tor-commits November 2012

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[translation/vidalia_alpha] Update translations for vidalia_alpha
by translation＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit 1cdc69766a6eca25bbf8d8778b6d7b59ed2d6197 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 9 00:15:20 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_alpha --- es/vidalia_es.po | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/es/vidalia_es.po b/es/vidalia_es.po index 470120e..973c0b6 100644 --- a/es/vidalia_es.po +++ b/es/vidalia_es.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:46+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-08 14:56+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-08 23:48+0000\n" "Last-Translator: strel <strelnic(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Spanish (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/es/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ msgstr "Gráfico de Ancho de Banda " msgctxt "BridgeDownloader" msgid "Starting HTTPS bridge request..." -msgstr "Iniciando la solicitud de bridge (puente a Tor no propagado) HTTPS... " +msgstr "Iniciando la solicitud de bridge HTTPS (puente a Tor no propagado)... " msgctxt "BridgeDownloader" msgid "Connecting to %1:%2..."

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[tor/master] Add and use and unlikely-to-be-eliminated memwipe()
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit 49dd5ef3a3d1775fdc3c0a7d069d3097b3baeeec Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 7 16:09:58 2012 -0500 Add and use and unlikely-to-be-eliminated memwipe() Apparently some compilers like to eliminate memset() operations on data that's about to go out-of-scope. I've gone with the safest possible replacement, which might be a bit slow. I don't think this is critical path in any way that will affect performance, but if it is, we can work on that in 0.2.4. Fixes bug 7352. --- changes/bug7352 | 12 ++++++ src/common/aes.c | 4 +- src/common/compat.c | 2 +- src/common/crypto.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ src/common/crypto.h | 3 ++ src/common/mempool.c | 3 +- src/common/tortls.c | 4 +- src/common/util.c | 2 +- src/or/buffers.c | 6 ++-- src/or/circuitlist.c | 8 ++-- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 4 +- src/or/connection_or.c | 8 ++-- src/or/networkstatus.c | 2 +- src/or/onion.c | 24 ++++++------ src/or/rendclient.c | 4 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 4 +- src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 6 ++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug7352 b/changes/bug7352 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74a878d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7352 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Tor tries to wipe potentially sensitive data after using it, so + that if some subsequent security failure exposes Tor's memory, + the damage will be limited. But we had a bug where the compiler + was eliminating these wipe operations when it decided that the + memory was no longer visible to a (correctly running) program, + hence defeating our attempt at defense in depth. We fix that + by using OpenSSL's OPENSSL_cleanse() operation, which a compiler + is unlikely to optimize away. Future versions of Tor may use + a less ridiculously heavy approach for this. Fixes bug 7352. + Reported in an article by Andrey Karpov. + diff --git a/src/common/aes.c b/src/common/aes.c index 59d864a..295a907 100644 --- a/src/common/aes.c +++ b/src/common/aes.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ aes_cipher_free(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher) if (!cipher) return; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher->evp); - memset(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); + memwipe(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); tor_free(cipher); } void @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ aes_cipher_free(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher) if (cipher->using_evp) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher->key.evp); } - memset(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); + memwipe(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); tor_free(cipher); } diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index ca850a3..59e3898 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ tor_munmap_file(tor_mmap_t *handle) { char *d = (char*)handle->data; tor_free(d); - memset(handle, 0, sizeof(tor_mmap_t)); + memwipe(handle, 0, sizeof(tor_mmap_t)); tor_free(handle); } #endif diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index a69e6c5..30990ec 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ crypto_cipher_free(crypto_cipher_t *env) tor_assert(env->cipher); aes_cipher_free(env->cipher); - memset(env, 0, sizeof(crypto_cipher_t)); + memwipe(env, 0, sizeof(crypto_cipher_t)); tor_free(env); } @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, /* Try to parse it. */ r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1); - memset(contents, 0, strlen(contents)); + memwipe(contents, 0, strlen(contents)); tor_free(contents); if (r) return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/ @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, s[len]='\0'; r = write_str_to_file(fname, s, 0); BIO_free(bio); - memset(s, 0, strlen(s)); + memwipe(s, 0, strlen(s)); tor_free(s); return r; } @@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, if (crypto_digest(digest,from,fromlen)<0) return -1; r = crypto_pk_private_sign(env,to,tolen,digest,DIGEST_LEN); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); return r; } @@ -1045,14 +1045,14 @@ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, from+pkeylen-overhead-CIPHER_KEY_LEN, symlen); if (r<0) goto err; - memset(buf, 0, pkeylen); + memwipe(buf, 0, pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); tor_assert(outlen+symlen < INT_MAX); return (int)(outlen + symlen); err: - memset(buf, 0, pkeylen); + memwipe(buf, 0, pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); return -1; @@ -1103,13 +1103,13 @@ crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, r = crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, to+outlen, from+pkeylen, fromlen-pkeylen); if (r<0) goto err; - memset(buf,0,pkeylen); + memwipe(buf,0,pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); tor_assert(outlen + fromlen < INT_MAX); return (int)(outlen + (fromlen-pkeylen)); err: - memset(buf,0,pkeylen); + memwipe(buf,0,pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); return -1; @@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ crypto_digest_free(crypto_digest_t *digest) { if (!digest) return; - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(crypto_digest_t)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(crypto_digest_t)); tor_free(digest); } @@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, break; } memcpy(out, r, out_len); - memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); + memwipe(r, 0, sizeof(r)); } /** Allocate and return a new digest object with the same state as @@ -1673,10 +1673,10 @@ crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out, SHA256_Final((uint8_t*)hmac_out, &st); /* Now clear everything. */ - memset(k, 0, sizeof(k)); - memset(pad, 0, sizeof(pad)); - memset(d, 0, sizeof(d)); - memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st)); + memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(k)); + memwipe(pad, 0, sizeof(pad)); + memwipe(d, 0, sizeof(d)); + memwipe(&st, 0, sizeof(st)); #undef BLOCKSIZE #undef DIGESTSIZE #endif @@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, if (pubkey_bn) BN_free(pubkey_bn); if (secret_tmp) { - memset(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len); + memwipe(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len); tor_free(secret_tmp); } if (result < 0) @@ -2243,15 +2243,15 @@ crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t key_in_len, goto err; memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); } - memset(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); + memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); tor_free(tmp); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); return 0; err: - memset(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); + memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); tor_free(tmp); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); return -1; } @@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) return rand_poll_status ? 0 : -1; } RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf)); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); seed_weak_rng(); return 0; #else @@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) return -1; } RAND_seed(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); seed_weak_rng(); return 0; } @@ -2843,7 +2843,7 @@ base32_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen) } } - memset(tmp, 0, srclen); + memwipe(tmp, 0, srclen); tor_free(tmp); tmp = NULL; return 0; @@ -2888,11 +2888,54 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, } } crypto_digest_get_digest(d, key_out, key_out_len); - memset(tmp, 0, tmplen); + memwipe(tmp, 0, tmplen); tor_free(tmp); crypto_digest_free(d); } +/** + * Destroy the sz bytes of data stored at mem, setting them to + * the value byte. + * + * This function is preferable to memset, since many compilers will happily + * optimize out memset() when they can convince themselves that the data being + * cleared will never be read. + * + * Right now, our convention is to use this function when we are wiping data + * that's about to become inaccessible, such as stack buffers that are about + * to go out of scope or structures that are about to get freed. (In + * practice, it appears that the compilers we're currently using will optimize + * out the memset()s for stack-allocated buffers, but not those for + * about-to-be-freed structures. That could change, though, so we're being + * wary.) If there are live reads for the data, then you can just use + * memset(). + */ +void +memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) +{ + /* Because whole-program-optimization exists, we may not be able to just + * have this function call "memset". A smart compiler could inline it, then + * eliminate dead memsets, and declare itself to be clever. */ + + /* This is a slow and ugly function from OpenSSL that fills 'mem' with junk + * based on the pointer value, then uses that junk to update a global + * variable. It's an elaborate ruse to trick the compiler into not + * optimizing out the "wipe this memory" code. Read it if you like zany + * programming tricks! In later versions of Tor, we should look for better + * not-optimized-out memory wiping stuff. */ + OPENSSL_cleanse(mem, sz); + /* Just in case some caller of memwipe() is relying on getting a buffer + * filled with a particular value, fill the buffer. + * + * If this function gets inlined, this memset might get eliminated, but + * that's okay: We only care about this particular memset in the case where + * the caller should have been using memset(), and the memset() wouldn't get + * eliminated. In other words, this is here so that we won't break anything + * if somebody accidentally calls memwipe() instead of memset(). + **/ + memset(mem, byte, sz); +} + #ifdef TOR_IS_MULTITHREADED /** Helper: OpenSSL uses this callback to manipulate mutexes. */ static void diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 76bcbf7..7d56271 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ int digest256_from_base64(char *digest, const char *d64); void secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *s2k_specifier); +/** OpenSSL-based utility functions. */ +void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz); + #ifdef CRYPTO_PRIVATE /* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the * unit tests. */ diff --git a/src/common/mempool.c b/src/common/mempool.c index 2416bce..637f081 100644 --- a/src/common/mempool.c +++ b/src/common/mempool.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include "torint.h" +#include "crypto.h" #define MEMPOOL_PRIVATE #include "mempool.h" @@ -519,7 +520,7 @@ mp_pool_destroy(mp_pool_t *pool) destroy_chunks(pool->empty_chunks); destroy_chunks(pool->used_chunks); destroy_chunks(pool->full_chunks); - memset(pool, 0xe0, sizeof(mp_pool_t)); + memwipe(pool, 0xe0, sizeof(mp_pool_t)); FREE(pool); } diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index bec2c71..60aac64 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert) if (cert->cert) X509_free(cert->cert); tor_free(cert->encoded); - memset(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); + memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); tor_free(cert); } @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out) (char*)tls->ssl->session->master_key, tls->ssl->session->master_key_length, buf, len); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return 0; } diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 6fb597a..005c2b5 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ tor_process_handle_destroy(process_handle_t *process_handle, fclose(process_handle->stderr_handle); #endif - memset(process_handle, 0x0f, sizeof(process_handle_t)); + memwipe(process_handle, 0x0f, sizeof(process_handle_t)); tor_free(process_handle); } diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 9acc229..ad5ab83 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -1546,14 +1546,14 @@ socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) if (!req) return; if (req->username) { - memset(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); + memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); tor_free(req->username); } if (req->password) { - memset(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); + memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); tor_free(req->password); } - memset(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); + memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); tor_free(req); } diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 7ed942c..93ba69d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -612,11 +612,11 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) tor_free(ocirc->dest_address); if (ocirc->socks_username) { - memset(ocirc->socks_username, 0x12, ocirc->socks_username_len); + memwipe(ocirc->socks_username, 0x12, ocirc->socks_username_len); tor_free(ocirc->socks_username); } if (ocirc->socks_password) { - memset(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len); + memwipe(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len); tor_free(ocirc->socks_password); } } else { @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) * "active" checks will be violated. */ cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells); - memset(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ tor_free(mem); } @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim) crypto_dh_free(victim->dh_handshake_state); extend_info_free(victim->extend_info); - memset(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */ tor_free(victim); } diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 364e491..eac9c4f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn) } #endif - memset(mem, 0xCC, memlen); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(mem, 0xCC, memlen); /* poison memory */ tor_free(mem); } diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1592033..9563ca6 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3709,11 +3709,11 @@ circuit_clear_isolation(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->session_group = -1; circ->nym_epoch = 0; if (circ->socks_username) { - memset(circ->socks_username, 0x11, circ->socks_username_len); + memwipe(circ->socks_username, 0x11, circ->socks_username_len); tor_free(circ->socks_username); } if (circ->socks_password) { - memset(circ->socks_password, 0x05, circ->socks_password_len); + memwipe(circ->socks_password, 0x05, circ->socks_password_len); tor_free(circ->socks_password); } circ->socks_username_len = circ->socks_password_len = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 6293fe8..5eecee0 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state) crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received); tor_cert_free(state->auth_cert); tor_cert_free(state->id_cert); - memset(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t)); + memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t)); tor_free(state); } @@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, this very often at all. */ cell_pack(&packed, cell); crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, sizeof(packed.body)); - memset(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed)); + memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed)); } /** Remember that a variable-length cell has been transmitted (if @@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, sizeof(buf)); crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); } /** Set conn's state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems @@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn) connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn); var_cell_free(cell); - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index fadaf90..2553a74 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ networkstatus_vote_free(networkstatus_t *ns) digestmap_free(ns->desc_digest_map, NULL); - memset(ns, 11, sizeof(*ns)); + memwipe(ns, 11, sizeof(*ns)); tor_free(ns); } diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index ff1556c..f8c4d72 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0) goto err; - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); *handshake_state_out = dh; return 0; err: - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); return -1; } @@ -286,15 +286,15 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/ /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */ memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len); - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); crypto_dh_free(dh); return 0; err: - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); if (key_material) { - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); } if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); @@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state, /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */ memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len); - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); return 0; err: - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); return -1; } @@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */ memcpy(key_out, out+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len); r = 0; done: - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - memset(out, 0, out_len); + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(out, 0, out_len); tor_free(out); return r; } @@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ fast_client_handshake(const uint8_t *handshake_state,/*DIGEST_LEN bytes*/ memcpy(key_out, out+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len); r = 0; done: - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - memset(out, 0, out_len); + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(out, 0, out_len); tor_free(out); return r; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 6c751be..3a0cd1a 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -908,10 +908,10 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ); - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); return 0; err: - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 6af4778..d235f08 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1404,10 +1404,10 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN); if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info); - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); return 0; err: - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); if (launched) circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason); diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 2bf072b..299d07d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -4596,7 +4596,7 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out) if (close_paren-cp > HEX_DIGEST_LEN) return -1; hexlen = (int)(close_paren-cp); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); if ( hexlen == 0 || (hexlen % 2) == 1) return -1; if (base16_decode(digest, hexlen/2, cp, hexlen)) diff --git a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c index 38b2101..c7ab8dc 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ load_passphrase(void) cp = memchr(buf, '\n', n); passphrase_len = cp-buf; passphrase = tor_strndup(buf, passphrase_len); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return 0; } @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static void clear_passphrase(void) { if (passphrase) { - memset(passphrase, 0, passphrase_len); + memwipe(passphrase, 0, passphrase_len); tor_free(passphrase); } } @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ parse_commandline(int argc, char **argv) } } - memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + memwipe(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); if (verbose) set_log_severity_config(LOG_DEBUG, LOG_ERR, &s); else

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug7352_023_rebased' into maint-0.2.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3'
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit 81deddb08c6b8bf644f663dcdc31720e365f68dc Merge: 9f3f537 9ad4776 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 8 16:48:04 2012 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3' Conflicts: src/common/crypto.c src/or/rendservice.c changes/bug7352 | 12 +++++++ src/common/aes.c | 4 +- src/common/compat.c | 2 +- src/common/crypto.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/common/crypto.h | 3 ++ src/common/mempool.c | 3 +- src/common/tortls.c | 4 +- src/common/util.c | 2 +- src/or/buffers.c | 6 ++-- src/or/circuitlist.c | 8 ++-- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 4 +- src/or/connection_or.c | 8 ++-- src/or/networkstatus.c | 2 +- src/or/onion.c | 24 +++++++------- src/or/rendclient.c | 4 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 14 ++++---- src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 6 ++-- 19 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/circuitlist.c index 32a478d,93ba69d..abb8395 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@@ -680,9 -655,9 +680,9 @@@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ /* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our * "active" checks will be violated. */ - cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells); + cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_chan_cells); - memset(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ tor_free(mem); } diff --cc src/or/rendservice.c index fe0333e,d235f08..b13992a --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@@ -1383,570 -1402,16 +1383,570 @@@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0) goto err; memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN); - if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info); - memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); - return 0; + goto done; + + log_error: + if (!err_msg) { + if (stage_descr) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "unknown %s error for INTRODUCE2", stage_descr); + } else { + err_msg = tor_strdup("unknown error for INTRODUCE2"); + } + } + + log_warn(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d", err_msg, circuit->base_.n_circ_id); err: - memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + status = -1; if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); - if (launched) + if (launched) { circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason); - if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info); + } + tor_free(err_msg); + + done: - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid)); - memset(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie)); - memset(intro_key_digest, 0, sizeof(intro_key_digest)); - memset(auth_data, 0, sizeof(auth_data)); - memset(diffie_hellman_hash, 0, sizeof(diffie_hellman_hash)); ++ memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); ++ memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ++ memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid)); ++ memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie)); ++ memwipe(intro_key_digest, 0, sizeof(intro_key_digest)); ++ memwipe(auth_data, 0, sizeof(auth_data)); ++ memwipe(diffie_hellman_hash, 0, sizeof(diffie_hellman_hash)); + + /* Free the parsed cell */ + if (parsed_req) { + rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req); + parsed_req = NULL; + } + + /* Free rp if we must */ + if (need_rp_free) extend_info_free(rp); + + return status; +} + +/** Given a parsed and decrypted INTRODUCE2, find the rendezvous point or + * return NULL and an error string if we can't. + */ + +static extend_info_t * +find_rp_for_intro(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + uint8_t *need_free_out, char **err_msg_out) +{ + extend_info_t *rp = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + const char *rp_nickname = NULL; + const node_t *node = NULL; + uint8_t need_free = 0; + + if (!intro || !need_free_out) { + if (err_msg_out) + err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad parameters to find_rp_for_intro()"); + + goto err; + } + + if (intro->version == 0 || intro->version == 1) { + if (intro->version == 1) rp_nickname = (const char *)(intro->u.v1.rp); + else rp_nickname = (const char *)(intro->u.v0.rp); + + node = node_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0); + if (!node) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "Couldn't find router %s named in INTRODUCE2 cell", + escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname)); + } + + goto err; + } + + rp = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); + if (!rp) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "Could build extend_info_t for router %s named " + "in INTRODUCE2 cell", + escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname)); + } + + goto err; + } else { + need_free = 1; + } + } else if (intro->version == 2) { + rp = intro->u.v2.extend_info; + } else if (intro->version == 3) { + rp = intro->u.v3.extend_info; + } else { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "Unknown version %d in INTRODUCE2 cell", + (int)(intro->version)); + } + + goto err; + } + + goto done; + + err: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + else tor_free(err_msg); + + done: + if (rp && need_free_out) *need_free_out = need_free; + + return rp; +} + +/** Remove unnecessary parts from a rend_intro_cell_t - the ciphertext if + * already decrypted, the plaintext too if already parsed + */ + +void +rend_service_compact_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) +{ + if (!request) return; + + if ((request->plaintext && request->plaintext_len > 0) || + request->parsed) { + tor_free(request->ciphertext); + request->ciphertext_len = 0; + } + + if (request->parsed) { + tor_free(request->plaintext); + request->plaintext_len = 0; + } +} + +/** Free a parsed INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell that was allocated by + * rend_service_parse_intro(). + */ +void +rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) +{ + if (!request) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "rend_service_free_intro() called with NULL request!"); + return; + } + + /* Free ciphertext */ + tor_free(request->ciphertext); + request->ciphertext_len = 0; + + /* Have plaintext? */ + if (request->plaintext) { + /* Zero it out just to be safe */ + memset(request->plaintext, 0, request->plaintext_len); + tor_free(request->plaintext); + request->plaintext_len = 0; + } + + /* Have parsed plaintext? */ + if (request->parsed) { + switch (request->version) { + case 0: + case 1: + /* + * Nothing more to do; these formats have no further pointers + * in them. + */ + break; + case 2: + extend_info_free(request->u.v2.extend_info); + request->u.v2.extend_info = NULL; + break; + case 3: + if (request->u.v3.auth_data) { + memset(request->u.v3.auth_data, 0, request->u.v3.auth_len); + tor_free(request->u.v3.auth_data); + } + + extend_info_free(request->u.v3.extend_info); + request->u.v3.extend_info = NULL; + break; + default: + log_info(LD_BUG, + "rend_service_free_intro() saw unknown protocol " + "version %d.", + request->version); + } + } + + /* Zero it out to make sure sensitive stuff doesn't hang around in memory */ + memset(request, 0, sizeof(*request)); + + tor_free(request); +} + +/** Parse an INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell into a newly allocated + * rend_intro_cell_t structure. Free it with rend_service_free_intro() + * when finished. The type parameter should be 1 or 2 to indicate whether + * this is INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2. This parses only the non-encrypted + * parts; after this, call rend_service_decrypt_intro() with a key, then + * rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() to finish parsing. The optional + * err_msg_out parameter is set to a string suitable for log output + * if parsing fails. This function does some validation, but only + * that which depends solely on the contents of the cell and the + * key; it can be unit-tested. Further validation is done in + * rend_service_validate_intro(). + */ + +rend_intro_cell_t * +rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len, + uint8_t type, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + rend_intro_cell_t *rv = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + + if (!request || request_len <= 0) goto err; + if (!(type == 1 || type == 2)) goto err; + + /* First, check that the cell is long enough to be a sensible INTRODUCE */ + + /* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */ + if (request_len < + (DIGEST_LEN + REND_COOKIE_LEN + (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1) + + DH_KEY_LEN + 42)) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "got a truncated INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)type); + } + goto err; + } + + /* Allocate a new parsed cell structure */ + rv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rv)); + + /* Set the type */ + rv->type = type; + + /* Copy in the ID */ + memcpy(rv->pk, request, DIGEST_LEN); + + /* Copy in the ciphertext */ + rv->ciphertext = tor_malloc(request_len - DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(rv->ciphertext, request + DIGEST_LEN, request_len - DIGEST_LEN); + rv->ciphertext_len = request_len - DIGEST_LEN; + + goto done; + + err: + if (rv) rend_service_free_intro(rv); + rv = NULL; + if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "unknown INTRODUCE%d error", + (int)type); + } + + done: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + else tor_free(err_msg); + + return rv; +} + +/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v0 or v1 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 + * cell + */ + +static ssize_t +rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + const char *rp_nickname, *endptr; + size_t nickname_field_len, ver_specific_len; + + if (intro->version == 1) { + ver_specific_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 2; + rp_nickname = ((const char *)buf) + 1; + nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1; + } else if (intro->version == 0) { + ver_specific_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1; + rp_nickname = (const char *)buf; + nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1; + } else { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1() called with " + "bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + goto err; + } + + if (plaintext_len < ver_specific_len) { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "short plaintext of encrypted part in v1 INTRODUCE%d " + "cell (%lu bytes, needed %lu)", + (int)(intro->type), + (unsigned long)plaintext_len, + (unsigned long)ver_specific_len); + goto err; + } + + endptr = memchr(rp_nickname, 0, nickname_field_len); + if (!endptr || endptr == rp_nickname) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in " + "INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + goto err; + } + + if ((intro->version == 0 && + !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) || + (intro->version == 1 && + !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "bad nickname in INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + goto err; + } + + if (intro->version == 1) { + memcpy(intro->u.v1.rp, rp_nickname, endptr - rp_nickname + 1); + } else { + memcpy(intro->u.v0.rp, rp_nickname, endptr - rp_nickname + 1); + } + + return ver_specific_len; + + err: + return -1; +} + +/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v2 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell + */ + +static ssize_t +rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + unsigned int klen; + extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL; + ssize_t ver_specific_len; + + /* + * We accept version 3 too so that the v3 parser can call this with + * and adjusted buffer for the latter part of a v3 cell, which is + * identical to a v2 cell. + */ + if (!(intro->version == 2 || + intro->version == 3)) { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2() called with " + "bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + goto err; + } + + /* 7 == version, IP and port, DIGEST_LEN == id, 2 == key length */ + if (plaintext_len < 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t)); + tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr, get_uint32(buf + 1)); + extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 5)); + memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf + 7, DIGEST_LEN); + extend_info->nickname[0] = '$'; + base16_encode(extend_info->nickname + 1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname) - 1, + extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 7 + DIGEST_LEN)); + + /* 7 == version, IP and port, DIGEST_LEN == id, 2 == key length */ + if (plaintext_len < 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2 + klen) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + extend_info->onion_key = + crypto_pk_asn1_decode((const char *)(buf + 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2), klen); + if (!extend_info->onion_key) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "error decoding onion key in version %d " + "INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + ver_specific_len = 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen; + + if (intro->version == 2) intro->u.v2.extend_info = extend_info; + else intro->u.v3.extend_info = extend_info; + + return ver_specific_len; + + err: + extend_info_free(extend_info); + + return -1; +} + +/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v3 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell + */ + +static ssize_t +rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + ssize_t adjust, v2_ver_specific_len, ts_offset; + + /* This should only be called on v3 cells */ + if (intro->version != 3) { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3() called with " + "bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Check that we have at least enough to get auth_len: + * + * 1 octet for version, 1 for auth_type, 2 for auth_len + */ + if (plaintext_len < 4) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + /* + * The rend_client_send_introduction() function over in rendclient.c is + * broken (i.e., fails to match the spec) in such a way that we can't + * change it without breaking the protocol. Specifically, it doesn't + * emit auth_len when auth-type is REND_NO_AUTH, so everything is off + * by two bytes after that. Calculate ts_offset and do everything from + * the timestamp on relative to that to handle this dain bramage. + */ + + intro->u.v3.auth_type = buf[1]; + if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) { + intro->u.v3.auth_len = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 2)); + ts_offset = 4 + intro->u.v3.auth_len; + } else { + intro->u.v3.auth_len = 0; + ts_offset = 2; + } + + /* Check that auth len makes sense for this auth type */ + if (intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH || + intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) { + if (intro->u.v3.auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "wrong auth data size %d for INTRODUCE%d cell, " + "should be %d", + (int)(intro->u.v3.auth_len), + (int)(intro->type), + REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); + } + + goto err; + } + } + + /* Check that we actually have everything up to the timestamp */ + if (plaintext_len < (size_t)(ts_offset)) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH && + intro->u.v3.auth_len > 0) { + /* Okay, we can go ahead and copy auth_data */ + intro->u.v3.auth_data = tor_malloc(intro->u.v3.auth_len); + /* + * We know we had an auth_len field in this case, so 4 is + * always right. + */ + memcpy(intro->u.v3.auth_data, buf + 4, intro->u.v3.auth_len); + } + + /* + * Apparently we don't use the timestamp any more, but might as well copy + * over just in case we ever care about it. + */ + intro->u.v3.timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(buf + ts_offset)); + + /* + * From here on, the format is as in v2, so we call the v2 parser with + * adjusted buffer and length. We are 4 + ts_offset octets in, but the + * v2 parser expects to skip over a version byte at the start, so we + * adjust by 3 + ts_offset. + */ + adjust = 3 + ts_offset; + + v2_ver_specific_len = + rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(intro, + buf + adjust, plaintext_len - adjust, + err_msg_out); + + /* Success in v2 parser */ + if (v2_ver_specific_len >= 0) return v2_ver_specific_len + adjust; + /* Failure in v2 parser; it will have provided an err_msg */ + else return v2_ver_specific_len; + + err: return -1; }

1 0

[tor/master] Turn some memset()s introduced in tor 0.2.4 into memwipe()s
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit e1c7d12b1d91eea98442b54f9de88a742d7ac86a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 8 17:00:36 2012 -0500 Turn some memset()s introduced in tor 0.2.4 into memwipe()s --- src/or/rendclient.c | 10 +++++----- src/or/rendservice.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d38f920..3fb4025 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -317,8 +317,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); cleanup: - memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload)); - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload)); + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); return status; } @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query) rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address); done: - memset(descriptor_id, 0, sizeof(descriptor_id)); + memwipe(descriptor_id, 0, sizeof(descriptor_id)); return; } @@ -1281,8 +1281,8 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options, } else { strmap_free(parsed, rend_service_authorization_strmap_item_free); } - memset(descriptor_cookie_tmp, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_tmp)); - memset(descriptor_cookie_base64ext, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64ext)); + memwipe(descriptor_cookie_tmp, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_tmp)); + memwipe(descriptor_cookie_base64ext, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64ext)); return res; } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index b13992a..09792bd 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ rend_authorized_client_free(rend_authorized_client_t *client) crypto_pk_free(client->client_key); tor_strclear(client->client_name); tor_free(client->client_name); - memset(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie)); + memwipe(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie)); tor_free(client); } @@ -699,10 +699,10 @@ rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s) tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id); if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not write onion address to hostname file."); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return -1; } - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); /* If client authorization is configured, load or generate keys. */ if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) { @@ -830,13 +830,13 @@ rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname) * len is string length, not buffer length, but last byte is NUL * anyway. */ - memset(client_key_out, 0, len); + memwipe(client_key_out, 0, len); tor_free(client_key_out); goto err; } written = tor_snprintf(buf + written, sizeof(buf) - written, "client-key\n%s", client_key_out); - memset(client_key_out, 0, len); + memwipe(client_key_out, 0, len); tor_free(client_key_out); if (written < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry."); @@ -897,13 +897,13 @@ rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname) } strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free); - memset(cfname, 0, sizeof(cfname)); + memwipe(cfname, 0, sizeof(cfname)); /* Clear stack buffers that held key-derived material. */ - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(desc_cook_out, 0, sizeof(desc_cook_out)); - memset(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id)); - memset(extended_desc_cookie, 0, sizeof(extended_desc_cookie)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(desc_cook_out, 0, sizeof(desc_cook_out)); + memwipe(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id)); + memwipe(extended_desc_cookie, 0, sizeof(extended_desc_cookie)); return r; } @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) /* Have plaintext? */ if (request->plaintext) { /* Zero it out just to be safe */ - memset(request->plaintext, 0, request->plaintext_len); + memwipe(request->plaintext, 0, request->plaintext_len); tor_free(request->plaintext); request->plaintext_len = 0; } @@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) break; case 3: if (request->u.v3.auth_data) { - memset(request->u.v3.auth_data, 0, request->u.v3.auth_len); + memwipe(request->u.v3.auth_data, 0, request->u.v3.auth_len); tor_free(request->u.v3.auth_data); } @@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) } /* Zero it out to make sure sensitive stuff doesn't hang around in memory */ - memset(request, 0, sizeof(*request)); + memwipe(request, 0, sizeof(*request)); tor_free(request); } @@ -2075,9 +2075,9 @@ rend_service_decrypt_intro( else tor_free(err_msg); /* clean up potentially sensitive material */ - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(key_digest, 0, sizeof(key_digest)); - memset(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(key_digest, 0, sizeof(key_digest)); + memwipe(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id)); return status; } @@ -2513,9 +2513,9 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) err: circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason); done: - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(auth, 0, sizeof(auth)); - memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(auth, 0, sizeof(auth)); + memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid)); return; } @@ -2665,9 +2665,9 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) err: circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason); done: - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid)); - memset(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid)); + memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie)); return; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Merge branch 'bug7352_023_rebased' into maint-0.2.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Add and use and unlikely-to-be-eliminated memwipe()
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

1 0

[metrics-lib/master] Add support for parsing bridge-ip-versions lines.
by karsten＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit 17e9149f0733f854737d14233e3537a4ee25e4d2 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Thu Nov 8 14:18:18 2012 -0500 Add support for parsing bridge-ip-versions lines. --- .../torproject/descriptor/ExtraInfoDescriptor.java | 6 +++++ .../descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.java | 14 +++++++++++ .../impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.java | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/org/torproject/descriptor/ExtraInfoDescriptor.java b/src/org/torproject/descriptor/ExtraInfoDescriptor.java index 0e19425..e57febe 100644 --- a/src/org/torproject/descriptor/ExtraInfoDescriptor.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/descriptor/ExtraInfoDescriptor.java @@ -242,6 +242,12 @@ public interface ExtraInfoDescriptor extends Descriptor { * of 8, or null if no bridge statistics are included. */ public SortedMap<String, Integer> getBridgeIps(); + /* Return statistics on client IP addresses with map keys being protocol + * family, e.g., "v4" or "v6", and map values being the number of unique + * IP addresses rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8, or null if no + * bridge IP version statistics are included. */ + public SortedMap<String, Integer> getBridgeIpVersions(); + /* Return the (possibly empty) list of transports supported by this * bridge. */ public List<String> getTransports(); diff --git a/src/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.java b/src/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.java index d84a5e2..d7dfd79 100644 --- a/src/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.java @@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl extends DescriptorImpl this.parseBridgeStatsEndLine(line, lineNoOpt, partsNoOpt); } else if (keyword.equals("bridge-ips")) { this.parseBridgeStatsIpsLine(line, lineNoOpt, partsNoOpt); + } else if (keyword.equals("bridge-ip-versions")) { + this.parseBridgeIpVersionsLine(line, lineNoOpt, partsNoOpt); } else if (keyword.equals("transport")) { this.parseTransportLine(line, lineNoOpt, partsNoOpt); } else if (keyword.equals("router-signature")) { @@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl extends DescriptorImpl partsNoOpt, 1, 2); } + private void parseBridgeIpVersionsLine(String line, String lineNoOpt, + String[] partsNoOpt) throws DescriptorParseException { + this.bridgeIpVersions = ParseHelper.parseCommaSeparatedKeyValueList(line, + partsNoOpt, 1, 2); + } + private void parseTransportLine(String line, String lineNoOpt, String[] partsNoOpt) throws DescriptorParseException { if (partsNoOpt.length < 2) { @@ -897,6 +905,12 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl extends DescriptorImpl new TreeMap<String, Integer>(this.bridgeIps); } + private SortedMap<String, Integer> bridgeIpVersions; + public SortedMap<String, Integer> getBridgeIpVersions() { + return this.bridgeIpVersions == null ? null : + new TreeMap<String, Integer>(this.bridgeIpVersions); + } + private List<String> transports = new ArrayList<String>(); public List<String> getTransports() { return new ArrayList<String>(this.transports); diff --git a/test/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.java b/test/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.java index a2becd2..e1b19f8 100644 --- a/test/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.java +++ b/test/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.java @@ -641,6 +641,14 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest { return DescriptorBuilder.createWithBridgeStatsLines( bsb.buildBridgeStatsLines()); } + private String bridgeIpVersionsLine = "bridge-ip-versions v4=8,v6=16"; + private static ExtraInfoDescriptor createWithBridgeIpVersionsLine( + String line) throws DescriptorParseException { + BridgeStatsBuilder bsb = new BridgeStatsBuilder(); + bsb.bridgeIpVersionsLine = line; + return DescriptorBuilder.createWithBridgeStatsLines( + bsb.buildBridgeStatsLines()); + } private static ExtraInfoDescriptor createWithDefaultLines() throws DescriptorParseException { return DescriptorBuilder.createWithBridgeStatsLines( @@ -654,6 +662,9 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest { if (this.bridgeIpsLine != null) { sb.append(this.bridgeIpsLine + "\n"); } + if (this.bridgeIpVersionsLine != null) { + sb.append(this.bridgeIpVersionsLine + "\n"); + } String lines = sb.toString(); if (lines.endsWith("\n")) { lines = lines.substring(0, lines.length() - 1); @@ -1255,6 +1266,11 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest { assertEquals(24, ips.get("ir").intValue()); assertEquals(16, ips.get("sy").intValue()); assertFalse(ips.containsKey("no")); + SortedMap<String, Integer> ver = descriptor.getBridgeIpVersions(); + assertNotNull(ver); + assertEquals(8, ver.get("v4").intValue()); + assertEquals(16, ver.get("v6").intValue()); + assertFalse(ver.containsKey("v8")); } @Test(expected = DescriptorParseException.class) @@ -1269,6 +1285,14 @@ public class ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest { throws DescriptorParseException { BridgeStatsBuilder.createWithBridgeIpsLine("bridge-ips ir=24.5"); } + + @Test(expected = DescriptorParseException.class) + public void testBridgeIpVersionsDouble() + throws DescriptorParseException { + BridgeStatsBuilder.createWithBridgeIpVersionsLine( + "bridge-ip-versions v4=24.5"); + } + @Test() public void testRouterSignatureOpt() throws DescriptorParseException {

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[translation/vidalia_alpha] Update translations for vidalia_alpha
by translation＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit 8146ce7c0f16c41ae1f563691fb17fdd63bd6073 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 8 18:45:19 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_alpha --- lv/vidalia_lv.po | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/lv/vidalia_lv.po b/lv/vidalia_lv.po index 63e672c..8c76d30 100644 --- a/lv/vidalia_lv.po +++ b/lv/vidalia_lv.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:46+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-08 18:14+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-08 18:32+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Ojars Balcers <ojars.balcers(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: translations(a)vidalia-project.net\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -205,20 +205,20 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "Panic" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Panikas režīms" msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "" "WARNING: The panic button will erease the application if pressed" -msgstr "" +msgstr "BRĪDINĀJUMS: Nospiežot panikas pogu, lietotne tiks izdzēsta." msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "Enable panic button" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Iespējot panikas pogu" msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "Panic path:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Panikas režīma ceļš:" msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "" @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ msgstr "Vidalia neizdevās noņemt Tor pakalpojumu.\n\nIespējams, tas Jums būs msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "Select a Directory to Use for Panic" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Izvēlēties direktoriju, kuru izmantot panikas režīmam" msgctxt "AppearancePage" msgid "Language" @@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "DebugDialog" msgid "Plugin debug output" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Spraudņa atkļūdošanas izvade" msgctxt "DebugDialog" msgid "Plugin Output" @@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ msgstr "Sintakses kļūdas" msgctxt "DebugDialog" msgid "Exceptions" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Izņēmumi" msgctxt "GeneralPage" msgid "Executables (*.exe)" @@ -2008,13 +2008,13 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Panic is enabled" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Panikas režīms ir iespējots" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "" "WARNING: The Panic button is enabled. Use it carefully because it " "will remove Tor completely." -msgstr "" +msgstr "BRĪDINĀJUMS: Panikas poga ir iespējota. Izmantojiet to apdomīgi, jo to lietojot, Tor's tiks pilnībā noņemts." msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "New Circuit" @@ -2034,7 +2034,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Plugins" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Spraudņi" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Your clock is wrong" @@ -3186,7 +3186,7 @@ msgstr "<a href=\"#bridgeHelp\">Kas tas ir?</a>" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "Automatically distribute my bridge address" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Automātiski izplatīt manu tilta adresi" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "Relay traffic inside the Tor network (non-exit relay)" @@ -3198,7 +3198,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "Mirror the Relay Directory" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Spoguļot retranslatora direktoriju" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid ""

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[translation/vidalia_alpha] Update translations for vidalia_alpha
by translation＠torproject.org 08 Nov '12

08 Nov '12

commit 1122cc533d3e8cfd1972b7792a091a6e8596332e Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 8 18:15:18 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_alpha --- lv/vidalia_lv.po | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/lv/vidalia_lv.po b/lv/vidalia_lv.po index c7c5d28..63e672c 100644 --- a/lv/vidalia_lv.po +++ b/lv/vidalia_lv.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:46+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-08 17:43+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-08 18:14+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Ojars Balcers <ojars.balcers(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: translations(a)vidalia-project.net\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ msgctxt "CrashReportDialog" msgid "" "<a " "href=\"https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket\">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket</a>" -msgstr "" +msgstr "<a href=\"https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket\">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket</a>" msgctxt "CrashReportDialog" msgid "" @@ -1369,11 +1369,11 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "DebugDialog" msgid "Plugin Output" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Spraudņa izvade" msgctxt "DebugDialog" msgid "Syntax Errors" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Sintakses kļūdas" msgctxt "DebugDialog" msgid "Exceptions" @@ -2018,15 +2018,15 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "New Circuit" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Jauns maršruts" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Debug output" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Atkļūdošanas izvade" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Panic!" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Panika!" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Reattach tabs" @@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Your clock is wrong" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Jūsu pulkstenis ir nepareizs" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "" @@ -2081,11 +2081,11 @@ msgstr "neizdevās (%1)" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "(probably Telnet)" -msgstr "" +msgstr "(iespējams, ka Telnet)" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "(probably an email client)" -msgstr "" +msgstr "(iespējams, ka e-pasta klients)" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "" @@ -2526,15 +2526,15 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "NetViewer" msgid "Exit circuits" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Izejas maršruti" msgctxt "NetViewer" msgid "Internal circuits" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Iekšējie maršruti" msgctxt "NetViewer" msgid "Hidden Service circuits" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Slēpto pakalpojumu maršruti" msgctxt "NetworkPage" msgid "Copy (Ctrl+C)" @@ -2674,11 +2674,11 @@ msgstr "HTTP / HTTPS" msgctxt "NetworkPage" msgid "You must specify one or more bridges." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Jums jānorāda viens vai vairāki tilti." msgctxt "PluginEngine" msgid "WARNING: %1 doesn't have an info file." -msgstr "" +msgstr "BRĪDINĀJUMS: %1 nav informācijas datne." msgctxt "PluginWrapper" msgid "%1: Processing..." @@ -2748,7 +2748,7 @@ msgstr "noradīt" msgctxt "QDialogButtonBox" msgid "OK" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Labi" msgctxt "QObject" msgid "There were some settings that Vidalia wasn't able to apply together" @@ -3208,15 +3208,15 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "day" -msgstr "" +msgstr "diena" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "week" -msgstr "" +msgstr "nedēļa" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "month" -msgstr "" +msgstr "mēnesis" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "Enable accounting" @@ -3224,7 +3224,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "h:mm" -msgstr "" +msgstr "st:min" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "at" @@ -3240,19 +3240,19 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "KB" -msgstr "" +msgstr "KB" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "MB" -msgstr "" +msgstr "MB" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "GB" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GB" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "TB" -msgstr "" +msgstr "TB" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "Push no more than" @@ -3260,7 +3260,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "ServerPage" msgid "time" -msgstr "" +msgstr "laiks" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "Copy to Clipboard" @@ -3307,7 +3307,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "Connected to the Tor Network" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Savienojums ar Tor tīklu ir izveidots" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "" @@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "Potentially Dangerous Connection!" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Potenciāli bīstams savienojums!" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid ""

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tor-commits November 2012