January 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[metrics-web/master] Remove one country code, add four.
by karsten＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 3d7480ea94b5d4fe7b0cfd47821d1029d9fd8265 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Tue Jan 26 17:41:12 2016 +0100 Remove one country code, add four. - Remove FX (France, Metropolitan): Wikipedia says this country code was reserved on request of France, but it's neither used by MaxMind nor by little-t-tor. We can safely drop this country code from Metrics. - Add BQ (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba): This country code was assigned in 2010, and Metrics is missing it. We should add it. - Add CW (Curacao): See BQ, add it. - Add SX (Sint Maarten): See BQ, add it. - Add XK (Kosovo): Wikipedia says that XF is a user-assigned code that is being used by the European Commission, Switzerland, the Deutsche Bundesbank, SWIFT, and other organizations as a temporary country code for Kosovo. MaxMind adds this country code in its GeoIP2 format, and there are actual Tor users from that country code. We should add it to Metrics, too. Fixes #17786. --- modules/clients/country_info.py | 5 ++++- website/rserve/graphs.R | 5 ++++- website/src/org/torproject/metrics/web/graphs/Countries.java | 6 +++++- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/modules/clients/country_info.py b/modules/clients/country_info.py index e23728e..1a505d0 100644 --- a/modules/clients/country_info.py +++ b/modules/clients/country_info.py @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ countries = { "bm" : "Bermuda", "bn" : "Brunei", "bo" : "Bolivia", + "bq" : "Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba", "br" : "Brazil", "bs" : "the Bahamas", "bt" : "Bhutan", @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ countries = { "cr" : "Costa Rica", "cu" : "Cuba", "cv" : "Cape Verde", + "cw" : u"Curaçao", "cx" : "the Christmas Island", "cy" : "Cyprus", "cz" : "the Czech Republic", @@ -75,7 +77,6 @@ countries = { "fm" : "the Federated States of Micronesia", "fo" : "the Faroe Islands", "fr" : "France", - "fx" : "Metropolitan France", "ga" : "Gabon", "gb" : "the United Kingdom", "gd" : "Grenada", @@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ countries = { "ss" : "South Sudan", "st" : u"São Tomé and Príncipe", "sv" : "El Salvador", + "sx" : "Sint Maarten", "sy" : "the Syrian Arab Republic", "sz" : "Swaziland", "tc" : "Turks and Caicos Islands", @@ -244,6 +246,7 @@ countries = { "vu" : "Vanuatu", "wf" : "Wallis and Futuna", "ws" : "Samoa", + "xk" : "Kosovo", "ye" : "Yemen", "yt" : "Mayotte", "za" : "South Africa", diff --git a/website/rserve/graphs.R b/website/rserve/graphs.R index bbb2561..87ac39a 100644 --- a/website/rserve/graphs.R +++ b/website/rserve/graphs.R @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ countrylist <- list( "bm" = "Bermuda", "bn" = "Brunei", "bo" = "Bolivia", + "bq" = "Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba", "br" = "Brazil", "bs" = "the Bahamas", "bt" = "Bhutan", @@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ countrylist <- list( "cr" = "Costa Rica", "cu" = "Cuba", "cv" = "Cape Verde", + "cw" = "Curaçao", "cx" = "the Christmas Island", "cy" = "Cyprus", "cz" = "the Czech Republic", @@ -73,7 +75,6 @@ countrylist <- list( "fm" = "the Federated States of Micronesia", "fo" = "the Faroe Islands", "fr" = "France", - "fx" = "Metropolitan France", "ga" = "Gabon", "gb" = "the United Kingdom", "gd" = "Grenada", @@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ countrylist <- list( "ss" = "South Sudan", "st" = "São Tomé and Príncipe", "sv" = "El Salvador", + "sx" = "Sint Maarten", "sy" = "the Syrian Arab Republic", "sz" = "Swaziland", "tc" = "Turks and Caicos Islands", @@ -242,6 +244,7 @@ countrylist <- list( "vu" = "Vanuatu", "wf" = "Wallis and Futuna", "ws" = "Samoa", + "xk" = "Kosovo", "ye" = "Yemen", "yt" = "Mayotte", "za" = "South Africa", diff --git a/website/src/org/torproject/metrics/web/graphs/Countries.java b/website/src/org/torproject/metrics/web/graphs/Countries.java index 7a99a46..7982a8f 100644 --- a/website/src/org/torproject/metrics/web/graphs/Countries.java +++ b/website/src/org/torproject/metrics/web/graphs/Countries.java @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ public class Countries { this.knownCountries.add("bm;Bermuda".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("bt;Bhutan".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("bo;Bolivia".split(";")); + this.knownCountries.add("bq;Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba". + split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("ba;Bosnia and Herzegovina".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("bw;Botswana".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("bv;Bouvet Island".split(";")); @@ -78,6 +80,7 @@ public class Countries { this.knownCountries.add("ci:Côte d'Ivoire".split(":")); this.knownCountries.add("hr;Croatia".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("cu;Cuba".split(";")); + this.knownCountries.add("cw;Curaçao".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("cy;Cyprus".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("cz;Czech Republic".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("dk;Denmark".split(";")); @@ -95,7 +98,6 @@ public class Countries { this.knownCountries.add("fo;Faroe Islands".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("fj;Fiji".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("fi;Finland".split(";")); - this.knownCountries.add("fx;France, Metropolitan".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("fr;France".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("gf;French Guiana".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("pf;French Polynesia".split(";")); @@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ public class Countries { this.knownCountries.add("ki;Kiribati".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("kp;North Korea".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("kr;Korea, Republic of".split(";")); + this.knownCountries.add("xk;Kosovo".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("kw;Kuwait".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("kg;Kyrgyzstan".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("la;Laos".split(";")); @@ -226,6 +229,7 @@ public class Countries { this.knownCountries.add("sc;Seychelles".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("sl;Sierra Leone".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("sg;Singapore".split(";")); + this.knownCountries.add("sx;Sint Maarten".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("sk;Slovakia".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("si;Slovenia".split(";")); this.knownCountries.add("sb;Solomon Islands".split(";"));

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[torspec/master] Clients may bootstrap from a default fallback directory mirror
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 8ae8544ada81ce9d0e1c0216440e0b7daf8d2ded Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Jan 25 10:49:34 2016 +1100 Clients may bootstrap from a default fallback directory mirror Update the directory spec to describe client behaviour with default fallback directory mirrors after #15775 and #4483. --- dir-spec.txt | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/dir-spec.txt b/dir-spec.txt index 66b3421..a61f02c 100644 --- a/dir-spec.txt +++ b/dir-spec.txt @@ -2941,15 +2941,22 @@ Each client maintains a list of directory authorities. Insofar as possible, clients SHOULD all use the same list. + [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.8.1-alpha and later): + Each client also maintains a list of default fallback directory mirrors + (fallbacks). Each released version of Tor MAY have a different list, + depending on the mirrors that satisfy the fallback directory criteria at + release time.] + Clients try to have a live consensus network-status document at all times. A network-status document is "live" if the time in its valid-until field has not passed. When a client has no consensus network-status document, it downloads it - from a randomly chosen authority. In all other cases, the client - downloads from caches randomly chosen from among those believed to be V3 - directory servers. (This information comes from the network-status - documents; see 6 below.) + from a randomly chosen fallback directory mirror or authority. Clients + prefer fallbacks to authorities, trying them earlier and more frequently. + In all other cases, the client downloads from caches randomly chosen from + among those believed to be V3 directory servers. (This information comes + from the network-status documents; see 6 below.) After receiving any response client MUST discard any network-status documents that it did not request. @@ -2977,8 +2984,9 @@ (Note: clients can and should pick caches based on the network-status information they have: once they have first fetched network-status info - from an authority, they should not need to go to the authority directly - again.) + from an authority or fallback, they should not need to go to the authority + directly again, and should only choose the fallback at random, based on its + consensus weight in the current consensus.) To avoid swarming the caches whenever a consensus expires, the clients download new consensuses at a randomly chosen time after the

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[torspec/master] Fix a typo in the directory spec where cache was used instead of client
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 3181c504713c2e7c64b2b4b0bf2c966c7d296d1a Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Jan 25 10:51:05 2016 +1100 Fix a typo in the directory spec where cache was used instead of client --- dir-spec.txt | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/dir-spec.txt b/dir-spec.txt index a61f02c..2ab1878 100644 --- a/dir-spec.txt +++ b/dir-spec.txt @@ -2996,8 +2996,8 @@ consensus is no longer fresh, and 7/8 of the time remaining after that before the consensus is invalid.) - [For example, if a cache has a consensus that became valid at 1:00, - and is fresh until 2:00, and expires at 4:00, that cache will fetch + [For example, if a client has a consensus that became valid at 1:00, + and is fresh until 2:00, and expires at 4:00, that client will fetch a new consensus at a random time between 2:45 and 3:50, since 3/4 of the one-hour interval is 45 minutes, and 7/8 of the remaining 75 minutes is 65 minutes.]

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[tor/master] Correct grammatical errors in tor comments
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit c927b6cb1aff4588a5f3729f8cc919ef3616d73e Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:45:01 2016 +1100 Correct grammatical errors in tor comments Avoid using gender for things that don't have it. Avoid assigning a gender to tor users. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- src/or/config.c | 2 +- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_or.c | 4 ++-- src/or/directory.c | 2 +- src/or/entrynodes.c | 2 +- src/or/ext_orport.c | 2 +- src/or/relay.c | 2 +- src/or/transports.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index e742a56..a6fffdf 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ consider_recording_trackhost(const entry_connection_t *conn, char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; /* Search the addressmap for this conn's destination. */ - /* If he's not in the address map.. */ + /* If they're not in the address map.. */ if (!options->TrackHostExits || addressmap_have_mapping(conn->socks_request->address, options->TrackHostExitsExpire)) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 8ee1634..d2d8815 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) #endif /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no - Extended ORPort, inform the user that she is missing out. */ + Extended ORPort, inform the user that they are missing out. */ if (server_mode(options) && options->ServerTransportPlugin && !options->ExtORPort_lines) { log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "We use pluggable transports but the Extended " diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index c003104..efe804d 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) if (!SOCKET_OK(news)) { /* accept() error */ int e = tor_socket_errno(conn->s); if (ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e)) { - return 0; /* he hung up before we could accept(). that's fine. */ + return 0; /* they hung up before we could accept(). that's fine. */ } else if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e)) { warn_too_many_conns(); return 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 73e4d19..d778eb3 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn) } /** Conn just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and - * return -1 if he is lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong. + * return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong. * * If we initiated this connection (started_here is true), make sure * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the @@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn) * * Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with. * - * If he initiated the connection, make sure he's not already connected, + * If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected, * then initialize conn from the information in router. * * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index e1bdcb0..c1fa37f 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ connection_dir_request_failed(dir_connection_t *conn) return; /* this was a test fetch. don't retry. */ } if (!entry_list_is_constrained(get_options())) - router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0); /* don't try him again */ + router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0); /* don't try this one again */ if (conn->base_.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC || conn->base_.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_EXTRAINFO) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Giving up on serverdesc/extrainfo fetch from " diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index bf71fc3..789c53d 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory, } else { /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep - * using him. + * using it. * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */ preferred_min = 2; } diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c index f159f7d..810fa0d 100644 --- a/src/or/ext_orport.c +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(int is_enabled) } /** Read data from conn and see if the client sent us the - * authentication type that she prefers to use in this session. + * authentication type that they prefer to use in this session. * * Return -1 if we received corrupted data or if we don't support the * authentication type. Return 0 if we need more data in diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index ee2f041..aea51a1 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( } } } - /* check if he *ought* to have allowed it */ + /* check if the exit *ought* to have allowed it */ adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(circ, conn, diff --git a/src/or/transports.c b/src/or/transports.c index 81b8db2..5a3af85 100644 --- a/src/or/transports.c +++ b/src/or/transports.c @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) smartlist_add(mp->transports, transport); - /* For now, notify the user so that he knows where the server + /* For now, notify the user so that they know where the server transport is listening. */ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Server transport %s at %s:%d.", method_name, address, (int)port);

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug18145'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 42dea56363c24960e85344749644f6502f625463 Merge: 0010b80 4339fa5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 26 10:01:34 2016 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug18145' src/or/circuituse.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/config.c | 2 +- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_or.c | 4 ++-- src/or/directory.c | 2 +- src/or/entrynodes.c | 2 +- src/or/ext_orport.c | 2 +- src/or/or.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ src/or/relay.c | 2 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 15 ++++++++------- src/or/rendmid.c | 9 +++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 4 ++-- src/or/router.c | 2 +- src/or/transports.c | 2 +- 14 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Replace "Alice" with "the client" in a hidden service log message
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 4339fa560934de09dbe22c7615f68ed46ba3444c Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:49:16 2016 +1100 Replace "Alice" with "the client" in a hidden service log message --- src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 0a3fee6..05201a5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* Don't increment failure count, since the client may have picked * the rendezvous point maliciously */ log_info(LD_REND, - "Couldn't connect to Alice's chosen rend point %s " + "Couldn't connect to the client's chosen rend point %s " "(%s hop failed).", escaped(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)), failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last");

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[tor/master] Replace Alice/Bob with client/service in hidden service comments
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit fb939ed82e2b913850e9ba2be1b497a7002c97d0 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:48:31 2016 +1100 Replace Alice/Bob with client/service in hidden service comments --- src/or/circuituse.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ src/or/or.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ src/or/rendclient.c | 15 ++++++++------- src/or/rendmid.c | 9 +++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index a6fffdf..0a3fee6 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, /* decide if this circ is suitable for this conn */ /* for rend circs, circ->cpath->prev is not the last router in the - * circuit, it's the magical extra bob hop. so just check the nickname + * circuit, it's the magical extra service hop. so just check the nickname * of the one we meant to finish at. */ build_state = origin_circ->build_state; @@ -1493,11 +1493,11 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ); break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO: - /* at Bob, waiting for introductions */ + /* at the service, waiting for introductions */ rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ); break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND: - /* at Bob, connecting to rend point */ + /* at the service, connecting to rend point */ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ); break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: @@ -1617,29 +1617,29 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) circuit_testing_failed(circ, failed_at_last_hop); break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO: - /* at Bob, waiting for introductions */ + /* at the service, waiting for introductions */ if (circ->base_.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) { circuit_increment_failure_count(); } - /* no need to care here, because bob will rebuild intro + /* no need to care here, because the service will rebuild intro * points periodically. */ break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: - /* at Alice, connecting to intro point */ - /* Don't increment failure count, since Bob may have picked + /* at the client, connecting to intro point */ + /* Don't increment failure count, since the service may have picked * the introduction point maliciously */ - /* Alice will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if + /* The client will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if * the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */ break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: - /* at Alice, waiting for Bob */ + /* at the client, waiting for the service */ circuit_increment_failure_count(); - /* Alice will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if + /* the client will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if * the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */ break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND: - /* at Bob, connecting to rend point */ - /* Don't increment failure count, since Alice may have picked + /* at the service, connecting to rend point */ + /* Don't increment failure count, since the client may have picked * the rendezvous point maliciously */ log_info(LD_REND, "Couldn't connect to Alice's chosen rend point %s " diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 52bf337..103e76d 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -458,9 +458,11 @@ typedef enum { #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MIN_ 1 /** OR-side circuit purpose: normal circuit, at OR. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR 1 -/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from Bob, waiting for intro from Alices. */ +/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the service, waiting for intro from + * clients. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT 2 -/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from Alice, waiting for Bob. */ +/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the client, waiting for the service. + */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING 3 /** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, both circuits have this purpose. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED 4 @@ -479,43 +481,47 @@ typedef enum { * to becoming open, or they are open and have sent the * establish_rendezvous cell but haven't received an ack. * circuits that are c_rend_ready are open and have received a - * rend ack, but haven't heard from bob yet. if they have a + * rend ack, but haven't heard from the service yet. if they have a * buildstate->pending_final_cpath then they're expecting a - * cell from bob, else they're not. + * cell from the service, else they're not. * circuits that are c_rend_ready_intro_acked are open, and * some intro circ has sent its intro and received an ack. * circuits that are c_rend_joined are open, have heard from - * bob, and are talking to him. + * the service, and are talking to it. */ /** Client-side circuit purpose: Normal circuit, with cpath. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL 5 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, connecting to intro point. */ +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, connecting to intro point. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING 6 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point, +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point, * waiting for ACK/NAK. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT 7 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, introduced and acked, closing. */ +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, introduced and acked, closing. + */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED 8 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, waiting for ack. */ +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for ack. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND 9 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, waiting for Bob. */ +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY 10 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, waiting for Bob, INTRODUCE - * has been acknowledged. */ +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service, + * INTRODUCE has been acknowledged. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED 11 -/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, rendezvous established. */ +/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, rendezvous established. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED 12 /** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 13 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 13 -/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, waiting for introductions. */ +/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for + * introductions. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 14 -/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, successfully established - * intro. */ +/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully + * established intro. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 15 -/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, connecting to rend point. */ +/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend + * point. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 16 -/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, rendezvous established. */ +/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous + * established. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 17 /** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 18 diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d9cea53..e812a06 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, goto cleanup; } - /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */ + /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of the service's pk */ intro_key = NULL; SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro, { @@ -1096,9 +1096,9 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); /* From a path bias point of view, this circuit is now successfully used. - * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from Bob. He could induce - * Alice to attempt to connect to his hidden service and never reply - * to her rend requests */ + * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from malicious hidden services. + * They could induce the client to attempt to connect to their hidden + * service and never reply to the client's rend requests */ pathbias_mark_use_success(circ); /* XXXX This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to @@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, return 0; } -/** Bob sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */ +/** The service sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) @@ -1135,7 +1135,8 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND,"Got RENDEZVOUS2 cell from hidden service."); - /* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from bob. Finish the dh handshake...*/ + /* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh + * handshake...*/ tor_assert(circ->build_state); tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath); hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath; @@ -1164,7 +1165,7 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED); hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN; /* set the windows to default. these are the windows - * that alice thinks bob has. + * that the client thinks the service has. */ hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index 2451acb..cbfbcbe 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } - /* The request is valid. First, compute the hash of Bob's PK.*/ + /* The request is valid. First, compute the hash of the service's PK.*/ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, pk_digest)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key."); goto err; @@ -178,7 +178,8 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, (char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); - /* The first 20 bytes are all we look at: they have a hash of Bob's PK. */ + /* The first 20 bytes are all we look at: they have a hash of the service's + * PK. */ intro_circ = circuit_get_intro_point((const uint8_t*)request); if (!intro_circ) { log_info(LD_REND, @@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to Tor client."); goto err; } - /* And send an ack down Alice's circuit. Empty body means succeeded. */ + /* And send an ack down the client's circuit. Empty body means succeeded. */ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0,TO_CIRCUIT(circ), RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK, NULL,0,NULL)) { @@ -337,7 +338,7 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circ->circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats = 1; } - /* Send the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to Alice. */ + /* Send the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to the client. */ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2, (char*)(request+REND_COOKIE_LEN), diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 15d98bf..7471c62 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit, /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, circ_needs_uptime, 1); - /* Launch a circuit to alice's chosen rendezvous point. + /* Launch a circuit to the client's chosen rendezvous point. */ for (i=0;i<MAX_REND_FAILURES;i++) { int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL; @@ -2970,7 +2970,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /* Append the cpath entry. */ hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN; /* set the windows to default. these are the windows - * that bob thinks alice has. + * that the service thinks the client has. */ hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;

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[tor/master] Correct grammatical errors in tor log messages
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 7a4b4f0c3a08f08a5a7774b27811f0c5af3c1e99 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:47:23 2016 +1100 Correct grammatical errors in tor log messages Avoid using gender for things that don't have it. --- src/or/router.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 8cde4a1..741e1ed 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion, if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) { /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */ log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, " - "but he's just reporting his own IP address. Ignoring.", + "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.", suggestion); return; }

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[tor-browser-bundle/hardened-builds] Bump nightly versions for hardened-builds
by gk＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 9b4dfc9dbed50b4012caa70aae56e6b5d3cb9c0d Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:54:43 2016 +0000 Bump nightly versions for hardened-builds --- gitian/versions.nightly | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/gitian/versions.nightly b/gitian/versions.nightly index d209c6a..44e4ddb 100755 --- a/gitian/versions.nightly +++ b/gitian/versions.nightly @@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ MULTI_LINGUAL=1 VERIFY_TAGS=0 -FIREFOX_VERSION=38.5.0esr +FIREFOX_VERSION=38.6.0esr TORBROWSER_UPDATE_CHANNEL=default -TORBROWSER_TAG=tor-browser-${FIREFOX_VERSION}-5.5-2 +TORBROWSER_TAG=tor-browser-${FIREFOX_VERSION}-6.0-1 TOR_TAG=master TORLAUNCHER_TAG=master TORBUTTON_TAG=master @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ GITIAN_TAG=tor-browser-builder-3.x-8-gpgsux OPENSSL_VER=1.0.1q GMP_VER=5.1.3 FIREFOX_LANG_VER=$FIREFOX_VERSION -FIREFOX_LANG_BUILD=build2 +FIREFOX_LANG_BUILD=build1 BINUTILS_VER=2.24 GCC_VER=5.2.0 PYTHON_VER=2.7.5 @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ NOTOCJKFONT_VER=1.004 ## File names for the source packages OPENSSL_PACKAGE=openssl-${OPENSSL_VER}.tar.gz GMP_PACKAGE=gmp-${GMP_VER}.tar.bz2 -NOSCRIPT_PACKAGE=noscript_security_suite-2.9-sm+fx+fn.xpi +NOSCRIPT_PACKAGE=noscript_security_suite-2.9.0.2-sm+fx+fn.xpi TOOLCHAIN4_PACKAGE=x86_64-apple-darwin10.tar.xz TOOLCHAIN4_OLD_PACKAGE=multiarch-darwin11-cctools127.2-gcc42-5666.3-llvmgcc42-2336.1-Linux-120724.tar.xz OSXSDK_PACKAGE=MacOSX10.7.sdk.tar.gz @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ OSXSDK_HASH=da77bb0003fcca5ea8c4e8cb2da8828ded750c54afdcac29ec6f3b46ad5e3adf OSXSDK_OLD_HASH=6602d8d5ddb371fbc02e2a5967d9bd0cd7358d46f9417753c8234b923f2ea6fc TOOLCHAIN4_HASH=7b71bfe02820409b994c5c33a7eab81a81c72550f5da85ff7af70da3da244645 TOOLCHAIN4_OLD_HASH=65c1b2d302358a6b95a26c6828a66908a199276193bb0b268f2dcc1a997731e9 -NOSCRIPT_HASH=7d67363b10708ef816d786e99d035a16a41eee8c8c1b3c87e4544717b066db71 +NOSCRIPT_HASH=f3c9dec710e02d809fa85ac76750e5f074656105c1bde03d400cb597b2eb1fba MSVCR100_HASH=1221a09484964a6f38af5e34ee292b9afefccb3dc6e55435fd3aaf7c235d9067 PYCRYPTO_HASH=f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c ARGPARSE_HASH=ddaf4b0a618335a32b6664d4ae038a1de8fbada3b25033f9021510ed2b3941a4

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[translation/tor-launcher-network-settings] Update translations for tor-launcher-network-settings
by translation＠torproject.org 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

commit 8750ca1cc399b3614498566cef4381196363ca15 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 26 10:45:43 2016 +0000 Update translations for tor-launcher-network-settings --- nl/network-settings.dtd | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/nl/network-settings.dtd b/nl/network-settings.dtd index ab35d6b..af1ea16 100644 --- a/nl/network-settings.dtd +++ b/nl/network-settings.dtd @@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ <!ENTITY torSettings.firstQuestion "Welke van de volgende beschrijft het best jouw situatie?"> <!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt1 "De internetverbinding van deze computer is gecensureerd of loopt via een proxy."> -<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt2 "I need to configure bridge or local proxy settings before I connect to the Tor network."> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt2 "Ik moet een bridge of lokale proxy instellingen voordat ik verbinding kan maken met het Tor netwerk."> <!ENTITY torSettings.configure "Configureren"> -<!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt2 "I would like to make a direct connection to the Tor network."> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt2 "Ik wil een directe verbinding met het Tor netwerk maken."> <!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt3 "Dit zal in de meeste omstandigheden werken."> <!ENTITY torSettings.connect "Verbinden"> @@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ <!ENTITY torSettings.enterProxy "Voer de proxy-instellingen in."> <!ENTITY torSettings.bridgePageTitle "Tor bridge-configuratie"> <!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeQuestion "Blokkeert of filtert je Internet Service Provider (ISP) verbindingen met het Tor-netwerk?"> -<!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeExplanation1 "If you are not sure how to answer this question, choose No (if you are unable to connect to the Tor network without a bridge, you can add one later)."> -<!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeExplanation2 "If you choose Yes, you will be asked to configure Tor Bridges, which are unlisted relays that make it more difficult to block connections to the Tor Network."> +<!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeExplanation1 "Als je niet zeker bent hoe je deze vraag moet beantwoorden, kies dan Nee (als je niet kunt verbinden met het Tor netwerk zonder een bridge, kun je later een toevoegen)."> +<!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeExplanation2 "Als je Ja kiest, moet je zelf Tor Bridges instellen, maar omdat het geen vertrouwde relays zijn is het moeilijker om verbindingen te blokkeren naar het Tor Netwerk."> <!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeSettingsPrompt "Je ka de opgegeven bridges gebruiken, of je kan je eigen bridges verkrijgen en instellen. ">  <!ENTITY torsettings.startingTor "Wachten tot Tor gestart is…"> <!ENTITY torsettings.restartTor "Herstart Tor"> -<!ENTITY torsettings.reconfigTor "Reconfigure"> +<!ENTITY torsettings.reconfigTor "Herconfigureer"> <!ENTITY torsettings.discardSettings.prompt "You have configured Tor bridges or you have entered local proxy settings.  To make a direct connection to the Tor network, these settings must be removed."> <!ENTITY torsettings.discardSettings.proceed "Remove Settings and Connect">

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