tor-commits January 2012

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852 discussions

[torbrowser/maint-2.2] bump tbbs to 2.2.35-4 for new openssl
by erinn＠torproject.org 05 Jan '12

05 Jan '12

commit b68db42c8ab2d69e59e646131d19f01f6359c1af Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 11:04:14 2012 +0100 bump tbbs to 2.2.35-4 for new openssl --- README.LINUX-2.2 | 4 ++-- README.OSX-2.2 | 4 ++-- README.WIN-2.2 | 4 ++-- build-scripts/linux.mk | 2 +- build-scripts/osx.mk | 2 +- build-scripts/windows.mk | 2 +- changelog.linux-2.2 | 7 +++++++ changelog.osx-2.2 | 7 +++++++ changelog.windows-2.2 | 7 +++++++ 9 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.LINUX-2.2 b/README.LINUX-2.2 index 87cb931..fa8278a 100644 --- a/README.LINUX-2.2 +++ b/README.LINUX-2.2 @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ Included applications --------------------- Vidalia 0.2.15 (with Qt 4.6.2) -Tor 0.2.2.35 (with libevent-2.0.16-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-1.0.0e) +Tor 0.2.2.35 (with libevent-2.0.16-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-1.0.0f) Firefox (Aurora) 9.0.1 \_ Torbutton 1.4.5.1 - |_ NoScript 2.2.4 + |_ NoScript 2.2.5 |_ HTTPS-Everywhere 1.2.1 Usage diff --git a/README.OSX-2.2 b/README.OSX-2.2 index 2ea9db6..f5b4363 100644 --- a/README.OSX-2.2 +++ b/README.OSX-2.2 @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ Included applications --------------------- Vidalia 0.2.15 (with Qt 4.6.2) -Tor 0.2.2.35 (with libevent-2.0.16-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-1.0.0d) +Tor 0.2.2.35 (with libevent-2.0.16-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-1.0.0f) Firefox (Aurora) 9.0.1 \_ Torbutton 1.4.5.1 - |_ NoScript 2.2.4 + |_ NoScript 2.2.5 |_ HTTPS-Everywhere 1.2.1 Usage diff --git a/README.WIN-2.2 b/README.WIN-2.2 index b005c2a..6fa63a6 100644 --- a/README.WIN-2.2 +++ b/README.WIN-2.2 @@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ Included applications --------------------- Vidalia 0.2.15 (with Qt 4.6.2) -Tor 0.2.2.35 (with libevent-2.0.16-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-1.0.0e) +Tor 0.2.2.35 (with libevent-2.0.16-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-1.0.0f) FirefoxPortable 9.0.1 \_ Firefox (Aurora) 9.0.1 \_ Torbutton 1.4.5.1 - |_ NoScript 2.2.4 + |_ NoScript 2.2.5 |_ HTTPS-Everywhere 1.2.1 Usage diff --git a/build-scripts/linux.mk b/build-scripts/linux.mk index 4f93eec..594e4d7 100644 --- a/build-scripts/linux.mk +++ b/build-scripts/linux.mk @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ include $(PWD)/versions.mk ## Architecture ARCH_TYPE=$(shell uname -m) -BUILD_NUM=3 +BUILD_NUM=4 PLATFORM=Linux ## Location of directory for source unpacking diff --git a/build-scripts/osx.mk b/build-scripts/osx.mk index f53941b..8f31ec8 100644 --- a/build-scripts/osx.mk +++ b/build-scripts/osx.mk @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ include $(PWD)/versions.mk ## Architecture ARCH_TYPE=i386 -BUILD_NUM=3 +BUILD_NUM=4 PLATFORM=MacOS ## Location of directory for source unpacking diff --git a/build-scripts/windows.mk b/build-scripts/windows.mk index 8c2971f..5d2371b 100644 --- a/build-scripts/windows.mk +++ b/build-scripts/windows.mk @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ## Include versions include $(PWD)/versions.mk -BUILD_NUM=3 +BUILD_NUM=4 PLATFORM=Windows ## Location of required libraries diff --git a/changelog.linux-2.2 b/changelog.linux-2.2 index 9475ded..fb5e57c 100644 --- a/changelog.linux-2.2 +++ b/changelog.linux-2.2 @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +Tor Browser Bundle (2.2.35-4); suite=linux + + * Update OpenSSL to 1.0.0f + * Update NoScript to 2.2.5 + + -- Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Thu Jan 5 11:02:28 CET 2012 + Tor Browser Bundle (2.2.35-3); suite=linux * Update Firefox to 9.0.1 diff --git a/changelog.osx-2.2 b/changelog.osx-2.2 index 4f850d0..a327aaf 100644 --- a/changelog.osx-2.2 +++ b/changelog.osx-2.2 @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +Tor Browser Bundle (2.2.35-4); suite=osx + + * Update OpenSSL to 1.0.0f + * Update NoScript to 2.2.5 + + -- Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Thu Jan 5 11:01:36 CET 2012 + Tor Browser Bundle (2.2.35-3); suite=osx * Update Firefox to 9.0.1 diff --git a/changelog.windows-2.2 b/changelog.windows-2.2 index c53d06d..36fd885 100644 --- a/changelog.windows-2.2 +++ b/changelog.windows-2.2 @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +Tor Browser Bundle (2.2.35-4); suite=windows + + * Update OpenSSL to 1.0.0f + * Update NoScript to 2.2.5 + + -- Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Thu Jan 5 11:02:26 CET 2012 + Tor Browser Bundle (2.2.35-3); suite=windows * Update Firefox to 9.0.1

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[translation/vidalia_help] Update translations for vidalia_help
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Jan '12

05 Jan '12

commit 3442ffc67e2d04c6f47410cec852094b71a9b1f4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 09:45:17 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_help --- nl/config.po | 9 +++++++-- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/nl/config.po b/nl/config.po index eaff1d6..dbc3e3c 100644 --- a/nl/config.po +++ b/nl/config.po @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ # Translators: # <flabber(a)online.be>, 2011. # runasand <runa.sandvik(a)gmail.com>, 2011. -# Shondoit Walker <shondoit+transifex(a)gmail.com>, 2011. +# Shondoit Walker <shondoit+transifex(a)gmail.com>, 2011, 2012. msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2010-06-26 16:58+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2011-12-25 09:01+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-01-05 09:21+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Shondoit Walker <shondoit+transifex(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ msgid "" "href=\"bridges.html#finding\">finding bridge relays</a> for more information" " on how to learn new bridge relay addresses and fingerprints." msgstr "" +"Als verbindingen naar normale Tor relays geblokkeerd zijn, dan moet je een " +"bridge relay adres te weten komen en het hier toevoegen. Zie het help " +"onderwerp over <a href=\"bridges.html#finding\">vinden van bridge relays</a>" +" voor meer informatie over hoe nieuwe bridge adressen en fingerprints te " +"weten te komen." #. type: Content of: <html><body> #: en/config.html:100

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[torbrowser/maint-2.2] update libevent library names for linux
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 9df7c935f4284815b65d651e68780bf6e5b7378f Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 00:01:05 2012 +0100 update libevent library names for linux --- build-scripts/linux.mk | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/build-scripts/linux.mk b/build-scripts/linux.mk index 963da78..4f93eec 100644 --- a/build-scripts/linux.mk +++ b/build-scripts/linux.mk @@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ install-binaries: # zlib cp -d $(ZLIB)/libz.so $(ZLIB)/libz.so.1 $(ZLIB)/libz.so.1.2.5 $(LIBSDIR)/libz # Libevent - cp -d $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.3 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core.so \ - $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5.1.3 \ - $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5.1.3 \ + cp -d $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.4 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core.so \ + $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5.1.4 \ + $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5.1.4 \ $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra.so $(LIBEVENT)/libevent.so $(LIBSDIR) # libpng cp -d $(LIBPNG)/libpng14.so* $(LIBSDIR)

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[torbrowser/maint-2.3] update libevent library names for linux
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

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[torbrowser/master] update libevent library names for linux
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

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[torbrowser/maint-2.2] bump openssl to 1.0.0f
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit e7294698e0fe8e49786f47e42c05c54c0f4a7b40 Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 23:57:10 2012 +0100 bump openssl to 1.0.0f --- build-scripts/versions.mk | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/build-scripts/versions.mk b/build-scripts/versions.mk index 20cfd71..ec85656 100644 --- a/build-scripts/versions.mk +++ b/build-scripts/versions.mk @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HTTPSEVERY_VER=1.2.1 FIREFOX_VER=9.0.1 LIBEVENT_VER=2.0.16-stable LIBPNG_VER=1.4.8 -NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.4 -OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0e +NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.5 +OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0f OTR_VER=3.2.0 PIDGIN_VER=2.6.4 QT_VER=4.6.2

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[torbrowser/maint-2.3] bump openssl to 1.0.0f
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

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[torbrowser/master] bump openssl to 1.0.0f
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

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[tor/master] Move description of HidServAuth out of the FascistFirewall group
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit c6a8ee36fb42e5012704c2428772491ddf3057a6 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 01:28:35 2011 -0800 Move description of HidServAuth out of the FascistFirewall group --- doc/tor.1.txt | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 5662131..b373678 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -644,16 +644,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443) -**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]:: - Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 - characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 - characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal - purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times - for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and - this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden - services can be configured to require authorization using the - **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. - **ReachableAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...:: A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except @@ -683,6 +673,16 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to port 80. +**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]:: + Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 + characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 + characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal + purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times + for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and + this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden + services can be configured to require authorization using the + **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. + **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__:: A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these

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[tor/master] Don't close HS client circs which are 'almost connected' on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 4b13c33c0c18c66cc39caba9b70005bbe43c6613 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Dec 23 05:25:17 2011 -0800 Don't close HS client circs which are 'almost connected' on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 12 +++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 ++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 5 ++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b2754a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - Don't close hidden service client circuits which have almost + finished connecting to their destination when they reach the + normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would close + introduction circuits which are waiting for an acknowledgement + from the introduction-point relay and rendezvous circuits which + have been specified in an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden + service after the normal CBT; now, we mark them as 'timed out', + and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. Fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index ef4ac6f..58d8aa6 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; } + /* If this is a timed-out hidden service circuit, skip it. */ + if (origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) { + return 0; + } + if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) if (circ->timestamp_dirty && @@ -351,7 +356,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed * custom timeouts yet */ struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, - cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff; + cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, + hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct timeval now; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; @@ -371,6 +378,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff, + MAX(circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000, + options->SocksTimeout * 1000)); + while (next_circ) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; @@ -392,6 +403,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) else cutoff = general_cutoff; + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) + cutoff = hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &cutoff, >)) continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */ @@ -497,6 +511,43 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } + /* If this is a hidden-service circuit which is far enough along + * in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already + * flagged it as 'timed out', flag it as 'timed out' so we'll + * launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it for close + * yet. + * + * (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout + * period above, so we won't close them in the next call to + * circuit_expire_building.) */ + if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { + switch (victim->purpose) { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: + /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in + * an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. A circ's + * pending_final_cpath field is non-NULL iff it is a rend circ + * and we have tried to send an INTRODUCE1 cell specifying it. + * Thus, if the pending_final_cpath field *is* NULL, then we + * want to not spare it. */ + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath == + NULL) + break; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: + /* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " + "as timed-out HS circ", + victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, + victim->n_circ_id, + victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), + victim->purpose); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; + continue; + default: + break; + } + } + if (victim->n_conn) log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 63ff5c4..63eb64c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2607,6 +2607,13 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * cannibalized circuits. */ unsigned int has_opened : 1; + /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out + * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has + * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to + * its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous + * circuit. */ + unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; + /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT]; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 84a9d49..17c92ab 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + /* Now that this circuit has finished connecting to its destination, + * make sure circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch is willing to return it + * so we can actually use it. */ + circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0; + onion_append_to_cpath(&circ->cpath, hop); circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */

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tor-commits January 2012