November 2012 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor-design-2012/master] add a bit more about the control protocol
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit d69a468a07322588d60820c3e5752be05d97cdbc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 01:04:09 2012 -0500 add a bit more about the control protocol --- todo | 4 ++-- tor-design-2012.tex | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index da35f25..aab4d6a 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ ITEMS: o Bandwidth authorities o Path selection rules o stream isolation - . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] + o Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls X rise and fall of .exit - . controller protocol + o controller protocol o torbutton o tor browser bundle diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 69c04a6..38a6eed 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1826,6 +1826,37 @@ caches,'' and periodically fetch network consensus documents; clients can contact a cache instead, once they know who the caches are. +\subsection{The Tor controller protocol} + +Tor has always had a minimalist user interface---it can be +configured on the command line or a configuration file and sends +output to a log file. This was fine for advanced users, but most +users will prefer a GUI. Building a GUI into Tor would be +difficult, and would force certain choices (e.g. GUI toolkit) to +be made which might not suit all users and all +platforms. Therefore Tor includes an interface for other programs to +communicate with the Tor daemon, extracting information to display +on the GUI and changing the Tor configuration based on user +actions. This interface is an ASCII-based protocol, implemented +over a local socket, to allow another program to control Tor. + +The control protocol has also proven useful to researchers +experimenting with Tor. Initially the functionality exposed in the +control protocol was simply that exposed by the configuration file +and log files. Providing status information in a specified and +machine-readable format made the task of monitoring and +controlling Tor easier. Later, functionality was added to the +control protocol which should not be exposed to ordinary Tor users +but is useful to researchers, such as allowing controllers to +arbitrarily control the path selection process. + +To prevent arbitrary local processes from changing Tor's +configuration to make it less secure, the control protocol +provides authentication mechanisms so that only authorized local +processes (ones that can read an appropriate file on the +filesystem, or that know an appropriate passord) can connect to +the controller port. + \section{Attacks and Defenses} \label{sec:attacks}

1 0

r25887: {website} Adding project to update tor's documentation Project idea by (website/trunk/getinvolved/en)
by Damian Johnson 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

Author: atagar Date: 2012-11-14 05:50:42 +0000 (Wed, 14 Nov 2012) New Revision: 25887 Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml Log: Adding project to update tor's documentation Project idea by Runa. Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-14 05:44:16 UTC (rev 25886) +++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-14 05:50:42 UTC (rev 25887) @@ -1014,6 +1014,27 @@ </li> + <a id="docUpdate"></a> + <li> + Website and video documentation update + + Priority: High + + Effort Level: Medium + + Skill Level: Medium + + Likely Mentors: Runa, Karen + + Identify outdated and/or weak pages on torproject.org and re-write the + documentation to appeal to a less technical, more goal-oriented + audience. Create a number of 3-5 minute videos with graphically + portray the written documentation. See + <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?component=Website&status=new">the + website tickets</a> for more information and a starting point. + + </li> + <a id="torCleanup"></a> <li> Tor Codebase Cleanup

1 0

[tor-design-2012/master] Integrate path selection material from the blog posts
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 7b05ef4dbef55f73ba9e87caf8a9e5a090cf2c31 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 00:46:50 2012 -0500 Integrate path selection material from the blog posts --- todo | 10 ++---- tor-design-2012.tex | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index 489ae86..da35f25 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ ITEMS: o Improved authorization model for hidden services o Faster first-hop circuit establishment with CREATE_FAST o Cell queueing and scheduling. - . Integrate content from the second blog post [steven] + o Integrate content from the second blog post [steven] o guard nodes o Bridges, censorship resistance, and pluggable transports - - Changes and complexities in our path selection algorithms - - Bandwidth authorities - - Path selection rules + o Changes and complexities in our path selection algorithms + o Bandwidth authorities + o Path selection rules o stream isolation . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ ITEMS: o Revise "other design decisions" [nick] - - CAN DO AFTER SPONSOR DEADLINE: - Revise related work [steven] - Revise "attacks and defenses" [steven] diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index bb856e7..ebe39e8 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -996,6 +996,87 @@ attack~\cite{freedom21-security} is weakened. % We never made any support for the above; when a node goes down, the % circuits through it get destroyed. (Check that.) -NM +\subsection{Choosing nodes for circuits} + +Early onion routing designs assumed a set of uniform nodes, from +which clients would therefore choose uniformly at random. But this +approach creates terrible bandwidth bottlenecks: a server that would +allow 10x as many bytes per second as another would still get the +same number of circuits constructed through it, leading to +overloaded low-capacity relays and underutilized high-capacity +bandwidth. + +Therefore, Tor now weights\footnote{In the original paper, we + imagined that we might take Morphmix's approach, and divide nodes + into "bandwidth classes", such that clients would choose only from + among nodes having at least the same approximate bandwidth as the + clients. This may be a good design for peer-to-peer anonymity + networks, but it doesn't seem to work for the Tor network: the + most useful high-capacity nodes have more capacity than nearly any + typical client.} +its choice of nodes by servers' bandwidths, so +that a server with more bandwidth gets more circuits, and therefore +(probabilistically) more of the traffic. + +Later, it proved that weighting by bandwidth was also suboptimal, +because of nonuniformity in path selection rules. Consider that if +node A is suitable for use at any point in a circuit, but node B is +suitable only as the middle node, then node A will be considered for +use three times as often as B. If the two nodes have equal +bandwidth, node A will be chosen three times as often, leading to it +being overloaded in comparison with B. So now +0.2.2.10-alpha, we moved to a more sophisticated approach, where +nodes are chosen proportionally to their bandwidth, as weighted by +an algorithm to optimize load-balancing between nodes of different +capabilities. + +Weighting by \emph{advertised} bandwidth would open the possibility +of an attacker trying to see a disproportionate number of +circuits---not by running an extra-high number of nodes---but by +claiming to have a very large bandwidth. + +For a while, Tor tried to limit the impact of this attack by limiting +the maximum bandwidth that a client would believe, so that a single +rogue node couldn't just claim to have infinite bandwidth. This +approach proved unuseful, since some real nodes did in fact have +very high bandwidth. + +But now, clients use \emph{measured} bandwidth values published in +the network status consensus document (see +section~\ref{what?XXX}). A subset of the authorities measure and +vote on nodes' observed bandwidth, to prevent misbehaving nodes from +claiming (intentionally or accidentally) to have too much capacity. + +\subsubection{Avoiding duplicate node families in the same circuit} + +As mentioned above, if the first and last node in a circuit are +controlled by an adversary, they can use traffic correlation attacks +to notice that the traffic entering the network at the first hop +matches traffic leaving the circuit at the last hop, and thereby +trace a client's activity with high probability. Research on +preventing this attack has not yet come up with any affordable, +effective defense suitable for use in a low-latency anonymity +network. Therefore, the most promising mitigation strategies seem to +involve lowering the attacker's chances of controlling both ends of +a circuit. + +To this end, clients do not use any two nodes in a circuit whose IP +addresses are in the same /16. (When we designed the network, it was +marginally more difficult to acquire a large number of disparate +addresses than it was to get a large number of concentrated +addresses. This approach is imperfect, but possibly better than +nothing. + +To allow honest node operators to run more than one server without +inadvertently giving themselves the chance to see more traffic than +they should, we also allow nodes to declare themselves to be members +of the same ``family,'' such that a client won't use two nodes in the +same family in the same circuit. (Clients only believe mutual family +declarations, so that an adversary can't capture routes by having +his nodes claim unilaterally to be in a family with every node the +adversary doesn't control.) + + \subsection{Opening and closing streams} \label{subsec:tcp}

1 0

[tor-design-2012/master] integrate more of the guard nodes section
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 005d4af2af8e7af5888e7151f0dcd1892a24b014 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 00:50:25 2012 -0500 integrate more of the guard nodes section --- tor-design-2012.tex | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index ebe39e8..69c04a6 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1047,7 +1047,53 @@ section~\ref{what?XXX}). A subset of the authorities measure and vote on nodes' observed bandwidth, to prevent misbehaving nodes from claiming (intentionally or accidentally) to have too much capacity. -\subsubection{Avoiding duplicate node families in the same circuit} +\subsubsection{Guard nodes} + +We assume that if an +attacker controls or monitors the first hop and last hop of a +circuit, then the attacker can de-anonymize the user by correlating +timing and volume information. Many of the security improvements to +path selection discussed in this post concentrate on reducing the +probability that an attacker can be in this position, but no +reasonably efficient proposal can eliminate the possibility. + +Therefore, each time a user creates a circuit, there is a small +chance that the circuit will be compromised. However, most users +create a large number of Tor circuits, so with the original path +selection algorithm, these small chances would build up into a +large chance that at least one of their circuits would be +compromised. For users whose goal is to avoid having any of their +communications partners learned, having a fraction of their circuits +compromised is as unacceptable as having all of them compromised. + +To help improve this situation Tor uses Guard Nodes (initially +called "helper nodes", invented by Wright, Adler, Levine, and +Shields and proposed for use in Tor by Øverlier and Syverson). Each +Tor client picks a few Tor nodes to use persistently as its +"guards", and uses one of them as the first hop for all circuits (as +long as those nodes remain operational). + +This doesn't affect the probability that the first circuit is +compromised, but it does mean that if the guard nodes chosen by a +user are not attacker-controlled all their future circuits will be +safe. On the other hand, users who choose attacker-controlled guards +will have about $c/N$ of their circuits compromised, where $c$ is the +amount of attacker-controlled network resource and $N$ is the total +network resource. Without guard nodes every circuit has a $(c/N)^2$ +probability of being compromised. + +Essentially, the guard node approach recognises that some circuits +are going to be compromised, but it's better to increase your +probability of having no compromised circuits at the expense of also +increasing the proportion of your circuits that will be compromised +if any of them are. This is because compromising a fraction of a +user's circuits—sometimes even just one—can be enough to compromise +a user's anonymity. For users who have good guard nodes, the +situation is much better, and for users with bad guard nodes the +situation is not much worse than before. + + +\subsubsection{Avoiding duplicate node families in the same circuit} As mentioned above, if the first and last node in a circuit are controlled by an adversary, they can use traffic correlation attacks

1 0

r25886: {website} Adding Compass project Project idea by gsathya to refactor c (website/trunk/getinvolved/en)
by Damian Johnson 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

Author: atagar Date: 2012-11-14 05:44:16 +0000 (Wed, 14 Nov 2012) New Revision: 25886 Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml Log: Adding Compass project Project idea by gsathya to refactor compass. Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-13 19:30:28 UTC (rev 25885) +++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-14 05:44:16 UTC (rev 25886) @@ -675,6 +675,11 @@ aggregates the Tor relays based on various attributes. + + Project Ideas: + <a href="#compassRefactoring">Compass Refactoring</a> + + <a id="project-weather"></a> <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Weather">Weather</a> (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a @@ -1145,6 +1150,32 @@ </ol> </li> + <a id="compassRefactoring"></a> + <li> + Compass Refactoring + + Priority: Medium + + Effort Level: Medium + + Skill Level: Medium + + Likely Mentors: gsathya, karsten + + Compass was first designed to be a cli app and then hacked into a web app. + The codebase needs to be refactored such that the main processing code is + separated from the display functions(probably into separate files) and made + modular so that adding more features (<a + href="https://trac.torproject.org/6612">#6612</a>) is easy. For example, the + main processing logic could be in compass.py, whereas print_groups() and other + display related functions could be part of a separate cli.py; web.py would also + have to modified to make use of this new modular code. Bonus points for adding + features to compass(<a href="https://trac.torproject.org/6619">#6619</a>, <a + href="https://trac.torproject.org/6612">#6612</a>, <a + href="https://trac.torproject.org/6728">#6728</a>). + + </li> + <!-- <a id="stemPathsupport"></a> <li>

1 0

[tor-design-2012/master] Revise introduction lightly.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit c5ca54edcc25ff6761fcf45b07f06f4e0861d911 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 00:26:13 2012 -0500 Revise introduction lightly. --- todo | 9 +++++- tor-design-2012.tex | 74 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index af508bf..489ae86 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ ITEMS: o guard nodes o Bridges, censorship resistance, and pluggable transports - Changes and complexities in our path selection algorithms + - Bandwidth authorities + - Path selection rules o stream isolation . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls @@ -30,9 +32,9 @@ ITEMS: o torbutton o tor browser bundle - . Revise the abstract and introduction [nick] + o Revise the abstract and introduction [nick] o Abstract - - Introduction + o Introduction . Revise design goals and assumptions [steven] o Revise tor-design up to "opening and closing streams" [nick] @@ -40,6 +42,9 @@ ITEMS: o Revise hidden services section [nick] o Revise "other design decisions" [nick] + + + CAN DO AFTER SPONSOR DEADLINE: - Revise related work [steven] - Revise "attacks and defenses" [steven] diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 035bf0d..bb856e7 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -60,20 +60,11 @@ Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\ nickm(a)freehaven.net \and Paul Syverson \\ Naval Research Lab \\ syverson(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil} -% -% TOPICS TO ADD, NOT NOTED BELOW: -% - everything from the 'top changes in Tor' posts. -% - node reliability testing -% - path selection rules. -% - Stream isolation -% -% What else? -% - NM - \maketitle \thispagestyle{empty} \begin{abstract} +THIS IS A DRAFT. IT IS NOT FINISHED. We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding @@ -103,6 +94,9 @@ anonymous communication. \section{Overview} \label{sec:intro} +THIS IS A DRAFT. IT IS NOT FINISHED. IT IS BASED ON THE 2004 PAPER, +WITH PARTIAL UPDATES. + Onion Routing is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize TCP-based applications like web browsing, secure shell, and instant messaging. Clients choose a path through the @@ -120,16 +114,11 @@ proof-of-concept that ran on a single machine. Even this simple deployment processed connections from over sixty thousand distinct IP addresses from all over the world at a rate of about fifty thousand per day. -% TODO: Describe more of Tor's history here. -NM Here we describe Tor, a protocol for asynchronous, -loosely federated onion routers that provides the following +loosely federated onion routers. Tor provides +provides the following improvements over the old Onion Routing design: -% TODO: Perhaps we should drop the entire enumeration of how Tor differs -% from old Onion Routing; we could instead rattle off a list of ways Tor has -% changed since 2004, or instead discuss major features of the design as a -% whole. - NM - \textbf{Perfect forward secrecy:} In the original Onion Routing design, a single hostile node could record traffic and later compromise successive nodes in the circuit and force them to @@ -163,17 +152,12 @@ ORs~\cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98}. Tradeoffs between padding protection and cost were discussed, and \emph{traffic shaping} algorithms were theorized~\cite{or-pet00} to provide good security without expensive padding, but no concrete padding -scheme was suggested. Recent research~\cite{econymics} and +scheme was suggested. As of our first writing, research~\cite{econymics} and deployment experience~\cite{freedom21-security} suggest that this level of resource use is not practical or economical; and even full link padding is still -vulnerable~\cite{defensive-dropping}. Thus, until we have a -proven and convenient design for traffic shaping or low-latency -mixing that improves anonymity against a realistic adversary, we -leave these strategies out. -% We still don't have a solution for the above. Our related work -% section should summarize what we have learned in the meantime. We -% *have* had good outcomes from work that tried to -NM +vulnerable~\cite{defensive-dropping}. This has not changed since +our first publication, though we remain hopeful. \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} Onion Routing originally built a separate circuit for each application-level @@ -193,8 +177,6 @@ exit the circuit from the middle---possibly frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit. (It also allows for long-range padding if future research shows this to be worthwhile.) -% This is still a notable feature of Tor, but we don't use it for -% anything. -NM \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches @@ -203,9 +185,8 @@ inter-node control communication and global views of traffic. Tor's decentralized congestion control uses end-to-end acks to maintain anonymity while allowing nodes at the edges of the network to detect congestion or flooding and send less data -until the congestion subsides. -% We've been working on this some; we have found that our current approach -% doesn't work so well. -NM +until the congestion subsides. This is an area of active +experimentation and research. \textbf{Directory authorities:} The earlier Onion Routing design planned to flood state information through the @@ -234,7 +215,7 @@ traffic and look for corresponding corrupted traffic at the network edges~\cite{minion-design}. Tor hampers these attacks by verifying data integrity before it leaves the network. % Our approach here is a little broken; we're working on better. We should -% acknowledge the problems. -NM +% acknowledge the problems. Not in this section though. -NM \textbf{Rendezvous points and hidden services:} Tor provides an integrated mechanism for responder anonymity via @@ -246,22 +227,6 @@ path went down or rotated its keys. In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. -Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS -kernel patches or network stack support. This prevents us from -anonymizing non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our -portability and deployability. - -We have implemented all of the above features, including -rendezvous points. Our source code is available under a free -license, and Tor is not covered by the patent that affected -distribution and use of earlier versions of Onion Routing. We -have deployed a wide-area alpha network to test the design, to -get more experience with usability and users, and to provide a -research platform for experimentation. As of this writing, the -network stands at 32 nodes spread over two continents. -% The above figure is wrong; the above paragraph doesn't summarize our status -% well -NM - \textbf{Censorship resistance:} A growing number of Tor users require not only anonymous communications but also censorship resistance. Tor circumvents attempts to block access to the @@ -283,7 +248,20 @@ socket -- the ``control port''. Special-purpose controllers have also been developed by researchers to analyse Tor and prototype modifications. Additional resistance against protocol fingerprinting, for the purposes of censorship resistance, may -be provided by an external ``pluggable transport'' obfuscator. +be provided by an external ``pluggable transport'' obfuscator. + +% More features here. -NM + +Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS +kernel patches or network stack support. This prevents us from +anonymizing non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our +portability and deployability. + +Tor has been operational since 2003. Our source code is available +under a free license, and Tor is not covered by the patent that +affected distribution and use of earlier versions of Onion Routing. +As of this writing, the Tor network stands at about 3000 +nodes. We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe our goals and assumptions in

1 0

[translation/tails-persistence-setup_completed] Update translations for tails-persistence-setup_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit a6b40f82cafab8b37fc1dcc759b776a8c6b93797 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 04:45:56 2012 +0000 Update translations for tails-persistence-setup_completed --- zh_CN/zh_CN.po | 318 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/zh_CN/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f792314 --- /dev/null +++ b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR Tails developers +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# +# Translators: +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-10-29 19:33+0100\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-14 04:30+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: xtoaster <zhazhenzhong(a)gmail.com>\n" +"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: zh_CN\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0;\n" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:48 +msgid "Personal Data" +msgstr "个人数据" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:50 +msgid "Keep files stored in the `Persistent' directory" +msgstr "文件保存至'Persistent'目录" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:58 +msgid "GnuPG" +msgstr "GnuPG" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:60 +msgid "GnuPG keyrings and configuration" +msgstr "GnuPG 钥匙环与配置" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:68 +msgid "SSH Client" +msgstr "SSH 客户端" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:70 +msgid "SSH keys, configuration and known hosts" +msgstr "SSH 密钥，配置及已知服务器" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:78 +msgid "Pidgin" +msgstr "Pidgin" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:80 +msgid "Pidgin profiles and OTR keyring" +msgstr "Pidgin 配置文件及 OTR 钥匙环" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:88 +msgid "Claws Mail" +msgstr "Claws Mail" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:90 +msgid "Claws Mail profiles and locally stored email" +msgstr "Claws Mail 配置文件及存放于本地的邮件" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:98 +msgid "GNOME Keyring" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:100 +msgid "Secrets stored by GNOME Keyring" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环中的私钥" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:108 +msgid "Network Connections" +msgstr "网络连接" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:110 +msgid "Configuration of network devices and connections" +msgstr "配置网络设备和连接" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:118 +msgid "APT Packages" +msgstr "APT 软件包" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:120 +msgid "Packages downloaded by APT" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:128 +msgid "APT Lists" +msgstr "APT 列表" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:130 +msgid "Lists downloaded by APT" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包列表" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:138 +msgid "Dotfiles" +msgstr ".用户配置文件" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:140 +msgid "" +"Symlink into $HOME every file or directory found in the `dotfiles' directory" +msgstr "连入 $HOME 的符号链接，'.'开头目录中的所有文件和文件夹" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:259 +msgid "" +"The device Tails is running from cannot be found. Maybe you used the `toram'" +" option?" +msgstr "Tail 启动时的运行设备已无法找到。可能您使用了'toram'拷贝至内存选项？" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:284 +msgid "'Unparseable partition path.'" +msgstr "'分区路径解析失败。'" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:298 +msgid "Setup Tails persistent volume" +msgstr "设置 Tails 持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:442 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s already has a persistent volume." +msgstr "设备 %s 中已经存在持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:450 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s has not enough unallocated space." +msgstr "设置 %s 空闲空间不足。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:458 ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:472 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s has no persistent volume." +msgstr "设备 %s 中不存在持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:464 +msgid "" +"Cannot delete the persistent volume while in use. You should restart Tails " +"without persistence." +msgstr "持久卷使用中，无法删除。您需要以 Live 模式重启 Tails 。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:483 +msgid "Persistence volume is not unlocked." +msgstr "持久卷未锁定。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:488 +msgid "Persistence volume is not mounted." +msgstr "持久卷未挂载。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:493 +msgid "Persistence volume is not readable. Permissions or ownership problems?" +msgstr "从持久卷中读取失败。文件权限或文件所有者有误？" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:498 +msgid "Persistence volume is not writable. Maybe it was mounted read-only?" +msgstr "向持久卷中写入失败。可能已以只读模式挂载？" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:507 +#, perl-format +msgid "Tails is running from non-USB device %s." +msgstr "Tails 正运行于非 USB 设备 %s。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:513 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s is optical." +msgstr "设备 %s 为光盘设备。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:520 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s was not created using Tails USB installer." +msgstr "设备 %s 是不 Tails USB 安装程序生成的。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:554 +msgid "Error" +msgstr "错误" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:861 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Finished" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 完成" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:864 +msgid "" +"Any changes you have made will only take effect after restarting Tails.\n" +"\n" +"You may now close this application." +msgstr "您所做的任何更改在 Tails 重启后才能生效。\n\n您现在可以关闭本程序了。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:54 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume creation" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 创建持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:57 +msgid "Choose a passphrase to protect the persistent volume" +msgstr "输入一个密码来保护您的持久卷" + +#. TRANSLATORS: size, device vendor, device model +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:61 +#, perl-format +msgid "" +"A %s persistent volume will be created on the %s %s device. Data on " +"this device will be stored in an encrypted form protected by a passphrase." +msgstr "系统将创建一个 %s 的持久卷保存于 %s %s 设备上。此卷中的数据将加密存储与此设备上并受密码保护。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:66 +msgid "Create" +msgstr "创建" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:110 +msgid "" +"Beware! Using persistence has consequences that must be well " +"understood. Tails can't help you if you use it wrong! See <a " +"href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails" +" documentation about persistence</a> to learn more." +msgstr "注意！ 使用持久卷的影响您必须了解。如果您错误使用，Tails 也无法帮助您。更多信息参加 <a href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails 关于持久存储的文档</a> to learn more。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:144 +msgid "Passphrase:" +msgstr "密码:" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:154 +msgid "Verify Passphrase:" +msgstr "再次输入密码:" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:167 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:231 +msgid "Passphrase can't be empty" +msgstr "密码不能为空" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:222 +msgid "Passphrases do not match" +msgstr "密码不一致" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:262 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:189 +msgid "Failed" +msgstr "失败" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:269 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:84 +msgid "Correcting attributes on Tails system partition." +msgstr "正在校正 Tail 系统分区的属性。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:272 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:87 +msgid "The attributes of the Tails system partition will be corrected." +msgstr "即将校正 Tails 系统分区属性。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:280 +msgid "Mounting Tails persistence partition." +msgstr "正在挂载 Tails 持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:283 +msgid "The Tails persistence partition will be mounted." +msgstr "即将挂载 Tails 持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:304 +msgid "Creating..." +msgstr "正在创建..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:307 +msgid "Creating the persistent volume..." +msgstr "正在创建持久卷..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:60 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume configuration" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 配置持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:63 +msgid "Specify the files that will be saved in the persistent volume" +msgstr "设置要保存于持久卷中的文件" + +#. TRANSLATORS: partition, size, device vendor, device model +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:67 +#, perl-format +msgid "" +"The selected files will be stored in the encrypted partition %s (%s), on the" +" %s %s device." +msgstr "所选文件将被保存于加密分区 %s (%s)中，分区位于设备 %s %s 上。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:73 +msgid "Save" +msgstr "保存" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:135 +msgid "Make custom directory persistent (absolute path):" +msgstr "设置自定义目录为持久(绝对路径):" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:141 +msgid "Destination:" +msgstr "目的地:" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:204 +msgid "Saving..." +msgstr "正在保存..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:207 +msgid "Saving persistence configuration..." +msgstr "正在保存持久存储配置..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:41 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume deletion" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 删除持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:44 +msgid "Your persistent data will be deleted." +msgstr "您的存储于持久卷中的数据将被删除。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:48 +#, perl-format +msgid "" +"The persistent volume %s (%s), on the %s %s device, will be deleted." +msgstr "持久卷 %s (%s) 将被删除，此卷位于设备 %s %s 上。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:54 +msgid "Delete" +msgstr "删除" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:99 +msgid "Deleting..." +msgstr "正在删除..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:102 +msgid "Deleting the persistent volume..." +msgstr "正在删除持久卷..."

1 0

[translation/tails-persistence-setup] Update translations for tails-persistence-setup
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 1080eddec105acdbafbe3bac843df153d31cef15 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 04:45:54 2012 +0000 Update translations for tails-persistence-setup --- zh_CN/zh_CN.po | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/zh_CN/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po index 97c6d63..f792314 100644 --- a/zh_CN/zh_CN.po +++ b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po @@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-10-03 16:16+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-10-03 17:39+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-10-29 19:33+0100\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-14 04:30+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: xtoaster <zhazhenzhong(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -19,173 +19,173 @@ msgstr "" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:48 msgid "Personal Data" -msgstr "" +msgstr "个人数据" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:50 msgid "Keep files stored in the `Persistent' directory" -msgstr "" +msgstr "文件保存至'Persistent'目录" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:58 msgid "GnuPG" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GnuPG" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:60 msgid "GnuPG keyrings and configuration" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GnuPG 钥匙环与配置" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:68 msgid "SSH Client" -msgstr "" +msgstr "SSH 客户端" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:70 msgid "SSH keys, configuration and known hosts" -msgstr "" +msgstr "SSH 密钥，配置及已知服务器" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:78 msgid "Pidgin" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Pidgin" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:80 msgid "Pidgin profiles and OTR keyring" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Pidgin 配置文件及 OTR 钥匙环" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:88 msgid "Claws Mail" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Claws Mail" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:90 msgid "Claws Mail profiles and locally stored email" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Claws Mail 配置文件及存放于本地的邮件" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:98 msgid "GNOME Keyring" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:100 msgid "Secrets stored by GNOME Keyring" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环中的私钥" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:108 msgid "Network Connections" -msgstr "" +msgstr "网络连接" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:110 msgid "Configuration of network devices and connections" -msgstr "" +msgstr "配置网络设备和连接" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:118 msgid "APT Packages" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 软件包" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:120 msgid "Packages downloaded by APT" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:128 msgid "APT Lists" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 列表" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:130 msgid "Lists downloaded by APT" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包列表" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:138 msgid "Dotfiles" -msgstr "" +msgstr ".用户配置文件" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:140 msgid "" "Symlink into $HOME every file or directory found in the `dotfiles' directory" -msgstr "" +msgstr "连入 $HOME 的符号链接，'.'开头目录中的所有文件和文件夹" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:259 msgid "" "The device Tails is running from cannot be found. Maybe you used the `toram'" " option?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tail 启动时的运行设备已无法找到。可能您使用了'toram'拷贝至内存选项？" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:284 msgid "'Unparseable partition path.'" -msgstr "" +msgstr "'分区路径解析失败。'" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:298 msgid "Setup Tails persistent volume" -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置 Tails 持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:442 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s already has a persistent volume." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 中已经存在持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:450 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s has not enough unallocated space." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置 %s 空闲空间不足。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:458 ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:472 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s has no persistent volume." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 中不存在持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:464 msgid "" "Cannot delete the persistent volume while in use. You should restart Tails " "without persistence." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷使用中，无法删除。您需要以 Live 模式重启 Tails 。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:483 msgid "Persistence volume is not unlocked." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷未锁定。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:488 msgid "Persistence volume is not mounted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷未挂载。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:493 msgid "Persistence volume is not readable. Permissions or ownership problems?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "从持久卷中读取失败。文件权限或文件所有者有误？" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:498 msgid "Persistence volume is not writable. Maybe it was mounted read-only?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "向持久卷中写入失败。可能已以只读模式挂载？" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:507 #, perl-format msgid "Tails is running from non-USB device %s." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tails 正运行于非 USB 设备 %s。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:513 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s is optical." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 为光盘设备。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:520 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s was not created using Tails USB installer." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 是不 Tails USB 安装程序生成的。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:554 msgid "Error" -msgstr "" +msgstr "错误" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:861 msgid "Persistence wizard - Finished" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 完成" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:864 msgid "" "Any changes you have made will only take effect after restarting Tails.\n" "\n" "You may now close this application." -msgstr "" +msgstr "您所做的任何更改在 Tails 重启后才能生效。\n\n您现在可以关闭本程序了。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:54 msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume creation" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 创建持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:57 msgid "Choose a passphrase to protect the persistent volume" -msgstr "" +msgstr "输入一个密码来保护您的持久卷" #. TRANSLATORS: size, device vendor, device model #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:61 @@ -193,11 +193,11 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "A %s persistent volume will be created on the %s %s device. Data on " "this device will be stored in an encrypted form protected by a passphrase." -msgstr "" +msgstr "系统将创建一个 %s 的持久卷保存于 %s %s 设备上。此卷中的数据将加密存储与此设备上并受密码保护。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:66 msgid "Create" -msgstr "" +msgstr "创建" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:110 msgid "" @@ -205,63 +205,63 @@ msgid "" "understood. Tails can't help you if you use it wrong! See <a " "href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails" " documentation about persistence</a> to learn more." -msgstr "" +msgstr "注意！ 使用持久卷的影响您必须了解。如果您错误使用，Tails 也无法帮助您。更多信息参加 <a href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails 关于持久存储的文档</a> to learn more。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:144 msgid "Passphrase:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "密码:" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:154 msgid "Verify Passphrase:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "再次输入密码:" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:167 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:231 msgid "Passphrase can't be empty" -msgstr "" +msgstr "密码不能为空" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:222 msgid "Passphrases do not match" -msgstr "" +msgstr "密码不一致" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:262 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:189 msgid "Failed" -msgstr "" +msgstr "失败" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:269 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:84 msgid "Correcting attributes on Tails system partition." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在校正 Tail 系统分区的属性。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:272 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:87 msgid "The attributes of the Tails system partition will be corrected." -msgstr "" +msgstr "即将校正 Tails 系统分区属性。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:280 msgid "Mounting Tails persistence partition." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在挂载 Tails 持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:283 msgid "The Tails persistence partition will be mounted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "即将挂载 Tails 持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:304 msgid "Creating..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在创建..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:307 msgid "Creating the persistent volume..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在创建持久卷..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:60 msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume configuration" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 配置持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:63 msgid "Specify the files that will be saved in the persistent volume" -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置要保存于持久卷中的文件" #. TRANSLATORS: partition, size, device vendor, device model #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:67 @@ -269,50 +269,50 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "The selected files will be stored in the encrypted partition %s (%s), on the" " %s %s device." -msgstr "" +msgstr "所选文件将被保存于加密分区 %s (%s)中，分区位于设备 %s %s 上。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:73 msgid "Save" -msgstr "" +msgstr "保存" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:135 msgid "Make custom directory persistent (absolute path):" -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置自定义目录为持久(绝对路径):" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:141 msgid "Destination:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "目的地:" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:204 msgid "Saving..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在保存..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:207 msgid "Saving persistence configuration..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在保存持久存储配置..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:41 msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume deletion" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 删除持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:44 msgid "Your persistent data will be deleted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "您的存储于持久卷中的数据将被删除。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:48 #, perl-format msgid "" "The persistent volume %s (%s), on the %s %s device, will be deleted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷 %s (%s) 将被删除，此卷位于设备 %s %s 上。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:54 msgid "Delete" -msgstr "" +msgstr "删除" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:99 msgid "Deleting..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在删除..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:102 msgid "Deleting the persistent volume..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在删除持久卷..."

1 0

[tor-design-2012/master] Revise "other design decisions" section
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 69b010d08f259daaebd3f7360db9882612f19b4f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 13 23:02:11 2012 -0500 Revise "other design decisions" section --- todo | 5 +++-- tor-design-2012.tex | 48 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index ac44c7f..af508bf 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ LEGEND: o Done . Partially done ? Do we really need to do this? + X Abandoned: we don't need to do this. ITEMS: @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ ITEMS: o stream isolation . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls - ? rise and fall of .exit + X rise and fall of .exit . controller protocol o torbutton o tor browser bundle @@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ ITEMS: o Revise tor-design up to "opening and closing streams" [nick] . Revise tor-design "opening and closing streams" onward [steven] o Revise hidden services section [nick] - . Revise "other design decisions" [nick] + o Revise "other design decisions" [nick] CAN DO AFTER SPONSOR DEADLINE: - Revise related work [steven] diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 2f48cbb..035bf0d 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1452,7 +1452,8 @@ others. First of all, there are several CPU-consuming denial-of-service attacks wherein an attacker can force an OR to perform expensive -cryptographic operations. For example, an attacker can fake the +cryptographic operations at little cost to the attacker. +For example, an attacker can fake the start of a TLS handshake, forcing the OR to carry out its (comparatively expensive) half of the handshake at no real computational cost to the attacker. @@ -1470,8 +1471,6 @@ symmetric cryptography operations that keep cells flowing. This rate limiting could, however, allow an attacker to slow down other users when they build new circuits. -% What about link-to-link rate limiting? - The Tor network itself can be exploited as a DoS amplifier, because for every relay cell sent into an OP, a cell is generated at each hop on the circuit. An adversary could create @@ -1494,9 +1493,6 @@ requests and so cannot generate a path of longer than 8 hops. This does not however prevent an adversary tunneling Tor over Tor, and connecting from an exit node back to the Tor network. -% Mention long-path defense -NM -% Believed done -SJM - Adversaries can also attack the Tor network's hosts and network links. Disrupting a single circuit or link breaks all streams passing along that part of the circuit. Users similarly lose @@ -1510,19 +1506,22 @@ require more buffering at the network edges, however, and the performance and anonymity implications from this extra complexity still require investigation. -% Mention asymmetries in protocols, where a little effort from an attacker -% can make Tor do more calculation. That's bad. -NM - -\subsection{Exit policies and abuse} +In general, deliberate denial of service attacks have not yet had a +noticeable impact on the Tor network in the wild. While we are +aware to the possibility, and looking for more ways to mitigate +possible DoS attack vectors, we are currently more concerned with +circumstances under which misbehaving nodes accidentally ``attack'' +part of the network. For example, our decision to have the +directory authorities act both as the initial contact point for +clients to get directory information has led to clients placing +excessive load on those authorities during times when they couldn't +find pieces of directory information. + +\subsection{Exit policies, node history, and abuse} \label{subsec:exitpolicies} -% This whole section's introduction should get rewritten based on our -% experiences with the network. -NM - -% The thing with exit policies isn't so much (as we phrase it) a "mitigate -% abuse" thing. It's about allowing servers who can't tolerate *any* abuse -% to contribute to the network. Our thinking was kinda muddled there. -NM -Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor +The prospect of exit abuse limits the number of users willing to run +Tor nodes. Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by implicating @@ -1531,17 +1530,8 @@ use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or webservers) can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate at the exit OR. -We stress that Tor does not enable any new class of -abuse. Spammers and other attackers already have access to -thousands of misconfigured systems worldwide, and the Tor -network is far from the easiest way to launch attacks. But -because the onion routers can be mistaken for the originators of -the abuse, and the volunteers who run them may not want to deal -with the hassle of explaining anonymity networks to irate -administrators, we must block or limit abuse through the Tor -network. - -To mitigate abuse issues, each onion router's \emph{exit policy} +To enable volunteers to run nodes without having to necessarily +worry about these abuse issues, each onion router's \emph{exit policy} describes to which external addresses and ports the router will connect. On one end of the spectrum are \emph{open exit} nodes that will connect anywhere. On the other end are @@ -1551,7 +1541,7 @@ local host or network. A private exit can allow a client to connect to a given host or network more securely---an external adversary cannot eavesdrop traffic between the private exit and the final destination, and so is less sure of Alice's -destination and activities. Most onion routers in the current +destination and activities. Many onion routers in the current network function as \emph{restricted exits} that permit connections to the world at large, but prevent access to certain abuse-prone addresses and services such as SMTP. The OR might

1 0

[tor/master] Call channel_mark_for_close() properly in hibernate_go_dormant()
by andrea＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 7ab3004223bd61f8ad1c573b309c63824e038528 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 13 13:45:00 2012 -0800 Call channel_mark_for_close() properly in hibernate_go_dormant() --- src/or/hibernate.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index b33e5e2..9e54eb4 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ hibernating, phase 2: #define HIBERNATE_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" +#include "channeltls.h" #include "config.h" #include "connection.h" #include "connection_edge.h" @@ -846,7 +848,13 @@ hibernate_go_dormant(time_t now) if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) /* send socks failure if needed */ connection_mark_unattached_ap(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING); - else + else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + if (TO_OR_CONN(conn)->chan) { + channel_mark_for_close(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->chan)); + } else { + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } + } else connection_mark_for_close(conn); }

1 0