January 2015 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Remove no-longer-accurate comment from connection.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit 4316bb601a95ebe6e8353cc0a795605889039fe3 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 13 00:21:59 2015 +0000 Remove no-longer-accurate comment from connection.c --- src/or/connection.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 9866c4c..0a7a6a8 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -1508,8 +1508,6 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) } } else if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP) { - /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets - * and listeners at the same time */ tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); tor_assert(new_type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL); log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "New control connection opened.");

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[tor/master] Fix ipv4/ipv6 traffic bits on AF_UNIX socks listeners and remove hacky workarounds for brokenness
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit cb047f40786bf87f7fb17a500ca35eca9ba34f7c Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 13 00:18:17 2015 +0000 Fix ipv4/ipv6 traffic bits on AF_UNIX socks listeners and remove hacky workarounds for brokenness --- src/or/config.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 6 +----- src/or/relay.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index aea0498..219200f 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -6053,6 +6053,20 @@ parse_unix_socket_config(smartlist_t *out, smartlist_t *defaults, port->is_unix_addr = 1; memcpy(port->unix_addr, cfg->value, len+1); port->type = listener_type; + if (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) { + /* Some more bits to twiddle for this case + * + * XXX this should support parsing the same options + * parse_port_config() does, and probably that code should be + * factored out into a function we can call from here. For + * now, some reasonable defaults. + */ + + port->ipv4_traffic = 1; + port->ipv6_traffic = 1; + port->cache_ipv4_answers = 1; + port->cache_ipv6_answers = 1; + } smartlist_add(ports_to_add, port); } else { /* Keep track that we've seen a disable */ diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 390ad07..d8f397b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1233,8 +1233,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, { tor_addr_t addr; /* XXX Duplicate call to tor_addr_parse. */ - if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 && - !conn->is_socks_socket) { + if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0) { sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr); if ((family == AF_INET && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) || (family == AF_INET6 && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok)) { @@ -1837,9 +1836,6 @@ connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(entry_connection_t *ap_conn) if (!ap_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK; - if (ap_conn->is_socks_socket) - return 0; - exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath_layer->extend_info->identity_digest); if (ap_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok && exitnode) { diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index b7ab808..ac36e72 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -1328,8 +1328,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( } if (((family == AF_INET && ! entry_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) || - (family == AF_INET6 && ! entry_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok)) && - (!entry_conn->is_socks_socket)) { + (family == AF_INET6 && ! entry_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok))) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP, "Got a connected cell to %s with unsupported address family." " Closing.", fmt_addr(&addr));

1 0

[tor/master] whitespace fix
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit 2b8cebaac0232e2ca2fd09ffa3225d7550cb54a3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 13 13:11:39 2015 -0500 whitespace fix --- src/or/dirserv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 8abe6cb..b694f8a 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, /* Iff we are in a testing network, use TestingDirAuthVoteExit, TestingDirAuthVoteGuard, and TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir to - give out the Exit, Guard, and HSDir flags, respectively. + give out the Exit, Guard, and HSDir flags, respectively. But don't set the corresponding node flags. */ if (options->TestingTorNetwork) { if (routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->TestingDirAuthVoteExit,

1 0

[tor/master] Commit second draft of Jake's SOCKS5-over-AF_UNIX patch. See ticket #12585.
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit 8d59ddf3cba541c6578dff121e8f0623a7606bab Author: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob(a)appelbaum.net> Date: Mon Aug 11 12:27:04 2014 -0700 Commit second draft of Jake's SOCKS5-over-AF_UNIX patch. See ticket #12585. Signed-off-by: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug12585 | 9 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 9 ++ src/common/address.c | 18 ++++ src/or/config.c | 24 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 246 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/or/connection_edge.c | 6 +- src/or/main.c | 4 + src/or/or.h | 8 ++ src/or/relay.c | 5 +- 9 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug12585 b/changes/bug12585 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccdcd17 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug12585 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Major features (security) + - Implementation of SocksSocket option - SocksSocket implements a SOCKS + proxy reachable by Unix Domain Socket. This allows client applications to + communicate with Tor without having the ability to create AF_INET or + AF_INET6 family sockets. If an application has permission to create a socket + with AF_UNIX, it may directly communicate with Tor as if it were an other + SOCKS proxy. This should allow high risk applications to be entirely prevented + from connecting directly with TCP/IP, they will be able to only connect to the + internet through AF_UNIX and only through Tor. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 9e86a67..43aade9 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -483,6 +483,15 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and 255 characters. +[[SocksSocket]] **SocksSocket** __Path__:: + Like SocksPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP + socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) + +[[SocksSocketsGroupWritable]] **SocksSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and + write unix sockets (e.g. SocksSocket). If the option is set to 1, make + the SocksSocket socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0) + [[KeepalivePeriod]] **KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__:: To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection diff --git a/src/common/address.c b/src/common/address.c index a809260..1c3777f 100644 --- a/src/common/address.c +++ b/src/common/address.c @@ -121,6 +121,15 @@ tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a, } } +/** Set address a to zero. This address belongs to + * the AF_UNIX family. */ +static void +tor_addr_make_af_unix(tor_addr_t *a) +{ + memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); + a->family = AF_UNIX; +} + /** Set the tor_addr_t in a to contain the socket address contained in * sa. */ int @@ -142,6 +151,9 @@ tor_addr_from_sockaddr(tor_addr_t *a, const struct sockaddr *sa, tor_addr_from_in6(a, &sin6->sin6_addr); if (port_out) *port_out = ntohs(sin6->sin6_port); + } else if (sa->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { + tor_addr_make_af_unix(a); + return 0; } else { tor_addr_make_unspec(a); return -1; @@ -421,6 +433,10 @@ tor_addr_to_str(char *dest, const tor_addr_t *addr, size_t len, int decorate) ptr = dest; } break; + case AF_UNIX: + tor_snprintf(dest, len, "AF_UNIX"); + ptr = dest; + break; default: return NULL; } @@ -816,6 +832,8 @@ tor_addr_is_null(const tor_addr_t *addr) } case AF_INET: return (tor_addr_to_ipv4n(addr) == 0); + case AF_UNIX: + return 1; case AF_UNSPEC: return 1; default: diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 2fa077e..e080e77 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -190,6 +190,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(ControlPortWriteToFile, FILENAME, NULL), V(ControlSocket, LINELIST, NULL), V(ControlSocketsGroupWritable, BOOL, "0"), + V(SocksSocket, LINELIST, NULL), + V(SocksSocketsGroupWritable, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthentication, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthFileGroupReadable, BOOL, "0"), V(CookieAuthFile, STRING, NULL), @@ -1030,6 +1032,20 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) } #endif +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + if (options->SocksSocket || options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unix domain sockets (SocksSocket) not supported " + "on this OS/with this build."); + goto rollback; + } +#else + if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable && !options->SocksSocket) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Setting SocksSocketGroupWritable without setting" + "a SocksSocket makes no sense."); + goto rollback; + } +#endif + if (running_tor) { int n_ports=0; /* We need to set the connection limit before we can open the listeners. */ @@ -6120,6 +6136,12 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid ControlSocket configuration"); goto err; } + if (parse_unix_socket_config(ports, + options->SocksSocket, + CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) < 0) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid SocksSocket configuration"); + goto err; + } } if (! options->ClientOnly) { if (parse_port_config(ports, @@ -6163,6 +6185,8 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER); options->SocksPort_set = !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER); + options->SocksSocket_set = + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER); options->TransPort_set = !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER); options->NATDPort_set = diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index c67cc3c..ad7e6de 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ entry_connection_new(int type, int socket_family) entry_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok = 1; else if (socket_family == AF_INET6) entry_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok = 1; + else if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) + entry_conn->is_socks_socket = 1; return entry_conn; } @@ -516,9 +518,10 @@ connection_free_(connection_t *conn) buf_free(conn->outbuf); } else { if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { - /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets + /* For now only control and SOCKS ports can be Unix domain sockets * and listeners at the same time */ - tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER); if (unlink(conn->address) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not unlink %s: %s", conn->address, @@ -954,6 +957,47 @@ check_location_for_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, const char *path) } #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +/** Check whether we should be willing to open an AF_UNIX socket in + * path. Return 0 if we should go ahead and -1 if we shouldn't. */ +static int +check_location_for_socks_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, + const char *path) +{ + int r = -1; + char *p = tor_strdup(path); + cpd_check_t flags = CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY; + if (get_parent_directory(p)<0 || p[0] != '/') { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Bad unix socket address '%s'. Tor does not support " + "relative paths for unix sockets.", path); + goto done; + } + + if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) + flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; + + if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { + char *escpath, *escdir; + escpath = esc_for_log(path); + escdir = esc_for_log(p); + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Before Tor can create a SocksSocket in %s, the " + "directory %s needs to exist, and to be accessible only by the " + "user%s account that is running Tor. (On some Unix systems, " + "anybody who can list a socket can connect to it, so Tor is " + "being careful.)", escpath, escdir, + options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable ? " and group" : ""); + tor_free(escpath); + tor_free(escdir); + goto done; + } + + r = 0; + done: + tor_free(p); + return r; +} +#endif + /** Tell the TCP stack that it shouldn't wait for a long time after * sock has closed before reusing its port. Return 0 on success, * -1 on failure. */ @@ -1029,30 +1073,103 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET || - listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6) { + listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6 || + (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && + type != CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER)) { int is_tcp = (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); if (is_tcp) start_reading = 1; - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, listensockaddr, &usePort); + if ( listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET || + listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6) { - log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); - - s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), - is_tcp ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, - is_tcp ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); - if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { - log_warn(LD_NET,"Socket creation failed: %s", - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(-1))); - goto err; + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, listensockaddr, &usePort); + + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); + + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), + is_tcp ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, + is_tcp ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); + if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Socket creation failed: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(-1))); + goto err; + } + + if (make_socket_reuseable(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(errno)); + } } - if (make_socket_reuseable(s) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on %s: %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), - tor_socket_strerror(errno)); +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && + type != CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) { + tor_assert(listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX); + + if (check_location_for_socks_unix_socket(options, address) < 0) + goto err; + + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening SocksSocket %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), address); + + tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr); + + if (unlink(address) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not unlink %s: %s", address, + strerror(errno)); + goto err; + } + + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "SocksSocket socket creation failed: %s.", + strerror(errno)); + goto err; + } + + if (bind(s, listensockaddr, + (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) == -1) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Bind to %s failed: %s.", address, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; + } +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H + if (options->User) { + pw = getpwnam(options->User); + if (pw == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "Unable to chown() %s socket: user %s not found.", + address, options->User); + goto err; + } else if (chown(address, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Unable to chown() %s socket: %s.", + address, strerror(errno)); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + + if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) { + /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all + * platforms. */ + if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_FS, "Unable to make %s group-writable.", address); + goto err; + } + } + + if (listen(s, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s: %s", address, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; + } } +#else + (void)options; +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ #if defined USE_TRANSPARENT && defined(IP_TRANSPARENT) if (options->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_TPROXY && @@ -1090,48 +1207,53 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } #endif - if (bind(s,listensockaddr,socklen) < 0) { - const char *helpfulhint = ""; - int e = tor_socket_errno(s); - if (ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e)) - helpfulhint = ". Is Tor already running?"; - log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not bind to %s:%u: %s%s", address, usePort, - tor_socket_strerror(e), helpfulhint); - goto err; - } - - if (is_tcp) { - if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + if (listensockaddr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) { + if (bind(s,listensockaddr,socklen) < 0) { + const char *helpfulhint = ""; + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e)) + helpfulhint = ". Is Tor already running?"; + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not bind to %s:%u: %s%s", address, usePort, + tor_socket_strerror(e), helpfulhint); goto err; } - } - if (usePort != 0) { - gotPort = usePort; - } else { - tor_addr_t addr2; - struct sockaddr_storage ss; - socklen_t ss_len=sizeof(ss); - if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &ss_len)<0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() couldn't learn address for %s: %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - gotPort = 0; + if (is_tcp) { + if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; + } + } + + if (usePort != 0) { + gotPort = usePort; + } else { + tor_addr_t addr2; + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + socklen_t ss_len=sizeof(ss); + if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &ss_len)<0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() couldn't learn address for %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + gotPort = 0; + } + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr2, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &gotPort); } - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr2, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &gotPort); } #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - } else if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { + } else if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && + type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) { start_reading = 1; /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets * and listeners at the same time */ tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); - if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address) < 0) - goto err; + if ( type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER ) { + if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address) < 0) + goto err; + } log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", conn_type_to_string(type), address); @@ -1177,6 +1299,15 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } } + if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) { + /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all + * platforms. */ + if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-writable.", address); + goto err; + } + } + if (listen(s, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s: %s", address, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); @@ -1294,6 +1425,8 @@ check_sockaddr(const struct sockaddr *sa, int len, int level) "Address for new connection has address/port equal to zero."); ok = 0; } + } else if (sa->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { + ok = 1; } else { ok = 0; } @@ -1378,7 +1511,8 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) return 0; } - if (conn->socket_family == AF_INET || conn->socket_family == AF_INET6) { + if (conn->socket_family == AF_INET || conn->socket_family == AF_INET6 || + (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP)) { tor_addr_t addr; uint16_t port; if (check_sockaddr(remote, remotelen, LOG_INFO)<0) { @@ -1419,7 +1553,16 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) newconn->port = port; newconn->address = tor_dup_addr(&addr); - if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family != AF_UNIX) { + log_notice(LD_NET, "New SOCKS connection opened from %s.", + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); + TO_ENTRY_CONN(newconn)->socks_request->socks_prefer_no_auth = + TO_LISTENER_CONN(conn)->socks_prefer_no_auth; + } + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + newconn->port = 0; + newconn->address = tor_strdup(conn->address); + log_notice(LD_NET, "New SOCKS SocksSocket connection opened"); TO_ENTRY_CONN(newconn)->socks_request->socks_prefer_no_auth = TO_LISTENER_CONN(conn)->socks_prefer_no_auth; } @@ -1428,7 +1571,7 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); } - } else if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + } else if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP) { /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets * and listeners at the same time */ tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); @@ -2392,6 +2535,7 @@ connection_is_rate_limited(connection_t *conn) return 0; /* Internal connection */ else if (! options->CountPrivateBandwidth && (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) == AF_UNSPEC || /* no address */ + tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) == AF_UNIX || /* no address */ tor_addr_is_internal(&conn->addr, 0))) return 0; /* Internal address */ else diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index d8f397b..390ad07 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1233,7 +1233,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, { tor_addr_t addr; /* XXX Duplicate call to tor_addr_parse. */ - if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0) { + if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 && + !conn->is_socks_socket) { sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr); if ((family == AF_INET && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) || (family == AF_INET6 && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok)) { @@ -1836,6 +1837,9 @@ connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(entry_connection_t *ap_conn) if (!ap_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK; + if (ap_conn->is_socks_socket) + return 0; + exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath_layer->extend_info->identity_digest); if (ap_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok && exitnode) { diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index c925b7d..0c49b40 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -385,6 +385,10 @@ connection_remove(connection_t *conn) (int)conn->s, conn_type_to_string(conn->type), smartlist_len(connection_array)); + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + log_notice(LD_NET, "Closing SOCKS SocksSocket connection"); + } + control_event_conn_bandwidth(conn); tor_assert(conn->conn_array_index >= 0); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 58e2164..5bb5f5b 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1702,6 +1702,9 @@ typedef struct entry_connection_t { * do we prefer IPv6? */ unsigned int prefer_ipv6_virtaddr : 1; + /** Are we a socks SocksSocket listener? */ + unsigned int is_socks_socket:1; + } entry_connection_t; typedef enum { @@ -3528,6 +3531,10 @@ typedef struct { * for control connections. */ int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */ + config_line_t *SocksSocket; /**< List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on + * for SOCKS connections. */ + + int SocksSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS sockets g+rw? */ /** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */ config_line_t *DirPort_lines; config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */ @@ -3550,6 +3557,7 @@ typedef struct { */ unsigned int ORPort_set : 1; unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1; + unsigned int SocksSocket_set : 1; unsigned int TransPort_set : 1; unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1; unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1; diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 2d11096..b7ab808 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -1327,8 +1327,9 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( return 0; } - if ((family == AF_INET && ! entry_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) || - (family == AF_INET6 && ! entry_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok)) { + if (((family == AF_INET && ! entry_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) || + (family == AF_INET6 && ! entry_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok)) && + (!entry_conn->is_socks_socket)) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP, "Got a connected cell to %s with unsupported address family." " Closing.", fmt_addr(&addr));

1 0

[tor/master] Rename is_tcp in connection_listener_new(), since AF_UNIX means SOCK_STREAM no longer implies TCP
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit 48633c07660216d3b852b609c44fa318d55908f0 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 7 19:45:59 2015 +0000 Rename is_tcp in connection_listener_new(), since AF_UNIX means SOCK_STREAM no longer implies TCP --- src/or/connection.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index bb2cff3..c17a414 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -1084,8 +1084,8 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6 || (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && type != CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER)) { - int is_tcp = (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); - if (is_tcp) + int is_stream = (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); + if (is_stream) start_reading = 1; if ( listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET || @@ -1097,8 +1097,8 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), - is_tcp ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, - is_tcp ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); + is_stream ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, + is_stream ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Socket creation failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(-1))); @@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, goto err; } - if (is_tcp) { + if (is_stream) { if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s)));

1 0

[tor/master] Downgrade open/close log message for SocksSocket
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit a3bcde3638d035303a9a5bf8373c1b841a1f5636 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 7 22:57:51 2015 +0000 Downgrade open/close log message for SocksSocket --- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/main.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 51d891d..c78ceba 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { newconn->port = 0; newconn->address = tor_strdup(conn->address); - log_notice(LD_NET, "New SOCKS SocksSocket connection opened"); + log_info(LD_NET, "New SOCKS SocksSocket connection opened"); TO_ENTRY_CONN(newconn)->socks_request->socks_prefer_no_auth = TO_LISTENER_CONN(conn)->socks_prefer_no_auth; } diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 0c49b40..233b444 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ connection_remove(connection_t *conn) smartlist_len(connection_array)); if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { - log_notice(LD_NET, "Closing SOCKS SocksSocket connection"); + log_info(LD_NET, "Closing SOCKS SocksSocket connection"); } control_event_conn_bandwidth(conn);

1 0

[tor/master] Refactor check_location_for_unix_socket()/check_location_for_socks_unix_socket() to eliminate duplicated code
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit c6451e4c9f2e36f447b4da7d91403a16dde4d2e7 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 7 19:17:04 2015 +0000 Refactor check_location_for_unix_socket()/check_location_for_socks_unix_socket() to eliminate duplicated code --- src/or/connection.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index ad7e6de..bb2cff3 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -918,54 +918,57 @@ warn_too_many_conns(void) } #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H -/** Check whether we should be willing to open an AF_UNIX socket in - * path. Return 0 if we should go ahead and -1 if we shouldn't. */ + +#define UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET 0 +#define UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET 1 + +/** Check if the purpose isn't one of the ones we know what to do with */ + static int -check_location_for_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, const char *path) +is_valid_unix_socket_purpose(int purpose) { - int r = -1; - char *p = tor_strdup(path); - cpd_check_t flags = CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY; - if (get_parent_directory(p)<0 || p[0] != '/') { - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Bad unix socket address '%s'. Tor does not support " - "relative paths for unix sockets.", path); - goto done; + int valid = 0; + + switch (purpose) { + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET: + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET: + valid = 1; + break; } - if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) - flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; + return valid; +} - if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { - char *escpath, *escdir; - escpath = esc_for_log(path); - escdir = esc_for_log(p); - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Before Tor can create a control socket in %s, the " - "directory %s needs to exist, and to be accessible only by the " - "user%s account that is running Tor. (On some Unix systems, " - "anybody who can list a socket can connect to it, so Tor is " - "being careful.)", escpath, escdir, - options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable ? " and group" : ""); - tor_free(escpath); - tor_free(escdir); - goto done; +/** Return a string description of a unix socket purpose */ +static const char * +unix_socket_purpose_to_string(int purpose) +{ + const char *s = "unknown-purpose socket"; + + switch (purpose) { + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET: + s = "control socket"; + break; + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET: + s = "SOCKS socket"; + break; } - r = 0; - done: - tor_free(p); - return r; + return s; } -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H /** Check whether we should be willing to open an AF_UNIX socket in * path. Return 0 if we should go ahead and -1 if we shouldn't. */ static int -check_location_for_socks_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, - const char *path) +check_location_for_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, const char *path, + int purpose) { int r = -1; - char *p = tor_strdup(path); + char *p = NULL; + + tor_assert(is_valid_unix_socket_purpose(purpose)); + + p = tor_strdup(path); cpd_check_t flags = CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY; if (get_parent_directory(p)<0 || p[0] != '/') { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Bad unix socket address '%s'. Tor does not support " @@ -973,19 +976,24 @@ check_location_for_socks_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, goto done; } - if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) + if ((purpose == UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET && + options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) || + (purpose == UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET && + options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable)) { flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; + } if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { char *escpath, *escdir; escpath = esc_for_log(path); escdir = esc_for_log(p); - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Before Tor can create a SocksSocket in %s, the " - "directory %s needs to exist, and to be accessible only by the " - "user%s account that is running Tor. (On some Unix systems, " - "anybody who can list a socket can connect to it, so Tor is " - "being careful.)", escpath, escdir, - options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable ? " and group" : ""); + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Before Tor can create a %s in %s, the directory " + "%s needs to exist, and to be accessible only by the user%s " + "account that is running Tor. (On some Unix systems, anybody " + "who can list a socket can connect to it, so Tor is being " + "careful.)", + unix_socket_purpose_to_string(purpose), escpath, escdir, + options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable ? " and group" : ""); tor_free(escpath); tor_free(escdir); goto done; @@ -1109,8 +1117,10 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, type != CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) { tor_assert(listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX); - if (check_location_for_socks_unix_socket(options, address) < 0) + if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address, + UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET) < 0) { goto err; + } log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening SocksSocket %s on %s", conn_type_to_string(type), address); @@ -1251,8 +1261,10 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); if ( type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER ) { - if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address) < 0) + if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address, + UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET) < 0) { goto err; + } } log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s",

1 0

[tor/master] Bring sanity to connection_listener_new()
by nickm＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit 2ca1c386b0d1c396fa8d8f4b5334349e24a2f9e8 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 7 22:51:24 2015 +0000 Bring sanity to connection_listener_new() --- src/or/connection.c | 200 +++++++++++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 134 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index c17a414..51d891d 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ check_location_for_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, const char *path, { int r = -1; char *p = NULL; - + tor_assert(is_valid_unix_socket_purpose(purpose)); p = tor_strdup(path); @@ -1081,105 +1081,30 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET || - listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6 || - (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && - type != CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER)) { + listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6) { int is_stream = (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); if (is_stream) start_reading = 1; - if ( listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET || - listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6) { - - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, listensockaddr, &usePort); - - log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); - - s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), - is_stream ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, - is_stream ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); - if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Socket creation failed: %s", - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(-1))); - goto err; - } + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, listensockaddr, &usePort); - if (make_socket_reuseable(s) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on %s: %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), - tor_socket_strerror(errno)); - } + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); + + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), + is_stream ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, + is_stream ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); + if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Socket creation failed: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(-1))); + goto err; } -#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && - type != CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) { - tor_assert(listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX); - - if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address, - UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET) < 0) { - goto err; - } - - log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening SocksSocket %s on %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), address); - - tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr); - - if (unlink(address) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not unlink %s: %s", address, - strerror(errno)); - goto err; - } - - s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "SocksSocket socket creation failed: %s.", - strerror(errno)); - goto err; - } - - if (bind(s, listensockaddr, - (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) == -1) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Bind to %s failed: %s.", address, - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - goto err; - } -#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H - if (options->User) { - pw = getpwnam(options->User); - if (pw == NULL) { - log_warn(LD_NET, - "Unable to chown() %s socket: user %s not found.", - address, options->User); - goto err; - } else if (chown(address, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Unable to chown() %s socket: %s.", - address, strerror(errno)); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - - if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) { - /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all - * platforms. */ - if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_FS, "Unable to make %s group-writable.", address); - goto err; - } - } - - if (listen(s, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s: %s", address, - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - goto err; - } + if (make_socket_reuseable(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(errno)); } -#else - (void)options; -#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ #if defined USE_TRANSPARENT && defined(IP_TRANSPARENT) if (options->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_TPROXY && @@ -1217,54 +1142,57 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } #endif - if (listensockaddr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) { - if (bind(s,listensockaddr,socklen) < 0) { - const char *helpfulhint = ""; - int e = tor_socket_errno(s); - if (ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e)) - helpfulhint = ". Is Tor already running?"; - log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not bind to %s:%u: %s%s", address, usePort, - tor_socket_strerror(e), helpfulhint); - goto err; - } + if (bind(s,listensockaddr,socklen) < 0) { + const char *helpfulhint = ""; + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e)) + helpfulhint = ". Is Tor already running?"; + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not bind to %s:%u: %s%s", address, usePort, + tor_socket_strerror(e), helpfulhint); + goto err; + } - if (is_stream) { - if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - goto err; - } + if (is_stream) { + if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; } + } - if (usePort != 0) { - gotPort = usePort; - } else { - tor_addr_t addr2; - struct sockaddr_storage ss; - socklen_t ss_len=sizeof(ss); - if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &ss_len)<0) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() couldn't learn address for %s: %s", - conn_type_to_string(type), - tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - gotPort = 0; - } - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr2, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &gotPort); + if (usePort != 0) { + gotPort = usePort; + } else { + tor_addr_t addr2; + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + socklen_t ss_len=sizeof(ss); + if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &ss_len)<0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() couldn't learn address for %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + gotPort = 0; } + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr2, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &gotPort); } #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - } else if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX && - type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) { + /* + * AF_UNIX generic setup stuff (this covers both CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER + * and CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER cases) + */ + } else if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { + /* We want to start reading for both AF_UNIX cases */ start_reading = 1; - /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets + /* For now only control ports or SOCKS ports can be Unix domain sockets * and listeners at the same time */ - tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER || + type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER); - if ( type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER ) { - if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address, - UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET) < 0) { + if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address, + (type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) ? + UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET : + UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET) < 0) { goto err; - } } log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", @@ -1277,17 +1205,20 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, strerror(errno)); goto err; } + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Socket creation failed: %s.", strerror(errno)); goto err; } - if (bind(s, listensockaddr, (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) == -1) { + if (bind(s, listensockaddr, + (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) == -1) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Bind to %s failed: %s.", address, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); goto err; } + #ifdef HAVE_PWD_H if (options->User) { pw = tor_getpwnam(options->User); @@ -1302,7 +1233,9 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } } #endif - if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) { + + if (type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER && + options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) { /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all * platforms. */ if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { @@ -1311,7 +1244,8 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } } - if (options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) { + if (type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER && + options->SocksSocketsGroupWritable) { /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all * platforms. */ if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { @@ -1325,8 +1259,6 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); goto err; } -#else - (void)options; #endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ } else { log_err(LD_BUG, "Got unexpected address family %d.",

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[torbutton/master] Bug 13998: Adapt code to fixed globalHttpsWhitelist
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit 915ec73bb2b556aa937a827fbe746b21dacec1f3 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 12 13:03:34 2015 +0000 Bug 13998: Adapt code to fixed globalHttpsWhitelist --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 29 ++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index 4715fb6..8adef28 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -2166,6 +2166,7 @@ var torbutton_sec_ml_bool_prefs = { var torbutton_sec_mh_bool_prefs = { "javascript.options.baselinejit.content" : false, + "noscript.global" : false, "noscript.globalHttpsWhitelist" : true, // XXX: pref for disableing SVG is missing }; @@ -2198,7 +2199,10 @@ function torbutton_update_security_slider() { for (p in torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs) { m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, !torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs[p]) } - // XXX: Adding and removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in Noscript. + // Removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in older Noscript versions. + // We leave that in for a while as there may be users that were affected + // by this bug. Removing it immediately and having the auto-updater might + // leave users exposed to the problem. if (capValue.indexOf(" https:") >= 0) { m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", capValue.replace(" https:", "")); @@ -2224,7 +2228,10 @@ function torbutton_update_security_slider() { for (p in torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs) { m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, !torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs[p]) } - // XXX: Adding and removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in Noscript. + // Removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in older Noscript versions. + // We leave that in for a while as there may be users that were affected + // by this bug. Removing it immediately and having the auto-updater might + // leave users exposed to the problem. if (capValue.indexOf(" https:") >= 0) { m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", capValue.replace(" https:", "")); @@ -2244,17 +2251,14 @@ function torbutton_update_security_slider() { for (p in torbutton_sec_ml_bool_prefs) { m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, torbutton_sec_ml_bool_prefs[p]) } - for (p in torbutton_sec_mh_bool_prefs) { - m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, torbutton_sec_mh_bool_prefs[p]) - } + // Order matters here as both the high mode and the medium-high mode + // share some preferences/values. So, let's revert the high mode + // preferences first and set the medium-high mode ones afterwards. for (p in torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs) { m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, !torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs[p]) } - // XXX: Adding and removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in Noscript. - // missing. - if (capValue.indexOf(" https:") < 0) { - m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", capValue + - " https:"); + for (p in torbutton_sec_mh_bool_prefs) { + m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, torbutton_sec_mh_bool_prefs[p]) } m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref("gfx.font_rendering.graphite.enabled", false); break; @@ -2276,7 +2280,10 @@ function torbutton_update_security_slider() { for (p in torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs) { m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref(p, torbutton_sec_h_bool_prefs[p]) } - // XXX: Adding and removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in Noscript. + // Removing "https:" is needed due to a bug in older Noscript versions. + // We leave that in for a while as there may be users that were affected + // by this bug. Removing it immediately and having the auto-updater might + // leave users exposed to the problem. if (capValue.indexOf(" https:") >= 0) { m_tb_prefs.setCharPref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", capValue.replace(" https:", ""));

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[torbutton/master] Bug 13998: Bind volatilePrivatePermissions to disk
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 13 Jan '15

13 Jan '15

commit eb343e2cdcbd35ae6140543f248969a7e3b9aa8d Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 13 10:57:00 2015 +0000 Bug 13998: Bind volatilePrivatePermissions to disk We set `noscript.volatilePrivatePermissions` to `true` if disk records are disabled and otherwise to `false`. All this in the assumption NoScript is enabled at all. --- src/chrome/content/preferences.js | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/preferences.js b/src/chrome/content/preferences.js index 75937eb..f67906c 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/preferences.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/preferences.js @@ -286,6 +286,20 @@ function torbutton_prefs_save(doc) { // Privacy and Security Settings o_torprefs.setBoolPref('block_disk', doc.getElementById('torbutton_blockDisk').checked); + // If we have NoScript enabled we set `noscript.volatilePrivatePermissions` + // to `true` if we are blocking disk records and to `false` if we are + // enabling them. + try { + if ("@maone.net/noscript-service;1" in Components.classes) { + let o_noscriptprefs = torbutton_get_prefbranch('noscript.'); + if (o_torprefs.getBoolPref('block_disk')) { + o_noscriptprefs.setBoolPref('volatilePrivatePermissions', true); + } else { + o_noscriptprefs.setBoolPref('volatilePrivatePermissions', false); + } + } + } catch (e) {} + o_torprefs.setBoolPref('resist_fingerprinting', doc.getElementById('torbutton_resistFingerprinting').checked); o_torprefs.setBoolPref('no_tor_plugins', doc.getElementById('torbutton_blockPlugins').checked); o_torprefs.setBoolPref('restrict_thirdparty', doc.getElementById('torbutton_restrictThirdParty').checked);

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