April 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add an XXX022-1090 to note consider_exit_fmily b0rkenness
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit affdec8d044513fb87a6dd8931be49974326e8e7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 15:02:37 2011 -0400 Add an XXX022-1090 to note consider_exit_fmily b0rkenness --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4fa87c0..b6627a0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4142,6 +4142,8 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ + /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose + * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] don't exit enclave to excluded relays
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 719b5b87dee4910bb3e2d29db6e2012416f60d3d Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:57:01 2011 -0500 don't exit enclave to excluded relays --- src/or/routerlist.c | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 29e2e96..523596d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void) /** Find a router that's up, that has this IP address, and * that allows exit to this address:port, or return NULL if there * isn't a good one. + * Don't exit enclave to excluded relays -- it wouldn't actually + * hurt anything, but this way there are fewer confused users. */ routerinfo_t * router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) @@ -1545,6 +1547,7 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) uint32_t addr; struct in_addr in; tor_addr_t a; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!tor_inet_aton(address, &in)) return NULL; /* it's not an IP already */ @@ -1557,7 +1560,8 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) if (router->addr == addr && router->is_running && compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&a, port, router->exit_policy) == - ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED) + ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED && + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) return router; }); return NULL;

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad78bafb71fbd66e83b29aba612d17f7d03e575b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:59 2011 -0400 Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc. ExcludeExitNodes foo now means that foo.exit doesn't work. If StrictNodes is set, then ExcludeNodes foo also overrides foo.exit. foo.exit , however, still works even if foo is not listed in ExitNodes. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1f5eb70..f435976 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1497,9 +1497,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, hostname_type_t addresstype; or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct in_addr addr_tmp; + /* We set this to true if this is an address we should automatically + * remap to a local address in VirtualAddrNetwork */ int automap = 0; char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN]; time_t map_expires = TIME_MAX; + /* This will be set to true iff the address starts out as a non-.exit + address, and we remap it to one because of an entry in the addressmap. */ int remapped_to_exit = 0; time_t now = time(NULL); @@ -1610,18 +1614,24 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, /* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit * node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */ char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.'); + + /* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */ + routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ? + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion : options->ExcludeExitNodes; + /*XXX023 make this a node_t. */ + routerinfo_t *router; + tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { + /* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */ if (s[1] != '\0') { - /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's - * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, - * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business - * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; *s = 0; } else { + /* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit. That's not okay. */ log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", safe_str_client(socks->address)); control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s", @@ -1630,23 +1640,33 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, return -1; } } else { - routerinfo_t *r; + /* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); - r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); - *socks->address = 0; - if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || - !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, - r))) { - strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); - } else { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", - r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", - safe_str_client(socks->address)); - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); + if (router) { + *socks->address = 0; + strlcpy(socks->address, router->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } } + /* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */ + if (!router) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */ + if (routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* XXXX022-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and + Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch + implies no. */ } if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 84f0e87c6a6629d047a39f658b7f7c96767219ca Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:20:19 2011 -0400 If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit We could probably do something smarter here, but the situation is unusual enough that it's okay to just fail the circuit. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +++++-- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4832cae..c58509f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4130,15 +4130,18 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) need_capacity = 0; goto retry; } +#if 0 + /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the + same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win + here. */ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ - /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose - * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; } +#endif /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */ }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 4906188b622872899f76cf01167cfef3e09cbffd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:09:24 2011 -0500 handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post If we're picking a random directory node, never pick an excluded one. But if we've chosen a specific one (or all), allow it unless strictnodes is set (in which case warn so the user knows it's their fault). When warning that we won't connect to a strictly excluded node, log what it was we were trying to do at that node. When ExcludeNodes is set but StrictNodes is not set, we only use non-excluded nodes if we can, but fall back to using excluded nodes if none of those nodes is usable. --- src/or/directory.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 8f33a60..0c095fe 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void) } /** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using - * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload' - * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of + * connection purpose dir_purpose and uploading payload + * (of length payload_len). The dir_purpose should be one of * 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'. * + * router_purpose describes the type of descriptor we're + * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge. + * * type specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2, * HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to. * @@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int post_via_tor; smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers(); int found = 0; @@ -287,6 +291,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, if ((type & ds->type) == 0) continue; + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping.", + ds->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + continue; + } + found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */ if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR) ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0; @@ -496,12 +510,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, time_t if_modified_since, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerinfo_t *router; char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1]; struct in_addr in; const char *address; tor_addr_t addr; router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest); + if (!router && anonymized_connection) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we " "don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname); @@ -514,6 +530,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, address = address_buf; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); + + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.", + status->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr, status->or_port, status->dir_port, status->version_supports_conditional_consensus, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 5d9ab8c..29e2e96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags) static routerstatus_t * router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerstatus_t *result; smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel; @@ -1079,10 +1080,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF); int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL); int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!consensus) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); trusted_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1114,6 +1118,11 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) && !router_supports_extrainfo(status->identity_digest, 0)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); @@ -1155,6 +1164,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; } @@ -1165,6 +1183,7 @@ static routerstatus_t * router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, int *n_busy_out) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel; routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1175,10 +1194,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, const int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH); int n_busy = 0; + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!trusted_dir_servers) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); overloaded_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1197,6 +1219,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, continue; if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, + &d->fake_status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr); @@ -1243,6 +1271,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, smartlist_free(tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad3da535366aeb9b7441f4881899758bc7475168 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:54:20 2009 -0400 If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/config.c | 3 ++- src/or/or.h | 4 ++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 13 ++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2d4d5c0..ebbda21 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2938,6 +2938,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); + /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); } @@ -3979,7 +3980,8 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. */ - routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, 0); + routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, smartlist_add(entry_fps,ri->cache_info.identity_digest)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, { @@ -4155,7 +4157,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes + /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9675c73..bd904dc 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1412,7 +1412,8 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */ if (options->EntryNodes && (!old_options || - (!routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes)))) + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes))) entry_nodes_should_be_added(); /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 06e6d7f..50a1223 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@ typedef struct { * ORs not to consider as exits. */ /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ - struct routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our * process for all current and future memory. */ @@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ typedef struct trusted_dir_server_t { #define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX -/* Flags for pick_directory_server and pick_trusteddirserver. */ +/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */ /** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use * ourself to answer a directory request. * Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/ diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index c02654f..5d9ab8c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5516,10 +5516,11 @@ routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs) } /** Add every known routerinfo_t that is a member of routerset to - * out. If running_only, only add the running ones. */ + * out, but never add any that are part of excludeset. + * If running_only, only add the running ones. */ void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, - int running_only) + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only) { tor_assert(out); if (!routerset || !routerset->list) @@ -5529,12 +5530,13 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, if (routerset_is_list(routerset)) { /* No routers are specified by type; all are given by name or digest. - * we can do a lookup in O(len(list)). */ + * we can do a lookup in O(len(routerset)). */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerset->list, const char *, name, { routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1); if (router) { if (!running_only || router->is_running) - smartlist_add(out, router); + if (!routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) + smartlist_add(out, router); } }); } else { @@ -5544,7 +5546,8 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, router, { if (running_only && !router->is_running) continue; - if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router)) + if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router) && + !routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) smartlist_add(out, router); }); } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ca42811..cd0eb95 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, const extend_info_t *ei); void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include,

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 7e2e8074d52f9ace76d98a62d67a4bf781f06c3b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:22:53 2011 -0500 slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options this function really needs to get a total rewrite (or die) For now, use #if 0 to disable it. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- src/or/circuituse.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cdf49e3..7b20f7f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -242,33 +242,34 @@ circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose, return best ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(best) : NULL; } +#if 0 /** Check whether, according to the policies in options, the * circuit circ makes sense. */ -/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */ +/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more. + * Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also, + * it's never called. */ int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options) { const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL; - for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath && cpath_next != circ->cpath; - cpath = cpath_next) { + /* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */ + for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) { cpath_next = cpath->next; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, cpath->extend_info)) return 0; + } - if (cpath->next == circ->cpath) { - /* This is apparently the exit node. */ + /* then consider the final hop */ + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, + circ->cpath->prev->extend_info)) + return 0; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, - cpath->extend_info)) - return 0; - } - } return 1; } +#endif /** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born * at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.h b/src/or/circuituse.h index a121099..9f393ab 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.h +++ b/src/or/circuituse.h @@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ void circuit_expire_building(void); void circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports); int circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port, int min); +#if 0 int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options); +#endif void circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now); void circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 82178a81f6748c9b26bdc8a5da36dd34b689281b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:52:18 2009 -0400 refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes Make hidden services more flaky for people who set both ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. Not recommended, especially for hidden service operators. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 14 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8ac909f..90304c3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "routerlist.h" +static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ void @@ -739,10 +742,31 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + extend_info_t *result; + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + return result; + /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node + */ + if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return NULL; +} + +/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set + * iff strict is true. + */ +static extend_info_t * +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, + const int strict) +{ int i; rend_cache_entry_t *entry; rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + smartlist_t *usable_nodes; + int n_excluded = 0; if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { log_warn(LD_REND, @@ -750,13 +774,26 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); return NULL; } + /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, + * no nodes are usable. */ + usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes); again: - if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise + * we're just about to retry anyways. + */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are " + "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping."); + } + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return NULL; + } - i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes)); + intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) @@ -766,13 +803,22 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); - rend_intro_point_free(intro); - smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } extend_info_free(intro->extend_info); intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); } + /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + intro->extend_info)) { + n_excluded++; + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; + } + + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 4503982..88f1ba3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now) /** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen * rendezvous point. */ + /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */ int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) @@ -875,6 +876,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t *access_time; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, @@ -1047,6 +1050,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } + /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " + "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */ + goto err; + } + r_cookie = ptr; base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); @@ -1394,7 +1406,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a * live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is - * now out-of-date.*/ + * now out-of-date. */ int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,

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[arm/master] Delaying connection resolution until after init
by atagar＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f75b0c9f47ea4932cbdfea888cab55af7397c5a6 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 09:41:40 2011 -0700 Delaying connection resolution until after init This is a huge performance fix, dropping the startup time from 0.84 seconds to 0.14 (83% improvement). Arm had been fetching connection contents on init, blocking the first redraw. The fix is to both move connection init into its runtime thread *and* delay its execution until after the initial redraw. This hides the call latency in the period that we're usually waiting for user input anyway. There's still perceived latency if the user immediately switches to the connections page, but this is both unavoidable and unusual. --- src/cli/connections/connPanel.py | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py b/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py index 8339f88..7e12232 100644 --- a/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py +++ b/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py @@ -71,9 +71,6 @@ class ConnectionPanel(panel.Panel, threading.Thread): # rate limits appResolver queries to once per update self.appResolveSinceUpdate = False - self._update() # populates initial entries - self._resolveApps(False) # resolves initial applications - # mark the initially exitsing connection uptimes as being estimates for entry in self._entries: if isinstance(entry, connEntry.ConnectionEntry): @@ -170,6 +167,16 @@ class ConnectionPanel(panel.Panel, threading.Thread): """ lastDraw = time.time() - 1 + + # Fetches out initial connection results. The wait is so this doesn't + # run during arm's interface initialization (otherwise there's a + # noticeable pause before the first redraw). + self._cond.acquire() + self._cond.wait(0.2) + self._cond.release() + self._update() # populates initial entries + self._resolveApps(False) # resolves initial applications + while not self._halt: currentTime = time.time()

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[arm/master] fix: Proc resolution without a pid gave stacktrace
by atagar＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f72aa4616ea605ac22fe012513d856aaeedb819e Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 08:52:54 2011 -0700 fix: Proc resolution without a pid gave stacktrace When the connection resolver hadn't been configured with a pid and we queried connections by proc resolution there was an uncaught exception. This didn't crash arm - it just resulted in a stacktrace for a split second at startup. This was most easily reproed by running arm on Linux in blind mode, with a sleep command between panel creation and redrawing the screen to keep the stack trace visible for a bit. --- src/util/connections.py | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/util/connections.py b/src/util/connections.py index f632306..c090893 100644 --- a/src/util/connections.py +++ b/src/util/connections.py @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ class ConnectionResolver(threading.Thread): else: self._rateThresholdBroken = 0 if isDefault: self._subsiquentFailures = 0 - except IOError, exc: + except (ValueError, IOError), exc: # this logs in a couple of cases: # - special failures noted by getConnections (most cases are already # logged via sysTools)

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