tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn) tor_assert(bn); x = BN_new(); tor_assert(x); - if (!dh_param_p) - init_dh_param(); + if (BUG(!dh_param_p)) + init_dh_param(); //LCOV_EXCL_LINE we already checked whether we did this. BN_set_word(x, 1); if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) { log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2."); diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index dd9a376..e981eac 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_int_op(s1len,OP_EQ, s2len); tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); - /* test dh_dup; make sure it works the same. */ dh1_dup = crypto_dh_dup(dh1); s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); @@ -132,6 +131,19 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); } + { + /* provoke an error in the openssl DH_compute_key function; make sure we + * survive. */ + tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES)); + + crypto_dh_free(dh2); + dh2= crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); /* no private key set */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2, + p1, DH_BYTES, + s1, 50); + tt_int_op(s1len, OP_EQ, -1); + } + done: crypto_dh_free(dh1); crypto_dh_free(dh2);

1 0

[tor/master] At long last, unit tests for degenerate DH public keys.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 94b34d1be6f20c967736ba858d6e765fd369c4e8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 17:08:56 2016 -0400 At long last, unit tests for degenerate DH public keys. Apparently, we detect and reject them correctly. Aren't you glad? --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index e89b94e..dd9a376 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -65,9 +65,71 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); { - /* XXXX Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught, - * Check 0, 1, N-1, >= N, etc. - */ + /* Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught. */ + + /* 1 and 0 should both fail. */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x01", 1, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x00", 1, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES); /* 0 with padding. */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 1; /* 1 with padding*/ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + /* 2 is okay, though weird. */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x02", 1, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(50, OP_EQ, s1len); + + const char P[] = + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" + "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" + "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9" + "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6" + "49286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"; + + /* p-1, p, and so on are not okay. */ + base16_decode(p1, sizeof(p1), P, strlen(P)); + + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xFE; /* p-1 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xFD; /* p-2 works fine */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(50, OP_EQ, s1len); + + const char P_plus_one[] = + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" + "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" + "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9" + "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6" + "49286651ECE653820000000000000000"; + + base16_decode(p1, sizeof(p1), P_plus_one, strlen(P_plus_one)); + + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0x01; /* p+2 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xff; /* p+256 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + memset(p1, 0xff, sizeof(DH_BYTES)), /* 2^1024-1 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); } done:

1 0

[tor/master] Refactor digest allocation backend code
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit b688945dfbc8b0a27f510db259ec7c1aaa4bfb34 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 4 09:53:10 2016 -0400 Refactor digest allocation backend code I'm doing this to simplify crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix, and make it better covered by our tests. --- src/common/crypto.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 9551435..8fdcfc1 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -1786,16 +1786,46 @@ crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(digest_algorithm_t alg) #undef STRUCT_FIELD_SIZE } +/** + * Internal function: create and return a new digest object for 'algorithm'. + * Does not typecheck the algorithm. + */ +static crypto_digest_t * +crypto_digest_new_internal(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) +{ + crypto_digest_t *r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(algorithm)); + r->algorithm = algorithm; + + switch (algorithm) + { + case DIGEST_SHA1: + SHA1_Init(&r->d.sha1); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA256: + SHA256_Init(&r->d.sha2); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA512: + SHA512_Init(&r->d.sha512); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA3_256: + keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 256); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA3_512: + keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 512); + break; + default: + tor_assert_unreached(); + } + + return r; +} + /** Allocate and return a new digest object to compute SHA1 digests. */ crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest_new(void) { - crypto_digest_t *r; - r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(DIGEST_SHA1)); - SHA1_Init(&r->d.sha1); - r->algorithm = DIGEST_SHA1; - return r; + return crypto_digest_new_internal(DIGEST_SHA1); } /** Allocate and return a new digest object to compute 256-bit digests @@ -1803,15 +1833,8 @@ crypto_digest_new(void) crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest256_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) { - crypto_digest_t *r; tor_assert(algorithm == DIGEST_SHA256 || algorithm == DIGEST_SHA3_256); - r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(algorithm)); - if (algorithm == DIGEST_SHA256) - SHA256_Init(&r->d.sha2); - else - keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 256); - r->algorithm = algorithm; - return r; + return crypto_digest_new_internal(algorithm); } /** Allocate and return a new digest object to compute 512-bit digests @@ -1819,15 +1842,8 @@ crypto_digest256_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest512_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) { - crypto_digest_t *r; tor_assert(algorithm == DIGEST_SHA512 || algorithm == DIGEST_SHA3_512); - r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(algorithm)); - if (algorithm == DIGEST_SHA512) - SHA512_Init(&r->d.sha512); - else - keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 512); - r->algorithm = algorithm; - return r; + return crypto_digest_new_internal(algorithm); } /** Deallocate a digest object. @@ -1977,27 +1993,7 @@ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(char *digest_out, size_t len_out, const char *append, digest_algorithm_t alg) { - crypto_digest_t *d = NULL; - switch (alg) { - case DIGEST_SHA1: - d = crypto_digest_new(); - break; - case DIGEST_SHA256: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ - case DIGEST_SHA3_256: - d = crypto_digest256_new(alg); - break; - case DIGEST_SHA512: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ - case DIGEST_SHA3_512: - d = crypto_digest512_new(alg); - break; - default: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called with unknown algorithm %d", alg); - /* If fragile_assert is not enabled, wipe output and return - * without running any calculations */ - memwipe(digest_out, 0xff, len_out); - tor_fragile_assert(); - goto free; - } + crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest_new_internal(alg); if (prepend) crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, prepend, strlen(prepend)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lst, const char *, cp, @@ -2005,8 +2001,6 @@ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(char *digest_out, size_t len_out, if (append) crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, append, strlen(append)); crypto_digest_get_digest(d, digest_out, len_out); - - free: crypto_digest_free(d); }

1 0

[tor/master] Mark even more crypto lines (the fragile_assert ones) as unreachable
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 62c5a1fa45efcb52eb3ce9d0cce04e31490a5468 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 4 09:59:24 2016 -0400 Mark even more crypto lines (the fragile_assert ones) as unreachable --- src/common/crypto.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 8fdcfc1..fb5dd06 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -938,6 +938,10 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) new_key = RSAPublicKey_dup(env->key); } if (!new_key) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * + * We can't cause RSA*Key_dup() to fail, so we can't really test this. + */ log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Unable to duplicate a %s key: openssl failed.", privatekey?"private":"public"); crypto_log_errors(LOG_ERR, @@ -945,6 +949,7 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) "Duplicating a public key"); tor_fragile_assert(); return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } return crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(new_key); @@ -1695,8 +1700,10 @@ crypto_digest_algorithm_get_name(digest_algorithm_t alg) case DIGEST_SHA3_512: return "sha3-512"; default: + // LCOV_EXCL_START tor_fragile_assert(); return "??unknown_digest??"; + // LCOV_EXCL_STOP } } @@ -1886,8 +1893,10 @@ crypto_digest_add_bytes(crypto_digest_t *digest, const char *data, keccak_digest_update(&digest->d.sha3, (const uint8_t *)data, len); break; default: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ tor_fragile_assert(); break; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } } @@ -1929,10 +1938,10 @@ crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, //LCOV_EXCL_START case DIGEST_SHA3_256: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ case DIGEST_SHA3_512: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handling unexpected algorithm %d", digest->algorithm); - tor_assert(0); /* This is fatal, because it should never happen. */ default: - tor_assert(0); /* Unreachable. */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handling unexpected algorithm %d", digest->algorithm); + /* This is fatal, because it should never happen. */ + tor_assert_unreached(); break; //LCOV_EXCL_STOP }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'crypto_unit_tests_v2_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 060e0d0a7510564bf86a79612c219b0205028e9d Merge: 7bc9d1e 62c5a1f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 16 08:26:11 2016 -0400 Merge branch 'crypto_unit_tests_v2_squashed' changes/bug18956 | 5 + src/common/crypto.c | 159 ++++++++----- src/common/crypto.h | 1 + src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 9 +- src/common/crypto_ed25519.c | 9 +- src/common/crypto_pwbox.c | 28 ++- src/common/crypto_s2k.c | 2 +- src/test/test_crypto.c | 525 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/test/test_ntor_cl.c | 5 +- 9 files changed, 663 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)

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