tor-commits September 2015

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15 participants
1411 discussions

[torspec/master] Add 252-single-onion.txt proposal
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 10a0965449ded4a589c822bc4c214cfd3a928353 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Fri Sep 4 16:58:11 2015 +0200 Add 252-single-onion.txt proposal Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> --- proposals/000-index.txt | 2 + proposals/252-single-onion.txt | 258 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 260 insertions(+) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index f00f3f0..fc10cce 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ Proposals by number: 249 Allow CREATE cells with >505 bytes of handshake data [DRAFT] 250 Random Number Generation During Tor Voting [DRAFT] 251 Padding for netflow record resolution reduction [DRAFT] +252 Single Onion Services [DRAFT] Proposals by status: @@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ Proposals by status: 249 Allow CREATE cells with >505 bytes of handshake data 250 Random Number Generation During Tor Voting 251 Padding for netflow record resolution reduction + 252 Single Onion Services NEEDS-REVISION: 131 Help users to verify they are using Tor 190 Bridge Client Authorization Based on a Shared Secret diff --git a/proposals/252-single-onion.txt b/proposals/252-single-onion.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f91acb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/252-single-onion.txt @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +Filename: 252-single-onion.txt +Title: Single Onion Services +Author: John Brooks, Paul Syverson, Roger Dingledine +Created: 2015-07-13 +Status: Draft + +1. Overview + + Single onion services are a modified form of onion services, which trade + service-side location privacy for improved performance, reliability, and + scalability. + + Single onion services have a .onion address identical to any other onion + service. The descriptor contains information sufficient to do a relay + extend of a circuit to the onion service and to open a stream for the onion + address. The introduction point and rendezvous protocols are bypassed for + these services. + + We also specify behavior for a tor instance to publish a single onion + service, which requires a reachable OR port, without necessarily acting + as a public relay in the network. + +2. Motivation + + Single onion services have a few benefits over double onion services: + + * Connection latency is much lower by skipping rendezvous + * Stream latency is reduced on a 4-hop circuit + * Removing rendezvous circuits improves service scalability + * A single onion service can use multiple relays for load balancing + + Single onion services are not location hidden on the service side, + but clients retain all of the benefits and privacy of onion + services. More details, relation to double onion services, and the + rationale for the 'single' and 'double' nomenclature are further + described in section 7.4. + + We believe these improvements, along with the other benefits of onion + services, will be a significant incentive for website and other internet + service operators to provide these portals to preserve the privacy of their + users. + +3. Onion descriptors + + The onion descriptor format is extended to add: + + "service-extend-locations" NL encrypted-string + [At most once] + + A list of relay extend info, which is used instead of introduction + points and rendezvous for single onion services. This field is + encoded and optionally encrypted in the same way as the + "introduction-points" field. + + The encoded contents of this field contains no more than 10 entries, + each containing the following data: + + "service-extend-location" SP link-specifiers NL + [At start, exactly once] + link-specifiers is a base64 encoded link specifier block, in + the format described by proposal 224 [BUILDING-BLOCKS] and the + EXTEND2 cell. + + "onion-key" SP key-type NL onion-key + [Exactly once] + Describes the onion key that must be used when extending to the + single onion service relay. + + The key-type field is one of: + "tap" + onion-key is a PEM-encoded RSA relay onion key + "ntor" + onion-key is a base64-encoded NTOR relay onion key + + [XXX: Should there be some kind of cookie to prove that we have the desc? + See also section 7.1. -special] + + A descriptor may contain either or both of "introduction-points" and + "service-extend-locations"; see section 5.2. + + [XXX: What kind of backwards compatibility issues exist here? Will existing + relays accept one of those descriptors? -special] + +4. Reaching a single onion service as a client + + Single onion services use normal onion hostnames, so the client will first + request the service's descriptor. If the descriptor contains a + "service-extend-locations" field, the client should ignore the introduction + points and rendezvous process in favor of the process defined here. + + The descriptor's "service-extend-locations" information is sufficient for a + client to extend a circuit to the onion service, regardless of whether it + is also listed as a relay in the network consensus. This extend info must + not be used for any other purpose. If multiple extend locations are + specified, the client should randomly select one. + + The client uses a 3-hop circuit to extend to the service location from the + descriptor. Once this circuit is built, the client sends a BEGIN cell to + the relay, with the onion address as hostname and the desired TCP port. + + If the circuit or stream fails, the client should retry using another + extend location from the descriptor. If all extend locations fail, and the + descriptor contains an "introduction-points" field, the client may fall + back to a full rendezvous operation. + +5. Publishing a single onion service + + To act as a single onion service, a tor instance (or cooperating group of + tor instances) must: + + * Have a publicly accessible OR port + * Publish onion descriptors in the same manner as any onion service + * Include a "service-extend-locations" section in the onion descriptor + * Accept RELAY_BEGIN cells for the service as defined in section 5.3 + +5.1. Configuration options + + The tor server operating a single onion service must accept connections as + a tor relay, but is not required to be published in the consensus or to + allow extending circuits. To enable this, we propose the following + configuration option: + + RelayAllowExtend 0|1 + If set, allow clients to extend circuits from this relay. Otherwise, + refuse all extend cells. PublishServerDescriptor must also be disabled + if this option is disabled. If ExitRelay is also disabled, this relay + will not pass through any traffic. + +5.2. Publishing descriptors + + A single onion service must publish descriptors in the same manner as any + onion service, as defined by rend-spec and section 3 of this proposal. + + Optionally, a set of introduction points may be included in the descriptor + to provide backwards compatibility with clients that don't support single + onion services, or to provide a fallback when the extend locations fail. + +5.3. RELAY_BEGIN + + When a RELAY_BEGIN cell is received with a configured single onion hostname + as the destination, the stream should be connected to the configured + backend server in the same manner as a service-side rendezvous stream. + + All relays must reject any RELAY_BEGIN cell with an address ending in + ".onion" that does not match a locally configured single onion service. + +6. Other considerations + +6.1. Load balancing + + High capacity services can distribute load by including multiple entries in + the "service-extend-locations" section of the descriptor, or by publishing + several descriptors to different onion service directories, or by a + combination of these methods. + +6.2. Benefits of also running a Tor relay + + If a single onion service also acts as a published tor relay, it will keep + connections to many other tor relays. This can significantly reduce the + latency of connections to the single onion service, and also helps the tor + network. + +6.3. Proposal 224 ("Next-Generation Hidden Services") + + This proposal is compatible with proposal 224, with small changes to the + service descriptor format. In particular: + + The "service-extend-location" sections are included in the encrypted + portion of the descriptor, adjacent to any "introduction-point" sections. + The "service-extend-locations" field is no longer present. An onion service + is also single onion service if any "service-extend-location" field is + present. + +6.4. Proposal 246 ("Merging Hidden Service Directories and Intro Points") + + This proposal is compatible with proposal 246. The onion service will + publish its descriptor to the introduction points in the same manner as any + other onion service. The client may choose to build a circuit to the + specified relays, or to continue with the rendezvous protocol. + + The client should not extend from the introduction point to the single + onion service's relay, to avoid overloading the introduction point. The + client may truncate the circuit and extend through a new relay. + +7. Discussion + +7.1. Authorization + + Client authorization for a single onion service is possible through + encryption of the service-extend-locations section in the descriptor, or + "stealth" publication under a new onion address, as with traditional onion + services. + + One problem with this is that if you suspect a relay is also serving a + single onion service, you can connect to it and send RELAY_BEGIN without + any further authorization. To prevent this, we would need to include a + cookie from the descriptor in the RELAY_BEGIN information. + +7.2. Preventing relays from being unintentionally published + + Many single onion servers will not want to relay other traffic, and will + set 'PublishServerDescriptor 0' to prevent it. Even when they do, they will + still generate a relay descriptor, which could be downloaded and published + to a directory authority without the relay's consent. To prevent this, we + should insert a field in the relay descriptor when PublishServerDescriptor + is disabled that instructs relays to never include it as part of a + consensus. + + [XXX: Also see task #16564] + +7.3. Ephemeral single onion services (ADD_ONION) + + The ADD_ONION control port command could be extended to support ephemerally + configured single onion services. We encourage this, but specifying its + behavior is out of the scope of this proposal. + +7.4. Onion service taxonomy and nomenclature + + Onion services in general provide several benefits. First, by requiring a + connection via Tor they provide the client the protections of Tor and make + it much more difficult to inadvertently bypass those protections than when + connecting to a non .onion site. Second, because .onion addresses are + self-authenticating, onion services have look-up, routing, and + authentication protections not provided by sites with standard domain + addresses. These benefits apply to all onion services. + + Onion services as originally introduced also provide network location + hiding of the service itself: because the client only ever connects through + the end of a Tor circuit created by the onion service, the IP address of + the onion service also remains protected. + + Applications and services already exist that use existing onion service + protocols for the above described general benefits without the need for + network location hiding. This Proposal is accordingly motivated by a desire + to provide the general benefits, without the complexity and overhead of + also protecting the location of the service. + + Further, as with what had originally been called 'location hidden + services', there may be useful and valid applications of this design that + are not reflected in our current intent. Just as 'location hidden service' + is a misleading name for many current onion service applications, we prefer + a name that is descriptive of the system but flexible with respect to + applications of it. We also prefer a nomenclature that consistently works + for the different types of onion services. + + It is also important to have short, simple names lest usage efficiencies + evolve easier names for us. For example, 'hidden service' has replaced the + original 'location hidden service' in Tor Proposals and other writings. + + For these reasons, we have chosen 'onion services' to refer to both those + as set out in this Proposal and those with the client-side and server-side + protections of the original---also for referring indiscriminately to any + and all onion services. We use 'double-onion service' to refer to services + that join two Tor circuits, one from the server and one from the client. We + use 'single-onion' when referring to services that use only a client-side + Tor circuit. In speech we sometimes use the even briefer, 'two-nion' and + 'one-ion' respectively. +

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[tor-messenger-build/master] docker-image: do apt-get update on Debian too
by boklm＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit c8f8802bfc298bf231678b49763bd05f5b9bafcd Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 16:39:53 2015 +0200 docker-image: do apt-get update on Debian too --- projects/docker-image/config | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/projects/docker-image/config b/projects/docker-image/config index 0502743..af2bde6 100644 --- a/projects/docker-image/config +++ b/projects/docker-image/config @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ pre: | [% IF pc(c('origin_project'), 'var/pre_pkginst') -%] [% pc(c('origin_project'), 'var/pre_pkginst') %] [% END -%] - [% IF c('lsb_release/id') == 'Ubuntu' %] + [% IF c('lsb_release/id') == 'Ubuntu' || c('lsb_release/id') == 'Debian' %] apt-get update -y apt-get upgrade -y [% END %]

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[tor/master] Fix an alignment issue in our extensions to ed25519_donna
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 81e3deeb54d2f3d022655c6a51f966ef44bf6fb3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 09:30:59 2015 -0400 Fix an alignment issue in our extensions to ed25519_donna Apparently this only happens with clang (or with some particular clang versions), and only on i386. Fixes 16970; bug not in any released Tor. Found by Teor; fix from Yawning. --- src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c index 7f5894d..12493f7 100644 --- a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c +++ b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, int signbit) { - static const bignum25519 one = { 1 }; + static const bignum25519 ALIGN(16) one = { 1 }; bignum25519 ALIGN(16) u, uminus1, uplus1, inv_uplus1, y; /* Prop228: y = (u-1)/(u+1) */

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[translation/torbutton-aboutdialogdtd] Update translations for torbutton-aboutdialogdtd
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 8b5114e78a1ca45cfb95faf3a6ec64d44a8a77b0 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 11:16:00 2015 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-aboutdialogdtd --- ur_PK/aboutdialog.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ur_PK/aboutdialog.dtd b/ur_PK/aboutdialog.dtd index 5099ad7..761c277 100644 --- a/ur_PK/aboutdialog.dtd +++ b/ur_PK/aboutdialog.dtd @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -<!ENTITY project.start "&brandShortName; is developed by "> +<!ENTITY project.start "ٹور بنایا ہے ">  <!ENTITY project.tpoLink "the &vendorShortName;"> <!ENTITY project.end ", a nonprofit working to defend your privacy and freedom online.">

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[tor-browser-bundle/master] Bug 16960: OS X nightly tor target is broken
by gk＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 96b9929f24d0461ec05b010c6a8d74506c8e2657 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 3 19:01:57 2015 +0000 Bug 16960: OS X nightly tor target is broken Commit b79e90f6ba9426158cf305655590f70d3ae89875 (which fixed bug 16901) makes it necessary to update our CFLAGS for cross-compiling tor for OS X. --- gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-tor.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-tor.yml b/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-tor.yml index 8e64922..848fbe9 100644 --- a/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-tor.yml +++ b/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-tor.yml @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ script: | # Building tor # XXX Clean up these flags? - export CFLAGS="-m64 -I/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/include/ -I/usr/lib/gcc/i686-apple-darwin10/4.2.1/include/ -I. -L/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/lib/ -L/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/lib/system/ -mmacosx-version-min=10.5" + export CFLAGS="-m64 -I${INSTDIR}/openssl/include -I/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/include/ -I/usr/lib/gcc/i686-apple-darwin10/4.2.1/include/ -I. -L/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/lib/ -L/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/lib/system/ -mmacosx-version-min=10.5" export LDFLAGS="-m64 -L/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/lib/ -L/usr/lib/apple/SDKs/MacOSX10.6.sdk/usr/lib/system/ -mmacosx-version-min=10.5" cd tor git update-index --refresh -q

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[translation/torbutton-torbuttondtd] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 47a2f8b58ff470ee7dc1232853fa40adbfb5d9a5 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 09:45:51 2015 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd --- my/torbutton.dtd | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/my/torbutton.dtd b/my/torbutton.dtd index 533f8c2..cac0486 100644 --- a/my/torbutton.dtd +++ b/my/torbutton.dtd @@ -151,13 +151,13 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty "Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_plugins "Disable browser plugins (such as Flash)"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting "Change details that distinguish you from other Tor Browser users"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption "Security Level"> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption "လုံခြုံ‌ရေးအဆင့်"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low "Low (default)"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low_usable_desc "This provides the most usable experience."> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low_desc "At this security level, all browser features are enabled."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low_desc "ဤလုံခြုံရေးအဆင့်တွင် Browser ၏လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်အားလုံးကို ခွင့်ပြုထားပါသည်။"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_font_rend_svg_tooltip "The SVG OpenType font rendering mechanism is disabled."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_med_low "Medium-Low"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_gen_desc "At this security level, the following changes apply (mouseover for details):"> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_gen_desc "ဤလုံခြုံရေးအဆင့်တွင် အောက်ပါပြောင်းလဲမှုများကိုပါ ဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်သည် (အသေးစိတ်သိရှိရန် မောက်စ်ကာစာကိုရွှေ့ပါ)"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_html5_desc "HTML5 video and audio media become click-to-play via NoScript."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_html5_tooltip "On some sites, you might need to use the NoScript toolbar button to enable these media objects."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_some_jit_desc "အချို့သော JavaScript လုပ်ဆောင်မှုများအား ပြင်ဆင်ခွင့်ပိတ်ထားပါသည်။"> @@ -178,10 +178,10 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_js_desc_tooltip "JavaScript can be enabled on a per-site basis via the NoScript toolbar button."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_high "High"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_all_js_desc "JavaScript is disabled by default on all sites."> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_audio_video_desc "Most audio and video formats are disabled."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_audio_video_desc "အသံဖိုင်နှင့်ဗွီဒီယိုဖိုင် အမျိုးစားအများစုကို လုပ်ဆောင်မှုပိတ်ပင်ထားသည်။"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_audio_video_desc_tooltip "WebM is the only codec that remains enabled."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_webfonts_desc "Some fonts and icons may display incorrectly."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_webfonts_desc_tooltip "Website-provided font files are blocked."> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_custom "Custom Values"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.circuit_display.title "Tor circuit for this site"> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_custom "စိတ်ကြိုက်တန်ဖိုး"> +<!ENTITY torbutton.circuit_display.title "ဤဆိုဒ်အတွက် Tor ပတ်လမ်း">

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[translation/torbutton-torbuttondtd] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 7fa5db7464634f0b28c0f26e68d6ef93d3145e65 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 09:15:57 2015 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd --- my/torbutton.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/my/torbutton.dtd b/my/torbutton.dtd index c8e8f8c..533f8c2 100644 --- a/my/torbutton.dtd +++ b/my/torbutton.dtd @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_gen_desc "At this security level, the following changes apply (mouseover for details):"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_html5_desc "HTML5 video and audio media become click-to-play via NoScript."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_html5_tooltip "On some sites, you might need to use the NoScript toolbar button to enable these media objects."> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_some_jit_desc "Some JavaScript performance optimizations are disabled."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_some_jit_desc "အချို့သော JavaScript လုပ်ဆောင်မှုများအား ပြင်ဆင်ခွင့်ပိတ်ထားပါသည်။"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_jit_desc_tooltip "ION JIT, Type Inference, ASM.JS."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_baseline_jit_desc_tooltip "Baseline JIT."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_jit_slower_desc "Scripts on some sites may run slower.">

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[translation/tor-launcher-progress] Update translations for tor-launcher-progress
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 5c77b5c69802ded525c6b7676a237a8d4af5d524 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 09:15:38 2015 +0000 Update translations for tor-launcher-progress --- my/progress.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/my/progress.dtd b/my/progress.dtd index a5a4e99..7b35c53 100644 --- a/my/progress.dtd +++ b/my/progress.dtd @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ <!ENTITY torprogress.dialog.title "Tor အနေအထား"> <!ENTITY torprogress.openSettings "Open Settings"> <!ENTITY torprogress.heading "Tor ကွန်ရက်ကို ဆက်သွယ်နေသည်"> -<!ENTITY torprogress.pleaseWait "Please wait while we establish a connection to the Tor network."> +<!ENTITY torprogress.pleaseWait "Tor ကွန်ယက်နှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်မှုပြု‌လုပ်နေစဥ်စောင့်ဆိုင်းပေးပါ။">

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[translation/gettor] Update translations for gettor
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Sep '15

04 Sep '15

commit 923bfe2d2f960b9a541ff0ea758debc77c44f796 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 4 09:15:06 2015 +0000 Update translations for gettor --- my/gettor.po | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/my/gettor.po b/my/gettor.po index 1f2bb8f..db73810 100644 --- a/my/gettor.po +++ b/my/gettor.po @@ -3,14 +3,15 @@ # This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. # # Translators: +# Thaw Pau <thawpau(a)gmail.com>, 2015 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2013-01-19 13:40+0100\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-10-15 17:11+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: runasand <runa.sandvik(a)gmail.com>\n" -"Language-Team: Burmese (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/my/)\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-04 09:03+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Thaw Pau <thawpau(a)gmail.com>\n" +"Language-Team: Burmese (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/my/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ msgid "" " obfs-linux-i386\n" " obfs-linux-x86_64\n" " source" -msgstr "" +msgstr "သင်အလိုရှိသည့် Tor Package ကို‌ပြောပါ email မှပို့ပေးလိုက်ပါမည်။ \nအောက်ပါ package အမည်များထဲမှ နှစ်သက်ရာကို ရွေးချယ်ပါ။\nwindows\nmacos-i386\nmacos-ppc\nlinux-i386\nlinux-x86_64\nobfs-windows\nobfs-macos-i386\nobfs-macos-x86_64\nobfs-linux-i386\nobfs-linux-x86_64\nsource" #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:61 msgid ""

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[tor/master] Fix windows test_keygen.sh. This time I think I have it!
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Sep '15

03 Sep '15

commit 81e58cd00a918c8590f564fda3aa950156a70337 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 3 15:23:10 2015 -0400 Fix windows test_keygen.sh. This time I think I have it! --- src/test/test_keygen.sh | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_keygen.sh b/src/test/test_keygen.sh index 917a804..87012cd 100755 --- a/src/test/test_keygen.sh +++ b/src/test/test_keygen.sh @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ DATA_DIR=`cd "${DATA_DIR}" && pwd` touch "${DATA_DIR}/empty_torrc" QUIETLY="--hush" +SILENTLY="--quiet" TOR="${TOR_BINARY} ${QUIETLY} --DisableNetwork 1 --ShutdownWaitLength 0 --ORPort 12345 --ExitRelay 0 -f ${DATA_DIR}/empty_torrc" ##### SETUP @@ -80,9 +81,9 @@ TOR="${TOR_BINARY} ${QUIETLY} --DisableNetwork 1 --ShutdownWaitLength 0 --ORPort # copying them into different keys directories in order to simulate # different kinds of configuration problems/issues. -# Step 1: Start Tor with --list-fingerprint. Make sure everything is there. +# Step 1: Start Tor with --list-fingerprint --quiet. Make sure everything is there. mkdir "${DATA_DIR}/orig" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${DATA_DIR}/orig" --list-fingerprint > /dev/null +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${DATA_DIR}/orig" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} > /dev/null check_dir "${DATA_DIR}/orig/keys" check_file "${DATA_DIR}/orig/keys/ed25519_master_id_public_key" @@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ SRC="${DATA_DIR}/orig" mkdir -p "${ME}/keys" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_master_id_"* "${ME}/keys/" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint >/dev/null || die "Tor failed when starting with only master key" +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} >/dev/null || die "Tor failed when starting with only master key" check_files_eq "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_master_id_public_key" "${ME}/keys/ed25519_master_id_public_key" check_files_eq "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" "${ME}/keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" check_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_signing_cert" @@ -224,11 +225,11 @@ SRC="${DATA_DIR}/orig" mkdir -p "${ME}/keys" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" "${ME}/keys/" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint > "${ME}/fp1" || die "Tor wouldn't start with only unencrypted secret key" +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} > "${ME}/fp1" || die "Tor wouldn't start with only unencrypted secret key" check_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_master_id_public_key" check_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_signing_cert" check_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_signing_secret_key" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint > "${ME}/fp2" || die "Tor wouldn't start again after starting once with only unencrypted secret key." +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} > "${ME}/fp2" || die "Tor wouldn't start again after starting once with only unencrypted secret key." check_files_eq "${ME}/fp1" "${ME}/fp2" @@ -288,7 +289,7 @@ cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" "${ME}/keys/" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_signing_cert" "${ME}/keys/" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_signing_secret_key" "${ME}/keys/" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint >/dev/null || die "Failed when starting with missing public key" +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} >/dev/null || die "Failed when starting with missing public key" check_keys_eq ed25519_master_id_secret_key check_keys_eq ed25519_master_id_public_key check_keys_eq ed25519_signing_secret_key @@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_master_id_public_key" "${ME}/keys/" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_signing_cert" "${ME}/keys/" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_signing_secret_key" "${ME}/keys/" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint >/dev/null || die "Failed when starting with offline secret key" +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} >/dev/null || die "Failed when starting with offline secret key" check_no_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" check_keys_eq ed25519_master_id_public_key check_keys_eq ed25519_signing_secret_key @@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ mkdir -p "${ME}/keys" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_signing_cert" "${ME}/keys/" cp "${SRC}/keys/ed25519_signing_secret_key" "${ME}/keys/" -${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint >/dev/null || die "Failed when starting with only signing material" +${TOR} --DataDirectory "${ME}" --list-fingerprint ${SILENTLY} >/dev/null || die "Failed when starting with only signing material" check_no_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" check_file "${ME}/keys/ed25519_master_id_public_key" check_keys_eq ed25519_signing_secret_key

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tor-commits September 2015