tor-commits December 2016

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[tor/master] Add an ed25519 identity to extend_info
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit b5e75ae7dd536f17f96179fc7744031131fb97b2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 14 14:34:25 2016 -0400 Add an ed25519 identity to extend_info --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 6 ++++-- src/or/circuituse.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/entrynodes.c | 5 ++++- src/or/or.h | 5 ++++- src/or/router.c | 7 +++++++ 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 0881f23..a767f40 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1181,6 +1181,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) } n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, + /* ed25519 ID: put it here. 15056 */ &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &msg, &should_launch); @@ -1192,8 +1193,9 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/, (const char*)ec.node_id, - NULL /*onion_key*/, - NULL /*curve25519_key*/, + NULL, /*ed25519 ID: get from ec. 15056*/ + NULL, /*onion_key*/ + NULL, /*curve25519_key*/ &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, ec.orport_ipv4.port); @@ -2356,19 +2358,23 @@ onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice) /** Allocate a new extend_info object based on the various arguments. */ extend_info_t * -extend_info_new(const char *nickname, const char *digest, +extend_info_new(const char *nickname, + const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, crypto_pk_t *onion_key, - const curve25519_public_key_t *curve25519_key, + const curve25519_public_key_t *ntor_key, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) { extend_info_t *info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t)); - memcpy(info->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(info->identity_digest, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + if (ed_id) + memcpy(&info->ed_identity, ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); if (nickname) strlcpy(info->nickname, nickname, sizeof(info->nickname)); if (onion_key) info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onion_key); - if (curve25519_key) - memcpy(&info->curve25519_onion_key, curve25519_key, + if (ntor_key) + memcpy(&info->curve25519_onion_key, ntor_key, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); tor_addr_copy(&info->addr, addr); info->port = port; @@ -2418,20 +2424,24 @@ extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect) return NULL; } + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_pubkey = node_get_ed25519_id(node); + if (valid_addr && node->ri) return extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname, - node->identity, - node->ri->onion_pkey, - node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey, - &ap.addr, - ap.port); + node->identity, + ed_pubkey, + node->ri->onion_pkey, + node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey, + &ap.addr, + ap.port); else if (valid_addr && node->rs && node->md) return extend_info_new(node->rs->nickname, - node->identity, - node->md->onion_pkey, - node->md->onion_curve25519_pkey, - &ap.addr, - ap.port); + node->identity, + ed_pubkey, + node->md->onion_pkey, + node->md->onion_curve25519_pkey, + &ap.addr, + ap.port); else return NULL; } diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index 1244601..f71c116 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ int circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime, int circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info); int circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info); void onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop); -extend_info_t *extend_info_new(const char *nickname, const char *digest, +extend_info_t *extend_info_new(const char *nickname, + const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, crypto_pk_t *onion_key, - const curve25519_public_key_t *curve25519_key, + const curve25519_public_key_t *ntor_key, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port); extend_info_t *extend_info_from_node(const node_t *r, int for_direct_connect); extend_info_t *extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index ba7b75f..eda53b4 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2103,8 +2103,10 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, return -1; } extend_info = extend_info_new(conn->chosen_exit_name+1, - digest, NULL, NULL, &addr, - conn->socks_request->port); + digest, + NULL, /* Ed25519 ID 15056, add a workaround.*/ + NULL, NULL, /* onion keys */ + &addr, conn->socks_request->port); } else { /* ! (want_onehop && conn->chosen_exit_name[0] == '$') */ /* We will need an onion key for the router, and we * don't have one. Refuse or relax requirements. */ diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index b3fa31d..d954477 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2306,7 +2306,10 @@ routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset, return 0; extinfo = extend_info_new( - NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port); + NULL, bridge->identity, + NULL, /* Ed25519 ID */ + NULL, NULL, /* onion keys */ + &bridge->addr, bridge->port); result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo); extend_info_free(extinfo); return result; diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index eb94f63..d9d3ec7 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2710,7 +2710,10 @@ typedef struct { typedef struct extend_info_t { char nickname[MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1]; /**< This router's nickname for * display. */ - char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of this router's identity key. */ + /** Hash of this router's RSA identity key. */ + char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + /** Ed25519 identity for this router, if any. */ + ed25519_public_key_t ed_identity; uint16_t port; /**< OR port. */ tor_addr_t addr; /**< IP address. */ crypto_pk_t *onion_key; /**< Current onionskin key. */ diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 79caf42..bc0eb3a 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -1312,8 +1312,15 @@ extend_info_from_router(const routerinfo_t *r) /* Make sure we don't need to check address reachability */ tor_assert_nonfatal(router_skip_or_reachability(get_options(), 0)); + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_key; + if (r->cache_info.signing_key_cert) + ed_id_key = &r->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key; + else + ed_id_key = NULL; + router_get_prim_orport(r, &ap); return extend_info_new(r->nickname, r->cache_info.identity_digest, + ed_id_key, r->onion_pkey, r->onion_curve25519_pkey, &ap.addr, ap.port); }

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[tor/master] Helper function for logging ed25519 public keys.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit 2cdd24ddd69a3cde2deae3eb69c24ae179d83834 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 10 10:43:28 2016 -0500 Helper function for logging ed25519 public keys. --- src/common/crypto_format.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/common/crypto_format.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_format.c b/src/common/crypto_format.c index 2f6d847..483013e 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_format.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_format.c @@ -161,6 +161,22 @@ curve25519_public_from_base64(curve25519_public_key_t *pkey, } } +/** For convenience: Convert pkey to a statically allocated base64 + * string and return it. Not threadsafe. Subsequent calls invalidate + * previous returns. */ +const char * +ed25519_fmt(const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey) +{ + static char formatted[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1]; + if (pkey) { + int r = ed25519_public_to_base64(formatted, pkey); + tor_assert(!r); + } else { + strlcpy(formatted, "<null>", sizeof(formatted)); + } + return formatted; +} + /** Try to decode the string input into an ed25519 public key. On * success, store the value in pkey and return 0. Otherwise return * -1. */ diff --git a/src/common/crypto_format.h b/src/common/crypto_format.h index 012e228..86c29d3 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_format.h +++ b/src/common/crypto_format.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ int ed25519_public_from_base64(ed25519_public_key_t *pkey, const char *input); int ed25519_public_to_base64(char *output, const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey); +const char *ed25519_fmt(const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey); /* XXXX move these to crypto_format.h */ #define ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN 86

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[tor/master] Helper function to see if an ed25519 pk is set.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit 431565e0531eb6cfdaabd2bba8912655898f079b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 14 14:27:44 2016 -0400 Helper function to see if an ed25519 pk is set. --- src/common/crypto_ed25519.c | 8 ++++++++ src/common/crypto_ed25519.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c index 30ed772..809ad12 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c @@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong) return 0; } +/** Return true iff 'pubkey' is set to zero (eg to indicate that it is not + * set). */ +int +ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey) +{ + return tor_mem_is_zero((char*)pubkey->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); +} + /* Return a heap-allocated array that contains msg prefixed by the * string prefix_str. Set final_msg_len_out to the size of the * final array. If an error occured, return NULL. It's the resonsibility of the diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h index 31afc49..5d63d90 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h +++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ ed25519_checksig_prefixed(const ed25519_signature_t *signature, const char *prefix_str, const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey); +int ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey); + + /** * A collection of information necessary to check an Ed25519 signature. Used * for batch verification.

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[tor/master] Propagate Ed25519 identities downwards into more functions.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit 6788418f28930467121537f31c4b43f981ae6ca8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Sep 24 11:25:48 2016 -0700 Propagate Ed25519 identities downwards into more functions. Actually set ed25519 identities on channels when we set a channel's identity. --- src/or/channel.c | 6 +++++- src/or/channel.h | 3 ++- src/or/connection_or.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- src/or/dirserv.c | 4 +++- src/or/dirserv.h | 3 ++- src/or/entrynodes.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- src/or/entrynodes.h | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index 4712891..e9bda24 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -1471,7 +1471,8 @@ channel_clear_identity_digest(channel_t *chan) void channel_set_identity_digest(channel_t *chan, - const char *identity_digest) + const char *identity_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity) { int was_in_digest_map, should_be_in_digest_map, state_not_in_map; @@ -1510,6 +1511,9 @@ channel_set_identity_digest(channel_t *chan, memset(chan->identity_digest, 0, sizeof(chan->identity_digest)); } + if (ed_identity) { + memcpy(&chan->ed25519_identity, ed_identity, sizeof(*ed_identity)); + } /* Put it in the digest map if we should */ if (should_be_in_digest_map) diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index 3f0bb37..26aa93b 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ void channel_mark_incoming(channel_t *chan); void channel_mark_outgoing(channel_t *chan); void channel_mark_remote(channel_t *chan); void channel_set_identity_digest(channel_t *chan, - const char *identity_digest); + const char *identity_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity); void channel_set_remote_end(channel_t *chan, const char *identity_digest, const char *nickname); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 4449d3f..a22c4ad 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *rsa_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { - (void) ed_id; // DOCDOC // XXXX not implemented yet. 15056 tor_assert(conn); tor_assert(rsa_digest); @@ -133,7 +132,8 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, /* Deal with channels */ if (conn->chan) - channel_set_identity_digest(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), rsa_digest); + channel_set_identity_digest(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), + rsa_digest, ed_id); } /** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of conn from the @@ -831,7 +831,6 @@ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, int started_here) { - (void) ed_id; // not fully used yet. 15056 const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest); connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest, ed_id); connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(conn, 1, get_options()); @@ -1116,7 +1115,6 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, channel_tls_t *chan)) { - (void) ed_id; // XXXX not fully used yet. 15056 or_connection_t *conn; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int socket_error = 0; @@ -1135,6 +1133,11 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing."); return NULL; } + if (server_mode(options) && router_ed25519_id_is_me(ed_id)) { + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself by Ed25519 " + "identity. Refusing."); + return NULL; + } conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, tor_addr_family(&addr)); @@ -1504,11 +1507,13 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); - if (started_here) + if (started_here) { + /* A TLS handshake can't teach us an Ed25519 ID, so we set it to NULL + * here. */ return connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(conn, (const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out, - NULL // Ed25519 ID 15056 - ); + NULL); + } return 0; } @@ -1541,8 +1546,6 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id) { - (void) ed_peer_id; // not used yet. 15056 - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) { @@ -1559,7 +1562,7 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, /* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now * we do -- remember it for future attempts. */ learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port, - (const char*)rsa_peer_id /*, ed_peer_id XXXX */); + (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id); } if (tor_memneq(rsa_peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) { @@ -1617,9 +1620,12 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, conn); return -1; } + + /* XXXX 15056 -- use the Ed25519 key */ + if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) { dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port, - (const char*)rsa_peer_id /*, ed_id XXXX 15056 */); + (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id); } return 0; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index c797c9a..54b434d 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3170,8 +3170,10 @@ dirserv_get_routerdescs(smartlist_t *descs_out, const char *key, void dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t or_port, - const char *digest_rcvd) + const char *digest_rcvd, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd) { + (void)ed_id_rcvd; // XXXX 15056 use this. node_t *node = NULL; tor_addr_port_t orport; routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.h b/src/or/dirserv.h index 1e4f27e..e83da5e 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.h +++ b/src/or/dirserv.h @@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ int dirserv_get_routerdescs(smartlist_t *descs_out, const char *key, const char **msg); void dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t or_port, - const char *digest_rcvd); + const char *digest_rcvd, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd); int dirserv_should_launch_reachability_test(const routerinfo_t *ri, const routerinfo_t *ri_old); void dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index c8215d3..af1b1a3 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2108,18 +2108,34 @@ node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node) */ void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest) + const char *digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { + // XXXX prop220 use ed_id here, once there is some way to specify + (void)ed_id; + int learned = 0; bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest); if (bridge && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) { + memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + learned = 1; + } + /* XXXX prop220 remember bridge ed25519 identities -- add a field */ +#if 0 + if (bridge && ed_id && + ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&bridge->ed25519_identity) && + !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)) { + memcpy(&bridge->ed25519_identity, ed_id, sizeof(*ed_id)); + learned = 1; + } +#endif + if (learned) { char *transport_info = NULL; const char *transport_name = find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(addr, port); if (transport_name) tor_asprintf(&transport_info, " (with transport '%s')", transport_name); - - memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + // XXXX prop220 log both fingerprints. log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned fingerprint %s for bridge %s%s.", hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addrport(addr, port), transport_info ? transport_info : ""); @@ -2216,6 +2232,8 @@ bridge_add_from_config(bridge_line_t *bridge_line) { bridge_info_t *b; + // XXXX prop220 add a way to specify ed25519 ID to bridge_line_t. + { /* Log the bridge we are about to register: */ log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Registering bridge at %s (transport: %s) (%s)", fmt_addrport(&bridge_line->addr, bridge_line->port), diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 00f9691..f8aaedf 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ int extend_info_is_a_configured_bridge(const extend_info_t *ei); int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node); void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest); + const char *digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); struct bridge_line_t; void bridge_add_from_config(struct bridge_line_t *bridge_line); void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest);

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[tor/master] Teach circuit_extend() more about Ed25519 identities.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit c83778686839c4596504ea392854e9e95884fcfa Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Sep 24 11:04:47 2016 -0700 Teach circuit_extend() more about Ed25519 identities. - forbid extending to the previous hop by Ed25519 ID. - If we know the Ed25519 ID for the next hop and the client doesn't, insist on the one from the consensus. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 887b8ec..e833fcb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1175,6 +1175,16 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) return -1; } + /* Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer it from + * our networkstatus */ + if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey)) { + const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)ec.node_id); + const ed25519_public_key_t *node_ed_id = NULL; + if (node && (node_ed_id = node_get_ed25519_id(node))) { + memcpy(ec.ed_pubkey.pubkey, node_ed_id->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + } + } + /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can * assist circular-path attacks. */ @@ -1185,10 +1195,15 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop."); return -1; } - // XXX 15056 check prev-hop Ed ID too - // XXX 15056 Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer - // XXX 15056 it from the networkstatus. + /* Check the previous hop Ed25519 ID too */ + if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey) && + ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ec.ed_pubkey, + &TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->ed25519_identity)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop " + "(by Ed25519 ID)."); + } n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, &ec.ed_pubkey,

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[tor/master] Add an option to disable dirauth ed25519 link key checks.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit 3d7e485402752d21d01cdf36ae1102d4b013fe85 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 10 12:41:17 2016 -0500 Add an option to disable dirauth ed25519 link key checks. If there is some horrible bug in our ed25519 link authentication code that causes us to label every single ed25519-having node as non-running, we'll be glad we had this. Otherwise we can remove it later. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 7 +++++++ src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/dirserv.c | 7 +++++-- src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 1071168..9f6f958 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2270,6 +2270,13 @@ on the public Tor network. (default), the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority vote indicating participation in the protocol. (Default: 1) +[[AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys]] **AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys** **0**|**1**:: + Authoritative directories only. If this option is set to 0, then we treat + relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them, + regardless of their Ed25519 key. We should only ever set this option to 0 + if there is some major bug in Ed25519 link authentication that causes us + to label all the relays as not Running. (Default: 1) + [[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__:: If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 51c6290..d100af8 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(User, STRING, NULL), OBSOLETE("UserspaceIOCPBuffers"), V(AuthDirSharedRandomness, BOOL, "1"), + V(AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys, BOOL, "1"), OBSOLETE("V1AuthoritativeDirectory"), OBSOLETE("V2AuthoritativeDirectory"), VAR("V3AuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL, V3AuthoritativeDir, "0"), diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index d060b29..0b896a2 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3186,7 +3186,8 @@ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, ri = node->ri; - if (ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) { + if (get_options()->AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys && + ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) { /* We allow the node to have an ed25519 key if we haven't been told one in * the routerinfo, but if we *HAVE* been told one in the routerinfo, it * needs to match. */ @@ -3256,6 +3257,7 @@ dirserv_should_launch_reachability_test(const routerinfo_t *ri, void dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); channel_t *chan = NULL; node_t *node = NULL; tor_addr_t router_addr; @@ -3266,7 +3268,8 @@ dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router) node = node_get_mutable_by_id(router->cache_info.identity_digest); tor_assert(node); - if (node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node)) { + if (options->AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys && + node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node)) { ed_id_key = &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key; } else { ed_id_key = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 14c2dd8..7e11bf0 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4577,6 +4577,11 @@ typedef struct { /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells? * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */ int ExtendByEd25519ID; + + /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority, + * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */ + /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */ + int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys; } or_options_t; /** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */

1 0

[tor/master] Migrate main data loop for set_bad_connections to use channel structures
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit a20c8a81d717852ad3a2bf261ec68efba692f0d7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 19 16:14:28 2016 -0400 Migrate main data loop for set_bad_connections to use channel structures This was the last user of our or_connections-by-ID map. It also had a tendency to be O(N) in cases that only had to be O(1). --- src/or/channel.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/channel.h | 2 ++ src/or/connection_or.c | 46 +++++++++++++--------------------------------- src/or/connection_or.h | 3 ++- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4 ++-- src/or/main.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index d484e71..4712891 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -4539,6 +4539,54 @@ channel_set_circid_type,(channel_t *chan, } } +/** Helper for channel_update_bad_for_new_circs(): Perform the + * channel_update_bad_for_new_circs operation on all channels in lst, + * all of which MUST have the same RSA ID. (They MAY have different + * Ed25519 IDs.) */ +static void +channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness(struct channel_list_s *lst, int force) +{ + channel_t *chan; + + smartlist_t *or_conns = smartlist_new(); + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(chan, lst, next_with_same_id) { + channel_tls_t *chantls = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + or_connection_t *orconn = chantls->conn; + if (orconn) + smartlist_add(or_conns, orconn); + } + /*XXXX This function should really be about channels. 15056 */ + connection_or_group_set_badness_(or_conns, force); + smartlist_free(or_conns); +} + +/** Go through all the channels (or if digest is non-NULL, just + * the OR connections with that digest), and set the is_bad_for_new_circs + * flag based on the rules in connection_or_group_set_badness() (or just + * always set it if force is true). + */ +void +channel_update_bad_for_new_circs(const char *digest, int force) +{ + if (digest) { + channel_idmap_entry_t *ent; + channel_idmap_entry_t search; + memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search)); + memcpy(search.digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + ent = HT_FIND(channel_idmap, &channel_identity_map, &search); + if (ent) { + channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness(&ent->channel_list, force); + } + return; + } + + /* no digest; just look at everything. */ + channel_idmap_entry_t **iter; + HT_FOREACH(iter, channel_idmap, &channel_identity_map) { + channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness(&(*iter)->channel_list, force); + } +} + /** * Update the estimated number of bytes queued to transmit for this channel, * and notify the scheduler. The estimate includes both the channel queue and diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index 39a4d05..3f0bb37 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -601,6 +601,8 @@ void channel_listener_dump_statistics(channel_listener_t *chan_l, void channel_listener_dump_transport_statistics(channel_listener_t *chan_l, int severity); +void channel_update_bad_for_new_circs(const char *digest, int force); + /* Flow control queries */ uint64_t channel_get_global_queue_estimate(void); int channel_num_cells_writeable(channel_t *chan); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index d0cd9c0..ca5f300 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn) * too old for new circuits? */ #define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7) -/** Given the head of the linked list for all the or_connections with a given +/** Given a list of all the or_connections with a given * identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as * appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections(). * @@ -978,19 +978,19 @@ connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn) * See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR * connection better than another. */ -static void -connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force) +void +connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force) { - // XXXX 15056 we should make this about channels instead, so we - // can finally remove orconn_identity_map. - - or_connection_t *or_conn = NULL, *best = NULL; + /* XXXX this should be entirely about channels, not OR connections. 15056*/ + /* XXXX Look at Ed25519 ids too! 15056 */ + + or_connection_t *best = NULL; int n_old = 0, n_inprogress = 0, n_canonical = 0, n_other = 0; time_t now = time(NULL); /* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of * everything else is. */ - for (or_conn = head; or_conn; or_conn = or_conn->next_with_same_id) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) { if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close || connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) continue; @@ -1014,11 +1014,11 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force) } else { ++n_other; } - } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn); /* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is. * expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */ - for (or_conn = head; or_conn; or_conn = or_conn->next_with_same_id) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) { if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close || connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */ @@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force) 0)) { best = or_conn; } - } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn); if (!best) return; @@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force) * 0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is * "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored. */ - for (or_conn = head; or_conn; or_conn = or_conn->next_with_same_id) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) { if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close || connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn) || or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) @@ -1098,27 +1098,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force) connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn); } } - } -} - -/** Go through all the OR connections (or if digest is non-NULL, just - * the OR connections with that digest), and set the is_bad_for_new_circs - * flag based on the rules in connection_or_group_set_badness() (or just - * always set it if force is true). - */ -void -connection_or_set_bad_connections(const char *digest, int force) -{ - if (!orconn_identity_map) - return; - - // XXXX This is just about the only remaining user of orconn_identity_map! - // XXXX If we kill it, we can yoink out the map. 15056. - - DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(orconn_identity_map, identity, or_connection_t *, conn) { - if (!digest || tor_memeq(digest, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) - connection_or_group_set_badness(conn, force); - } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn); } /** conn is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.h b/src/or/connection_or.h index da95718..b35bcdd 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.h +++ b/src/or/connection_or.h @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ or_connection_t *connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest, const tor_addr_t *target_addr, const char **msg_out, int *launch_out); -void connection_or_set_bad_connections(const char *digest, int force); void connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn); int connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn); @@ -111,5 +110,7 @@ void var_cell_free(var_cell_t *cell); /* DOCDOC */ #define MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS 4 +void connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force); + #endif diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index d954477..c8215d3 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ #define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" #include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitstats.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" #include "connection.h" -#include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" #include "directory.h" #include "entrynodes.h" @@ -2749,7 +2749,7 @@ entries_retry_helper(const or_options_t *options, int act) * the node down and undermine the retry attempt. We mark even * the established conns, since if the network just came back * we'll want to attach circuits to fresh conns. */ - connection_or_set_bad_connections(node->identity, 1); + channel_update_bad_for_new_circs(node->identity, 1); /* mark this entry node for retry */ router_set_status(node->identity, 1); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index c10f627..30adb16 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) } /* 5. We do housekeeping for each connection... */ - connection_or_set_bad_connections(NULL, 0); + channel_update_bad_for_new_circs(NULL, 0); int i; for (i=0;i<smartlist_len(connection_array);i++) { run_connection_housekeeping(i, now);

1 0

[tor/master] Dirauth: Don't treat a router as reachable if the Ed25519 key didn't match
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit ae6b73e847c64b7902a259f9f43f056ab41c0eb4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Oct 28 16:22:44 2016 -0400 Dirauth: Don't treat a router as reachable if the Ed25519 key didn't match --- src/or/dirserv.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 54b434d..b141a5d 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3173,7 +3173,6 @@ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, const char *digest_rcvd, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd) { - (void)ed_id_rcvd; // XXXX 15056 use this. node_t *node = NULL; tor_addr_port_t orport; routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; @@ -3184,8 +3183,24 @@ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, node = node_get_mutable_by_id(digest_rcvd); if (node == NULL || node->ri == NULL) return; + ri = node->ri; + if (ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) { + /* We allow the node to have an ed25519 key if we haven't been told one in + * the routerinfo, but if we *HAVE* been told one in the routerinfo, it + * needs to match. */ + const ed25519_public_key_t *expected_id = + &ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key; + tor_assert(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(expected_id)); + if (! ed_id_rcvd || ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id_rcvd, expected_id)) { + log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Router at %s:%d with RSA ID %s " + "did not present expected Ed25519 ID.", + fmt_addr(addr), or_port, hex_str(digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN)); + return; /* Don't mark it as reachable. */ + } + } + tor_addr_copy(&orport.addr, addr); orport.port = or_port; if (router_has_orport(ri, &orport)) {

1 0

[tor/master] Migrate extend2/create2 cell encoding to Trunnel
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit e054211237e88cace9f7d7ff403600c192df9a31 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 14 16:00:23 2016 -0400 Migrate extend2/create2 cell encoding to Trunnel (Not extended2/created2; that's too simple.) Incidentally, add ed25519 identities to the mix when we have them. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 +- src/or/onion.c | 289 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- src/or/onion.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index a767f40..e578a94 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) ec.orport_ipv4.port = hop->extend_info->port; tor_addr_make_unspec(&ec.orport_ipv6.addr); memcpy(ec.node_id, hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + /* 15056 Either here or in the onion.c encoding code, we should make an + * option to decide whether we declare the ED identity (if we know one) */ + memcpy(&ec.ed_pubkey, &hop->extend_info->ed_identity, + sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); len = onion_skin_create(ec.create_cell.handshake_type, hop->extend_info, @@ -1181,7 +1185,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) } n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, - /* ed25519 ID: put it here. 15056 */ + /*&ec.ed25519_id 15056 */ &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &msg, &should_launch); @@ -1193,7 +1197,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/, (const char*)ec.node_id, - NULL, /*ed25519 ID: get from ec. 15056*/ + &ec.ed_pubkey, NULL, /*onion_key*/ NULL, /*curve25519_key*/ &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, @@ -2367,7 +2371,7 @@ extend_info_new(const char *nickname, { extend_info_t *info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t)); memcpy(info->identity_digest, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - if (ed_id) + if (ed_id && !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)) memcpy(&info->ed_identity, ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); if (nickname) strlcpy(info->nickname, nickname, sizeof(info->nickname)); diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index a987883..f49707f 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "router.h" +// trunnel +#include "ed25519_cert.h" + /** Type for a linked list of circuits that are waiting for a free CPU worker * to process a waiting onion handshake. */ typedef struct onion_queue_t { @@ -871,13 +874,111 @@ check_extend_cell(const extend_cell_t *cell) return check_create_cell(&cell->create_cell, 1); } -/** Protocol constants for specifier types in EXTEND2 - * @{ - */ -#define SPECTYPE_IPV4 0 -#define SPECTYPE_IPV6 1 -#define SPECTYPE_LEGACY_ID 2 -/** @} */ +static int +extend_cell_from_extend1_cell_body(extend_cell_t *cell_out, + const extend1_cell_body_t *cell) +{ + tor_assert(cell_out); + memset(cell_out, 0, sizeof(*cell_out)); + tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr); + tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr); + + cell_out->cell_type = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr, cell->ipv4addr); + cell_out->orport_ipv4.port = cell->port; + if (tor_memeq(cell->onionskin, NTOR_CREATE_MAGIC, 16)) { + cell_out->create_cell.cell_type = CELL_CREATE2; + cell_out->create_cell.handshake_type = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; + cell_out->create_cell.handshake_len = NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN; + memcpy(cell_out->create_cell.onionskin, cell->onionskin + 16, + NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN); + } else { + cell_out->create_cell.cell_type = CELL_CREATE; + cell_out->create_cell.handshake_type = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP; + cell_out->create_cell.handshake_len = TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN; + memcpy(cell_out->create_cell.onionskin, cell->onionskin, + TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); + } + memcpy(cell_out->node_id, cell->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + return 0; +} + +static int +create_cell_from_create2_cell_body(create_cell_t *cell_out, + const create2_cell_body_t *cell) +{ + tor_assert(cell_out); + memset(cell_out, 0, sizeof(create_cell_t)); + if (BUG(cell->handshake_len > sizeof(cell_out->onionskin))) { + /* This should be impossible because there just isn't enough room in the + * input cell to make the handshake_len this large and provide a + * handshake_data to match. */ + return -1; + } + + cell_out->cell_type = CELL_CREATE2; + cell_out->handshake_type = cell->handshake_type; + cell_out->handshake_len = cell->handshake_len; + memcpy(cell_out->onionskin, + create2_cell_body_getconstarray_handshake_data(cell), + cell->handshake_len); + return 0; +} + +static int +extend_cell_from_extend2_cell_body(extend_cell_t *cell_out, + const extend2_cell_body_t *cell) +{ + tor_assert(cell_out); + int found_ipv4 = 0, found_ipv6 = 0, found_rsa_id = 0, found_ed_id = 0; + memset(cell_out, 0, sizeof(*cell_out)); + tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr); + tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr); + cell_out->cell_type = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; + + unsigned i; + for (i = 0; i < cell->n_spec; ++i) { + const link_specifier_t *ls = extend2_cell_body_getconst_ls(cell, i); + switch (ls->ls_type) { + case LS_IPV4: + if (found_ipv4) + continue; + found_ipv4 = 1; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr, ls->un_ipv4_addr); + cell_out->orport_ipv4.port = ls->un_ipv4_port; + break; + case LS_IPV6: + if (found_ipv6) + continue; + found_ipv6 = 1; + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr, + (const char *)ls->un_ipv6_addr); + cell_out->orport_ipv6.port = ls->un_ipv6_port; + break; + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + if (found_rsa_id) + return -1; + found_rsa_id = 1; + memcpy(cell_out->node_id, ls->un_legacy_id, 20); + break; + case LS_ED25519_ID: + if (found_ed_id) + return -1; + found_ed_id = 1; + memcpy(cell_out->ed_pubkey.pubkey, ls->un_ed25519_id, 32); + break; + default: + /* Ignore this, whatever it is. */ + break; + } + } + + if (!found_rsa_id || !found_ipv4) /* These are mandatory */ + return -1; + + return create_cell_from_create2_cell_body(&cell_out->create_cell, + cell->create2); +} /** Parse an EXTEND or EXTEND2 cell (according to command) from the * payload_length bytes of payload into cell_out. Return @@ -886,101 +987,41 @@ int extend_cell_parse(extend_cell_t *cell_out, const uint8_t command, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_length) { - const uint8_t *eop; - memset(cell_out, 0, sizeof(*cell_out)); if (payload_length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) return -1; - eop = payload + payload_length; switch (command) { case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND: { - if (payload_length != 6 + TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN + DIGEST_LEN) + extend1_cell_body_t *cell = NULL; + if (extend1_cell_body_parse(&cell, payload, payload_length)<0 || + cell == NULL) { + if (cell) + extend1_cell_body_free(cell); return -1; - - cell_out->cell_type = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr, get_uint32(payload)); - cell_out->orport_ipv4.port = ntohs(get_uint16(payload+4)); - tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr); - if (tor_memeq(payload + 6, NTOR_CREATE_MAGIC, 16)) { - cell_out->create_cell.cell_type = CELL_CREATE2; - cell_out->create_cell.handshake_type = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; - cell_out->create_cell.handshake_len = NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN; - memcpy(cell_out->create_cell.onionskin, payload + 22, - NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN); - } else { - cell_out->create_cell.cell_type = CELL_CREATE; - cell_out->create_cell.handshake_type = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP; - cell_out->create_cell.handshake_len = TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN; - memcpy(cell_out->create_cell.onionskin, payload + 6, - TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); } - memcpy(cell_out->node_id, payload + 6 + TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, - DIGEST_LEN); - break; + int r = extend_cell_from_extend1_cell_body(cell_out, cell); + extend1_cell_body_free(cell); + if (r < 0) + return r; } + break; case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: { - uint8_t n_specs, spectype, speclen; - int i; - int found_ipv4 = 0, found_ipv6 = 0, found_id = 0; - tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr); - tor_addr_make_unspec(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr); - - if (payload_length == 0) + extend2_cell_body_t *cell = NULL; + if (extend2_cell_body_parse(&cell, payload, payload_length) < 0 || + cell == NULL) { + if (cell) + extend2_cell_body_free(cell); return -1; - - cell_out->cell_type = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; - n_specs = *payload++; - /* Parse the specifiers. We'll only take the first IPv4 and first IPv6 - * address, and the node ID, and ignore everything else */ - for (i = 0; i < n_specs; ++i) { - if (eop - payload < 2) - return -1; - spectype = payload[0]; - speclen = payload[1]; - payload += 2; - if (eop - payload < speclen) - return -1; - switch (spectype) { - case SPECTYPE_IPV4: - if (speclen != 6) - return -1; - if (!found_ipv4) { - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&cell_out->orport_ipv4.addr, - get_uint32(payload)); - cell_out->orport_ipv4.port = ntohs(get_uint16(payload+4)); - found_ipv4 = 1; - } - break; - case SPECTYPE_IPV6: - if (speclen != 18) - return -1; - if (!found_ipv6) { - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr, - (const char*)payload); - cell_out->orport_ipv6.port = ntohs(get_uint16(payload+16)); - found_ipv6 = 1; - } - break; - case SPECTYPE_LEGACY_ID: - if (speclen != 20) - return -1; - if (found_id) - return -1; - memcpy(cell_out->node_id, payload, 20); - found_id = 1; - break; - } - payload += speclen; } - if (!found_id || !found_ipv4) - return -1; - if (parse_create2_payload(&cell_out->create_cell,payload,eop-payload)<0) - return -1; - break; + int r = extend_cell_from_extend2_cell_body(cell_out, cell); + extend2_cell_body_free(cell); + if (r < 0) + return r; } + break; default: return -1; } @@ -1137,12 +1178,11 @@ int extend_cell_format(uint8_t *command_out, uint16_t *len_out, uint8_t *payload_out, const extend_cell_t *cell_in) { - uint8_t *p, *eop; + uint8_t *p; if (check_extend_cell(cell_in) < 0) return -1; p = payload_out; - eop = payload_out + RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE; memset(p, 0, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); @@ -1165,33 +1205,56 @@ extend_cell_format(uint8_t *command_out, uint16_t *len_out, break; case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: { - uint8_t n = 2; + uint8_t n_specifiers = 2; *command_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; - - *p++ = n; /* 2 identifiers */ - *p++ = SPECTYPE_IPV4; /* First is IPV4. */ - *p++ = 6; /* It's 6 bytes long. */ - set_uint32(p, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&cell_in->orport_ipv4.addr)); - set_uint16(p+4, htons(cell_in->orport_ipv4.port)); - p += 6; - *p++ = SPECTYPE_LEGACY_ID; /* Next is an identity digest. */ - *p++ = 20; /* It's 20 bytes long */ - memcpy(p, cell_in->node_id, DIGEST_LEN); - p += 20; - - /* Now we can send the handshake */ - set_uint16(p, htons(cell_in->create_cell.handshake_type)); - set_uint16(p+2, htons(cell_in->create_cell.handshake_len)); - p += 4; - - if (cell_in->create_cell.handshake_len > eop - p) - return -1; - - memcpy(p, cell_in->create_cell.onionskin, + extend2_cell_body_t *cell = extend2_cell_body_new(); + link_specifier_t *ls; + { + /* IPv4 specifier first. */ + ls = link_specifier_new(); + extend2_cell_body_add_ls(cell, ls); + ls->ls_type = LS_IPV4; + ls->ls_len = 6; + ls->un_ipv4_addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&cell_in->orport_ipv4.addr); + ls->un_ipv4_port = cell_in->orport_ipv4.port; + } + { + /* Then RSA id */ + ls = link_specifier_new(); + extend2_cell_body_add_ls(cell, ls); + ls->ls_type = LS_LEGACY_ID; + ls->ls_len = DIGEST_LEN; + memcpy(ls->un_legacy_id, cell_in->node_id, DIGEST_LEN); + } + if (should_include_ed25519_id_extend_cells(NULL, get_options()) && + !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&cell_in->ed_pubkey)) { + /* Then, maybe, the ed25519 id! */ + ++n_specifiers; + ls = link_specifier_new(); + extend2_cell_body_add_ls(cell, ls); + ls->ls_type = LS_ED25519_ID; + ls->ls_len = 32; + memcpy(ls->un_ed25519_id, cell_in->ed_pubkey.pubkey, 32); + } + cell->n_spec = n_specifiers; + + /* Now, the handshake */ + cell->create2 = create2_cell_body_new(); + cell->create2->handshake_type = cell_in->create_cell.handshake_type; + cell->create2->handshake_len = cell_in->create_cell.handshake_len; + create2_cell_body_setlen_handshake_data(cell->create2, + cell_in->create_cell.handshake_len); + memcpy(create2_cell_body_getarray_handshake_data(cell->create2), + cell_in->create_cell.onionskin, cell_in->create_cell.handshake_len); - p += cell_in->create_cell.handshake_len; - *len_out = p - payload_out; + ssize_t len_encoded = extend2_cell_body_encode( + payload_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, + cell); + extend2_cell_body_free(cell); + if (len_encoded < 0 || len_encoded > UINT16_MAX) + return -1; + *len_out = (uint16_t) len_encoded; } break; default: diff --git a/src/or/onion.h b/src/or/onion.h index 0275fa0..19e4a7c 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.h +++ b/src/or/onion.h @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ typedef struct extend_cell_t { tor_addr_port_t orport_ipv6; /** Identity fingerprint of the node we're conecting to.*/ uint8_t node_id[DIGEST_LEN]; + /** Ed25519 public identity key. Zero if not set. */ + ed25519_public_key_t ed_pubkey; /** The "create cell" embedded in this extend cell. Note that unlike the * create cells we generate ourself, this once can have a handshake type we * don't recognize. */

1 0

[tor/master] When attempting to find a channel by ID, consider Ed ID.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

commit ef5158b2d2f67a1d70e6194b0fde291f853d485e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Sep 18 20:06:48 2016 -0400 When attempting to find a channel by ID, consider Ed ID. Right now, there's only a mechanism to look for a channel where the RSA ID matches *and* the ED ID matches. We can add a separate map later if we want. --- src/or/channel.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/or/channel.h | 21 +++++++++++----- src/or/channeltls.c | 1 - src/or/circuitbuild.c | 21 +++++++++------- src/or/connection_or.c | 4 +-- 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index af58107..d484e71 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -733,27 +733,62 @@ channel_find_by_global_id(uint64_t global_identifier) return rv; } +/** Return true iff chan matches rsa_id_digest and ed_id. + * as its identity keys. If either is NULL, do not check for a match. */ +static int +channel_remote_identity_matches(const channel_t *chan, + const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) +{ + if (BUG(!chan)) + return 0; + if (rsa_id_digest) { + if (tor_memneq(rsa_id_digest, chan->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return 0; + } + if (ed_id) { + if (tor_memneq(ed_id->pubkey, chan->ed25519_identity.pubkey, + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + /** - * Find channel by digest of the remote endpoint + * Find channel by RSA/Ed25519 identity of of the remote endpoint * - * This function looks up a channel by the digest of its remote endpoint in - * the channel digest map. It's possible that more than one channel to a - * given endpoint exists. Use channel_next_with_digest() to walk the list. + * This function looks up a channel by the digest of its remote endpoint's RSA + * identity key. If ed_id is provided and nonzero, only a channel + * matching the ed_id will be returned. + * + * It's possible that more than one channel to a given endpoint exists. Use + * channel_next_with_rsa_identity() to walk the list of channels; make sure + * to test for Ed25519 identity match too (as appropriate) */ - channel_t * -channel_find_by_remote_digest(const char *identity_digest) +channel_find_by_remote_identity(const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { channel_t *rv = NULL; channel_idmap_entry_t *ent, search; - tor_assert(identity_digest); + tor_assert(rsa_id_digest); /* For now, we require that every channel have + * an RSA identity, and that every lookup + * contain an RSA identity */ + if (ed_id && ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)) { + /* Treat zero as meaning "We don't care about the presence or absence of + * an Ed key", not "There must be no Ed key". */ + ed_id = NULL; + } - memcpy(search.digest, identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(search.digest, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN); ent = HT_FIND(channel_idmap, &channel_identity_map, &search); if (ent) { rv = TOR_LIST_FIRST(&ent->channel_list); } + while (rv && ! channel_remote_identity_matches(rv, rsa_id_digest, ed_id)) { + rv = channel_next_with_rsa_identity(rv); + } return rv; } @@ -766,7 +801,7 @@ channel_find_by_remote_digest(const char *identity_digest) */ channel_t * -channel_next_with_digest(channel_t *chan) +channel_next_with_rsa_identity(channel_t *chan) { tor_assert(chan); @@ -3296,7 +3331,8 @@ channel_is_better(time_t now, channel_t *a, channel_t *b, */ channel_t * -channel_get_for_extend(const char *digest, +channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, const tor_addr_t *target_addr, const char **msg_out, int *launch_out) @@ -3309,14 +3345,14 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *digest, tor_assert(msg_out); tor_assert(launch_out); - chan = channel_find_by_remote_digest(digest); + chan = channel_find_by_remote_identity(rsa_id_digest, ed_id); /* Walk the list, unrefing the old one and refing the new at each * iteration. */ - for (; chan; chan = channel_next_with_digest(chan)) { + for (; chan; chan = channel_next_with_rsa_identity(chan)) { tor_assert(tor_memeq(chan->identity_digest, - digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); if (CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) continue; @@ -3327,6 +3363,11 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *digest, continue; } + /* The Ed25519 key has to match too */ + if (!channel_remote_identity_matches(chan, rsa_id_digest, ed_id)) { + continue; + } + /* Never return a non-open connection. */ if (!CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(chan)) { /* If the address matches, don't launch a new connection for this diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index 7e7b2ec..2747e52 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -153,10 +153,16 @@ struct channel_s { int (*write_var_cell)(channel_t *, var_cell_t *); /** - * Hash of the public RSA key for the other side's identity key, or - * zeroes if the other side hasn't shown us a valid identity key. + * Hash of the public RSA key for the other side's RSA identity key, or + * zeroes if the other side hasn't shown us a valid RSA identity key. */ char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + /** + * The Ed25519 public identity key for the other side, or zeros if the other + * size hasn't shown us a valid Ed25519 identity key + */ + ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_identity; + /** Nickname of the OR on the other side, or NULL if none. */ char *nickname; @@ -489,10 +495,11 @@ int channel_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan, */ channel_t * channel_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest, + const char *rsa_id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); -channel_t * channel_get_for_extend(const char *digest, +channel_t * channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, const tor_addr_t *target_addr, const char **msg_out, int *launch_out); @@ -506,11 +513,13 @@ int channel_is_better(time_t now, */ channel_t * channel_find_by_global_id(uint64_t global_identifier); -channel_t * channel_find_by_remote_digest(const char *identity_digest); +channel_t * channel_find_by_remote_identity(const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); /** For things returned by channel_find_by_remote_digest(), walk the list. + * The RSA key will match for all returned elements; the Ed25519 key might not. */ -channel_t * channel_next_with_digest(channel_t *chan); +channel_t * channel_next_with_rsa_identity(channel_t *chan); /* * Helper macros to lookup state of given channel. diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index 9fb309d..8384576 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { - (void) ed_id; // XXXX not fully used yet channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index e578a94..9a3af40 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -63,8 +63,9 @@ #include "transports.h" static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, - uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest); + uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, int relayed); @@ -80,13 +81,12 @@ static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); */ static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest) + const char *id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { channel_t *chan; - chan = channel_connect(addr, port, id_digest, - NULL // XXXX Ed25519 id. - ); + chan = channel_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id); if (chan) command_setup_channel(chan); return chan; @@ -556,6 +556,7 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) firsthop->extend_info->port)); n_chan = channel_get_for_extend(firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, + &firsthop->extend_info->ed_identity, &firsthop->extend_info->addr, &msg, &should_launch); @@ -573,7 +574,8 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit( &firsthop->extend_info->addr, firsthop->extend_info->port, - firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest); + firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, + &firsthop->extend_info->ed_identity); if (!n_chan) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */ log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED; @@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) } n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, - /*&ec.ed25519_id 15056 */ + &ec.ed_pubkey, &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &msg, &should_launch); @@ -1212,7 +1214,8 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) /* we should try to open a connection */ n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, ec.orport_ipv4.port, - (const char*)ec.node_id); + (const char*)ec.node_id, + &ec.ed_pubkey); if (!n_chan) { log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit."); circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index eb67f06..e83dca2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *rsa_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { - (void) ed_id; // DOCDOC // XXXX not implemented yet. + (void) ed_id; // DOCDOC // XXXX not implemented yet. 15056 or_connection_t *tmp; tor_assert(conn); tor_assert(rsa_digest); @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, channel_tls_t *chan)) { - (void) ed_id; // XXXX not fully used yet. + (void) ed_id; // XXXX not fully used yet. 15056 or_connection_t *conn; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int socket_error = 0;

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tor-commits December 2016