February 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Merge branch 'check_log_mutex_uncherrypicked'
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit fed8c5199a9fbc91a7476323c145c59e9e30e30c Merge: 5a164d5 a7a98e2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 13:41:31 2016 -0500 Merge branch 'check_log_mutex_uncherrypicked' changes/assert_event_base | 5 +++++ src/common/compat_libevent.c | 1 + src/common/log.c | 13 ++++++++++--- src/test/testing_common.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --cc src/test/testing_common.c index 9c7fca0,fc4e05c..da9969d --- a/src/test/testing_common.c +++ b/src/test/testing_common.c @@@ -238,13 -241,7 +241,12 @@@ main(int c, const char **v update_approx_time(time(NULL)); options = options_new(); tor_threads_init(); + + struct tor_libevent_cfg cfg; + memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); + tor_libevent_initialize(&cfg); + control_initialize_event_queue(); - init_logging(1); configure_backtrace_handler(get_version()); for (i_out = i = 1; i < c; ++i) {

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[tor/master] Add another admonishment to WritingTests.md
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 5a164d50bbfd66ef51408794d03c8db8071ddabb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 13:17:21 2016 -0500 Add another admonishment to WritingTests.md --- doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md b/doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md index 42fba2d..4e98d3d 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md +++ b/doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md @@ -206,6 +206,48 @@ For example, `crypto_curve25519.h` contains: The `crypto_curve25519.c` file and the `test_crypto.c` file both define `CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE`, so they can see this declaration. +### STOP! Does this test really test? + +When writing tests, it's not enough to just generate coverage on all the +lines of the code that you're testing: It's important to make sure that +the test _really tests_ the code. + +For example, here is a _bad_ test for the unlink() function (which is +supposed to remove a file). + + static void + test_unlink_badly(void *arg) + { + (void) arg; + int r; + + const char *fname = get_fname("tmpfile"); + + /* If the file isn't there, unlink returns -1 and sets ENOENT */ + r = unlink(fname); + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, -1); + tt_int_op(errno, OP_EQ, ENOENT); + + /* If the file DOES exist, unlink returns 0. */ + write_str_to_file(fname, "hello world", 0); + r = unlink(fnme); + tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + tor_free(contents); + } + + +This test might get very high coverage on unlink(). So why is it a +bad test? Because it doesn't check that unlink() *actually removes the +named file*! + +Remember, the purpose of a test is to succeed if the code does what +it's supposed to do, and fail otherwise. Try to design your tests so +that they check for the code's intended and documented functionality +as much as possible. + + ### Mock functions for testing in isolation Often we want to test that a function works right, but the function to

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[translation/tor_animation_completed] Update translations for tor_animation_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 3804c2f89578c92563545bad82c97af96a002cc2 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 18:16:07 2016 +0000 Update translations for tor_animation_completed --- tl_PH.srt | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/tl_PH.srt b/tl_PH.srt index 5910259..61d0d6d 100644 --- a/tl_PH.srt +++ b/tl_PH.srt @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ mga lugar na pinupuntahan natin, at mga binabasa natin. 5 00:00:13,280 --> 00:00:14,640 -Hayaan mo akong ipaliwanag ito sa iyo ng mas mabuti. +Hayaan mong ipaliwanag ko ito sa iyo ng mas mabuti. 6 00:00:14,920 --> 00:00:17,740 @@ -38,106 +38,106 @@ ang browser na ginagamit mo para mag surf sa web, at kung ano-ano pa tungkol sa iyo at sobra-sobra pa tungkol sa iyo. 10 -00:00:29,620 --> 00:00:32,460 +00:00:29,200 --> 00:00:31,500 na hindi mo naman talagang sadyang ibahagi sa mga taong hindi mo kilala 11 -00:00:32,920 --> 00:00:35,840 +00:00:31,700 --> 00:00:34,000 - na maaring gamitin ang impormasyon mo na kanila'y pakikinabangan. 12 -00:00:36,220 --> 00:00:38,120 -Pero lahat ng iyon ay maiiwasan sa pamamagitan ng Tor! +00:00:34,500 --> 00:00:37,000 +Maliban kung gumagamit ka ng Tor! 13 -00:00:39,140 --> 00:00:42,840 +00:00:37,140 --> 00:00:40,840 Pinoprotektahan ng Tor Browser ang ating palihim (privacy) at pagkakakilanlan (identity) sa Internet. 14 -00:00:43,560 --> 00:00:46,760 +00:00:41,560 --> 00:00:44,760 Pinapatibay at sinisigurado ng Tor ang iyong koneksyon sa pamamagitan ng tatlong patong ng encryption 15 -00:00:46,940 --> 00:00:51,760 +00:00:44,940 --> 00:00:49,760 at idinadaan ito sa tatlong kinusang-loob na mga servers sa iba't-ibang sulok ng mundo, 16 -00:00:52,280 --> 00:00:55,520 +00:00:50,280 --> 00:00:53,520 para magkaroon tayong nang paliham na komunikasyon sa Internet. 17 -00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:00,280 +00:00:56,560 --> 00:00:58,280 Pinoprotektahan din ng Tor ang ating mga data 18 -00:01:00,400 --> 00:01:03,900 +00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:01,900 laban sa patamaang-gobyerno (government-targeted) o patamaang-korporasyon (corporate-targeted) at pang-masang pamamahala (mass surveillance). 19 -00:01:04,880 --> 00:01:09,340 +00:01:02,880 --> 00:01:07,340 Baka nakatira ka sa isang bansa na strikto sa kalayaan na sinusubukang kontrolin at imahala (surveil) ang Internet. 20 -00:01:09,900 --> 00:01:13,800 +00:01:07,900 --> 00:01:11,800 O kaya nama'y ayaw mong pakinabangan ng malalaking korporasyon ang iyong personal na impormasyon. 21 -00:01:14,880 --> 00:01:17,640 +00:01:12,880 --> 00:01:15,640 Ginagawa ng Tor na magkakamukha ang mga gumagamit nito 22 -00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:20,800 +00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:18,800 na nililito ang sinumang namamahala o nanonood, at sa pamamagitan nito ikaw ay nagiging anonimo o hindi nakikilala. 23 -00:01:21,500 --> 00:01:24,980 +00:01:19,500 --> 00:01:22,980 Kaya, kapag mas maraming taong gumagamit ng Tor network, mas lumalakas ito 24 -00:01:25,140 --> 00:01:29,800 +00:01:23,140 --> 00:01:27,800 sapagkat mas madaling magtago sa pangkat o grupo ng tao na magkakamukha. 25 -00:01:30,700 --> 00:01:33,240 +00:01:28,700 --> 00:01:31,240 Maaring mong iwasan o sikutan ang pagsensura ng hindi pagaalala 26 -00:01:33,400 --> 00:01:36,100 +00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:34,100 tungkol sa pagaalam ng sensura kung ano ang ginagawa mo sa Internet. 27 -00:01:38,540 --> 00:01:41,440 +00:01:36,540 --> 00:01:39,440 Hindi ka susundan ng mga ads kahit saan ng ilang buwan, 28 -00:01:41,640 --> 00:01:43,300 +00:01:39,640 --> 00:01:41,300 simula nung una kang pumindot sa isang produkto. 29 -00:01:45,880 --> 00:01:49,380 +00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:47,380 Sa pagamit ng Tor, hindi ka man lang malaman ng mga sites na binisita mo kung sino ka, 30 -00:01:49,540 --> 00:01:51,760 +00:01:47,540 --> 00:01:49,760 kung saang parte ng mundo mo sila binisita, 31 -00:01:51,920 --> 00:01:53,920 +00:01:49,920 --> 00:01:51,920 kung hindi ka mag lologin at magkukusang magsabi. 32 -00:01:56,200 --> 00:01:57,840 +00:01:54,200 --> 00:01:55,840 Sa pag-download at paggamit ng Tor, 33 -00:01:58,200 --> 00:02:00,560 +00:01:56,200 --> 00:01:58,560 maproprotektahan mo din ang pagiging anonimo ng mga nangangailangang tao, 34 -00:02:00,880 --> 00:02:03,640 +00:01:58,880 --> 00:02:01,640 tulad ng activists, journalists at bloggers. 35 -00:02:04,000 --> 00:02:09,000 +00:02:02,000 --> 00:02:07,000 Kaya'y i-download mo na ang Tor at gamitin! O kaya'y magpatakbo ng relay!

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[translation/tor_animation] Update translations for tor_animation
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit e360afe2965e119c99018e9431be8756c6994979 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 18:16:00 2016 +0000 Update translations for tor_animation --- tl_PH.srt | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/tl_PH.srt b/tl_PH.srt index 5910259..61d0d6d 100644 --- a/tl_PH.srt +++ b/tl_PH.srt @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ mga lugar na pinupuntahan natin, at mga binabasa natin. 5 00:00:13,280 --> 00:00:14,640 -Hayaan mo akong ipaliwanag ito sa iyo ng mas mabuti. +Hayaan mong ipaliwanag ko ito sa iyo ng mas mabuti. 6 00:00:14,920 --> 00:00:17,740 @@ -38,106 +38,106 @@ ang browser na ginagamit mo para mag surf sa web, at kung ano-ano pa tungkol sa iyo at sobra-sobra pa tungkol sa iyo. 10 -00:00:29,620 --> 00:00:32,460 +00:00:29,200 --> 00:00:31,500 na hindi mo naman talagang sadyang ibahagi sa mga taong hindi mo kilala 11 -00:00:32,920 --> 00:00:35,840 +00:00:31,700 --> 00:00:34,000 - na maaring gamitin ang impormasyon mo na kanila'y pakikinabangan. 12 -00:00:36,220 --> 00:00:38,120 -Pero lahat ng iyon ay maiiwasan sa pamamagitan ng Tor! +00:00:34,500 --> 00:00:37,000 +Maliban kung gumagamit ka ng Tor! 13 -00:00:39,140 --> 00:00:42,840 +00:00:37,140 --> 00:00:40,840 Pinoprotektahan ng Tor Browser ang ating palihim (privacy) at pagkakakilanlan (identity) sa Internet. 14 -00:00:43,560 --> 00:00:46,760 +00:00:41,560 --> 00:00:44,760 Pinapatibay at sinisigurado ng Tor ang iyong koneksyon sa pamamagitan ng tatlong patong ng encryption 15 -00:00:46,940 --> 00:00:51,760 +00:00:44,940 --> 00:00:49,760 at idinadaan ito sa tatlong kinusang-loob na mga servers sa iba't-ibang sulok ng mundo, 16 -00:00:52,280 --> 00:00:55,520 +00:00:50,280 --> 00:00:53,520 para magkaroon tayong nang paliham na komunikasyon sa Internet. 17 -00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:00,280 +00:00:56,560 --> 00:00:58,280 Pinoprotektahan din ng Tor ang ating mga data 18 -00:01:00,400 --> 00:01:03,900 +00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:01,900 laban sa patamaang-gobyerno (government-targeted) o patamaang-korporasyon (corporate-targeted) at pang-masang pamamahala (mass surveillance). 19 -00:01:04,880 --> 00:01:09,340 +00:01:02,880 --> 00:01:07,340 Baka nakatira ka sa isang bansa na strikto sa kalayaan na sinusubukang kontrolin at imahala (surveil) ang Internet. 20 -00:01:09,900 --> 00:01:13,800 +00:01:07,900 --> 00:01:11,800 O kaya nama'y ayaw mong pakinabangan ng malalaking korporasyon ang iyong personal na impormasyon. 21 -00:01:14,880 --> 00:01:17,640 +00:01:12,880 --> 00:01:15,640 Ginagawa ng Tor na magkakamukha ang mga gumagamit nito 22 -00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:20,800 +00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:18,800 na nililito ang sinumang namamahala o nanonood, at sa pamamagitan nito ikaw ay nagiging anonimo o hindi nakikilala. 23 -00:01:21,500 --> 00:01:24,980 +00:01:19,500 --> 00:01:22,980 Kaya, kapag mas maraming taong gumagamit ng Tor network, mas lumalakas ito 24 -00:01:25,140 --> 00:01:29,800 +00:01:23,140 --> 00:01:27,800 sapagkat mas madaling magtago sa pangkat o grupo ng tao na magkakamukha. 25 -00:01:30,700 --> 00:01:33,240 +00:01:28,700 --> 00:01:31,240 Maaring mong iwasan o sikutan ang pagsensura ng hindi pagaalala 26 -00:01:33,400 --> 00:01:36,100 +00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:34,100 tungkol sa pagaalam ng sensura kung ano ang ginagawa mo sa Internet. 27 -00:01:38,540 --> 00:01:41,440 +00:01:36,540 --> 00:01:39,440 Hindi ka susundan ng mga ads kahit saan ng ilang buwan, 28 -00:01:41,640 --> 00:01:43,300 +00:01:39,640 --> 00:01:41,300 simula nung una kang pumindot sa isang produkto. 29 -00:01:45,880 --> 00:01:49,380 +00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:47,380 Sa pagamit ng Tor, hindi ka man lang malaman ng mga sites na binisita mo kung sino ka, 30 -00:01:49,540 --> 00:01:51,760 +00:01:47,540 --> 00:01:49,760 kung saang parte ng mundo mo sila binisita, 31 -00:01:51,920 --> 00:01:53,920 +00:01:49,920 --> 00:01:51,920 kung hindi ka mag lologin at magkukusang magsabi. 32 -00:01:56,200 --> 00:01:57,840 +00:01:54,200 --> 00:01:55,840 Sa pag-download at paggamit ng Tor, 33 -00:01:58,200 --> 00:02:00,560 +00:01:56,200 --> 00:01:58,560 maproprotektahan mo din ang pagiging anonimo ng mga nangangailangang tao, 34 -00:02:00,880 --> 00:02:03,640 +00:01:58,880 --> 00:02:01,640 tulad ng activists, journalists at bloggers. 35 -00:02:04,000 --> 00:02:09,000 +00:02:02,000 --> 00:02:07,000 Kaya'y i-download mo na ang Tor at gamitin! O kaya'y magpatakbo ng relay!

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[tor/maint-0.2.6] Make ensure_capacity a bit more pedantically correct
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit c2fd64846978290b0e7c7165d7658a5e704eee8f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:54:52 2016 -0500 Make ensure_capacity a bit more pedantically correct Issues noted by cypherpunks on #18162 --- src/common/container.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/common/container.c b/src/common/container.c index 46d9c2e..b1431df 100644 --- a/src/common/container.c +++ b/src/common/container.c @@ -58,11 +58,16 @@ smartlist_clear(smartlist_t *sl) sl->num_used = 0; } +#if SIZE_MAX < INT_MAX +#error "We don't support systems where size_t is smaller than int." +#endif + /** Make sure that sl can hold at least size entries. */ static INLINE void smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, size_t size) { -#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT + /* Set MAX_CAPACITY to MIN(INT_MAX, SIZE_MAX / sizeof(void*)) */ +#if (SIZE_MAX/SIZEOF_VOID_P) > INT_MAX #define MAX_CAPACITY (INT_MAX) #else #define MAX_CAPACITY (int)((SIZE_MAX / (sizeof(void*))))

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[tor/maint-0.2.6] avoid integer overflow in and around smartlist_ensure_capacity.
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit bca7083e8285e8e6a4377076a7e432417eafc6d2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 27 12:26:02 2016 -0500 avoid integer overflow in and around smartlist_ensure_capacity. This closes bug 18162; bugfix on a45b1315909c9, which fixed a related issue long ago. In addition to the #18162 issues, this fixes a signed integer overflow in smarltist_add_all(), which is probably not so great either. --- changes/bug18162 | 7 +++++++ src/common/container.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug18162 b/changes/bug18162 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0844d6f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18162 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security, pointers): + + - Avoid a difficult-to-trigger heap corruption attack when extending + a smartlist to contain over 16GB of pointers. Fixes bug #18162; + bugfix on Tor 0.1.1.11-alpha, which fixed a related bug + incompletely. Reported by Guido Vranken. + diff --git a/src/common/container.c b/src/common/container.c index eec497a..46d9c2e 100644 --- a/src/common/container.c +++ b/src/common/container.c @@ -60,15 +60,17 @@ smartlist_clear(smartlist_t *sl) /** Make sure that sl can hold at least size entries. */ static INLINE void -smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, int size) +smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, size_t size) { #if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT #define MAX_CAPACITY (INT_MAX) #else #define MAX_CAPACITY (int)((SIZE_MAX / (sizeof(void*)))) #endif - if (size > sl->capacity) { - int higher = sl->capacity; + tor_assert(size <= MAX_CAPACITY); + + if (size > (size_t) sl->capacity) { + size_t higher = (size_t) sl->capacity; if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(size > MAX_CAPACITY/2)) { tor_assert(size <= MAX_CAPACITY); higher = MAX_CAPACITY; @@ -76,7 +78,8 @@ smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, int size) while (size > higher) higher *= 2; } - sl->capacity = higher; + tor_assert(higher <= INT_MAX); /* Redundant */ + sl->capacity = (int) higher; sl->list = tor_realloc(sl->list, sizeof(void*)*((size_t)sl->capacity)); } } @@ -85,7 +88,7 @@ smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, int size) void smartlist_add(smartlist_t *sl, void *element) { - smartlist_ensure_capacity(sl, sl->num_used+1); + smartlist_ensure_capacity(sl, ((size_t) sl->num_used)+1); sl->list[sl->num_used++] = element; } @@ -93,11 +96,12 @@ smartlist_add(smartlist_t *sl, void *element) void smartlist_add_all(smartlist_t *s1, const smartlist_t *s2) { - int new_size = s1->num_used + s2->num_used; - tor_assert(new_size >= s1->num_used); /* check for overflow. */ + size_t new_size = (size_t)s1->num_used + (size_t)s2->num_used; + tor_assert(new_size >= (size_t) s1->num_used); /* check for overflow. */ smartlist_ensure_capacity(s1, new_size); memcpy(s1->list + s1->num_used, s2->list, s2->num_used*sizeof(void*)); - s1->num_used = new_size; + tor_assert(new_size <= INT_MAX); /* redundant. */ + s1->num_used = (int) new_size; } /** Remove all elements E from sl such that E==element. Preserve @@ -334,7 +338,7 @@ smartlist_insert(smartlist_t *sl, int idx, void *val) if (idx == sl->num_used) { smartlist_add(sl, val); } else { - smartlist_ensure_capacity(sl, sl->num_used+1); + smartlist_ensure_capacity(sl, ((size_t) sl->num_used)+1); /* Move other elements away */ if (idx < sl->num_used) memmove(sl->list + idx + 1, sl->list + idx,

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[tor/maint-0.2.6] Merge branch 'bug18162_024' into maint-0.2.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit ad95d64fece2c6d2eddffc8fa5178c3ffccc0cd7 Merge: d5ac79e c2fd648 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:55:25 2016 -0500 Merge branch 'bug18162_024' into maint-0.2.4 changes/bug18162 | 7 +++++++ src/common/container.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.6] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.5' into maint-0.2.6
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 740421af194b890c24242a834ed03ffc5c4c16ab Merge: 44ad3be ce289e2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:57:28 2016 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.5' into maint-0.2.6 changes/bug18162 | 7 +++++++ src/common/container.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --cc src/common/container.c index 864fd8a,c668068..76c129d --- a/src/common/container.c +++ b/src/common/container.c @@@ -66,28 -71,22 +71,25 @@@ smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t * #define MAX_CAPACITY (INT_MAX) #else #define MAX_CAPACITY (int)((SIZE_MAX / (sizeof(void*)))) - #define ASSERT_CAPACITY #endif - if (size > sl->capacity) { - int higher = sl->capacity; ++ + tor_assert(size <= MAX_CAPACITY); + + if (size > (size_t) sl->capacity) { + size_t higher = (size_t) sl->capacity; if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(size > MAX_CAPACITY/2)) { - #ifdef ASSERT_CAPACITY - /* We don't include this assertion when MAX_CAPACITY == INT_MAX, - * since int size; (size <= INT_MAX) makes analysis tools think we're - * doing something stupid. */ -- tor_assert(size <= MAX_CAPACITY); - #endif higher = MAX_CAPACITY; } else { while (size > higher) higher *= 2; } - sl->capacity = higher; + tor_assert(higher <= INT_MAX); /* Redundant */ + sl->capacity = (int) higher; - sl->list = tor_realloc(sl->list, sizeof(void*)*((size_t)sl->capacity)); + sl->list = tor_reallocarray(sl->list, sizeof(void *), + ((size_t)sl->capacity)); } +#undef ASSERT_CAPACITY +#undef MAX_CAPACITY } /** Append element to the end of the list. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.6] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into maint-0.2.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit ce289e2cb5099a4abe4468049dc0d262b65bfa17 Merge: f06d9a9 ad95d64 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:55:40 2016 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into maint-0.2.5 changes/bug18162 | 7 +++++++ src/common/container.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.7] Make ensure_capacity a bit more pedantically correct
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit c2fd64846978290b0e7c7165d7658a5e704eee8f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:54:52 2016 -0500 Make ensure_capacity a bit more pedantically correct Issues noted by cypherpunks on #18162 --- src/common/container.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/common/container.c b/src/common/container.c index 46d9c2e..b1431df 100644 --- a/src/common/container.c +++ b/src/common/container.c @@ -58,11 +58,16 @@ smartlist_clear(smartlist_t *sl) sl->num_used = 0; } +#if SIZE_MAX < INT_MAX +#error "We don't support systems where size_t is smaller than int." +#endif + /** Make sure that sl can hold at least size entries. */ static INLINE void smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, size_t size) { -#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT + /* Set MAX_CAPACITY to MIN(INT_MAX, SIZE_MAX / sizeof(void*)) */ +#if (SIZE_MAX/SIZEOF_VOID_P) > INT_MAX #define MAX_CAPACITY (INT_MAX) #else #define MAX_CAPACITY (int)((SIZE_MAX / (sizeof(void*))))

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