April 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.2] minor tweaks to manpage
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0f48e8fa9ad68f56c7b1076872848bd0f1e524b2 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 14:04:50 2011 -0400 minor tweaks to manpage --- doc/tor.1.txt | 12 +++++++----- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 866a702..04a0537 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this - list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below + list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: @@ -527,18 +527,20 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, - those used for self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To + those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end + at a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. + + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. + + - The .exit address notation, if enabled, overrides this option. + The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides + this option. **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. (Country codes and - address patterns are not yet supported.) This includes all + address patterns are not yet supported.) Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. + @@ -553,7 +555,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to - perform self-tests, connect to + perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download directory information. (Default: 0)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add a big changelog entry for bug 1090 fixes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit c49f660c1a9f196c8cbb4863bb377bdb6e642539 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:33:38 2011 -0400 Add a big changelog entry for bug 1090 fixes --- changes/bug1090-general | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-general b/changes/bug1090-general new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4656315 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-general @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ + o Major features and bugfixes (node selection) + + - Revise and unify the meaning of the ExitNodes, EntryNodes, + ExcludeEntryNodes, ExcludeExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, and + StrictNodes options. Previously, we had been ambiguous in + describing what counted as an "exit" node, and what operations + exactly "StrictNodes 0" would permit. This created confusion + when people saw nodes built through unexpected circuits, and + made it hard to tell real bugs from surprises. We now stipulate + that the intended behavior is: + + . "Exit", in the context of ExitNodes and ExcludeExitNodes, + means a node that delivers user traffic outside the Tor + network. + . "Entry", in the context of EntryNodes and ExcludeEntryNodes, + means a node used as the first hop of a multihop circuit: + it doesn't include direct connections to directory servers. + . "ExcludeNodes" applies to all nodes. + . "StrictNodes" changes the behavior of ExcludeNodes only. + When StrictNodes is set, Tor should avoid all nodes listed + in ExcludeNodes, even when it will make user requests + fail. When StrictNodes is *not* set, then Tor should + follow ExcludeNodes whenever it can, except when it must + use an excluded node to perform self-tests, connect to a + hidden service, provide a hidden service, fulfill a .exit + request, upload directory information, or fetch directory + information. + + Collectively, the changes to implement the behavior are a fix for + bug 1090. + + - ExcludeNodes now takes precedence over EntryNodes and ExitNodes: + if a node is listed in both, it's treated as excluded. + + - ExcludeNodes now applies to directory nodes: as a preference if + StrictNodes is 0, or an absolute requirement if StrictNodes is 1. + (Don't exclude all the directory authorities and set StrictNodes + to 1 unless you really want your Tor to break.) + + - ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes now override exit enclaving. + + - ExcludeExitNodes now overrides .exit requests. + + - We don't use bridges from ExcludeNodes. + + - When StrictNodes is 1: + . We now apply ExcludeNodes to hidden service introduction points + and to rendezvous points selected by hidden service users. + This can make your hidden service less reliable: use it with + caution! + . If we have used ExcludeNodes on ourself, do not try self-tests. + . If we have excluded all the directory authorities, we will + not even try to upload our descriptor if we're a server. + . Do not honor .exit requests to an excluded node. + + - Remove a misfeature that caused us to ignore the Fast/Stable flags + if ExitNodes was set. Bugfix on 0.2.2.7-alpha. + + - When the set of permitted nodes changes, we now remove any + mappings introduced via TrackExitHosts to now-excluded nodes. + Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. + + - We never cannibalize a circuit that had excluded nodes on it, + even if StrictNodes is 0. Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. + + - Improve log messages related to excluded nodes. + + - Revert a change where we would be laxer about attaching streams to + circuits than when building the circuits. This was meant to + prevent a set of bugs where streams were never attachable, but our + improved code here should make this unnecessary. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.7-alpha. +

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] explain an argument in a function comment
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0c40dda3ad824d8a782dafae4c4233a949837df3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:43:11 2011 -0400 explain an argument in a function comment --- src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d444611..65e632f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -764,7 +764,8 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) } /** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set - * iff strict is true. + * iff strict is true. If warnings is false, don't complain + * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true. */ static extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f7a5bc16d689e8b919285c66cd0f07a6694bcc69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:18:01 2011 -0400 warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream --- changes/bug1090-launch-warning | 5 +++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 ++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-launch-warning b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f3fbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle + a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency + between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our + "attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cc4a739..fd1cf6b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1409,7 +1409,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, extend_info_free(extend_info); - if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream. + * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's + * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */ + if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD && + ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched " + "%d circuits without finding one it likes.", + escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address), + conn->socks_request->port, + conn->num_circuits_launched); + } else { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 50a1223..7d354c8 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t { * already retried several times. */ uint8_t num_socks_retries; +#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10 + /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If + * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our + * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our + * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */ + unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4; + /** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */ unsigned int is_dns_request:1;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] revert most of ef81649d2fc
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f962dda8c188ebe17be1ad7d6548f303b6425943 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 19:55:34 2011 -0400 revert most of ef81649d2fc Now we believe it to be the case that we never build a circuit for our stream that has an unsuitable exit, so we'll never need to use such a circuit. The risk is that we have some code that builds the circuit, but now we refuse to use it, meaning we just build a bazillion circuits and ignore them all. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ src/or/connection_edge.c | 19 ++----------------- src/or/connection_edge.h | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b963f1a..6401e71 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2728,7 +2728,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, { if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn)) continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */ - if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router, 1)) { + if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router)) { ++n_supported[i]; // log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.", // router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 530941c..cc4a739 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, return 0; } } - if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter, 0)) { + if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter)) { /* can't exit from this router */ return 0; } @@ -166,6 +166,10 @@ circuit_is_better(circuit_t *a, circuit_t *b, uint8_t purpose) return 1; if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(b) && TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(b)->build_state->is_internal) + /* XXX023 what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I + * think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already + * makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to + * be. -RD */ return 1; } break; @@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, if (exitrouter && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) { int ok; if (conn) { - ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter, 0); + ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter); } else { addr_policy_result_t r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy( 0, port, exitrouter->exit_policy); @@ -1291,9 +1295,10 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, * refactor into a single function? */ routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional; - if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router, 0)) { + if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) { log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.", + "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or " + "would refuse request. %s.", conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing"); if (opt) { conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; @@ -1611,9 +1616,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn) } return -1; } - if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router, 0)) { + if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) { log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.", + "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or " + "would refuse request. %s.", conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing"); if (opt) { conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1ee57ab..082cd5f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3044,15 +3044,9 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn) * to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it. * (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been * resolved.) - * - * If excluded_means_no is 1 and Exclude*Nodes is set and excludes - * this relay, return 0. - * XXX022-1090 This StrictNodes business needs more work, a la bug 1090. See - * also git commit ef81649d. */ int -connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, - int excluded_means_no) +connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit) { or_options_t *options = get_options(); @@ -3102,17 +3096,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, return 0; } if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion && - (options->StrictNodes || excluded_means_no) && routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, exit)) { - /* If we are trying to avoid this node as exit, and we have StrictNodes - * set, then this is not a suitable exit. Refuse it. - * - * If we don't have StrictNodes set, then this function gets called in - * two contexts. First, we've got a circuit open and we want to know - * whether we can use it. In that case, we somehow built this circuit - * despite having the last hop in ExcludeExitNodes, so we should be - * willing to use it. Second, we are evaluating whether this is an - * acceptable exit for a new circuit. In that case, skip it. */ + /* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */ return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index c4ae467..70d0dd2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ int connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ); int connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ); void connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *conn); int connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn); -int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, - int excluded_means_no); +int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit); void connection_ap_expire_beginning(void); void connection_ap_attach_pending(void); void connection_ap_fail_onehop(const char *failed_digest,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug1090-part1-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 99621bc5a629a81a5a823ce21ac3d967443d0e12 Merge: 8f6cb93 0c40dda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:45:28 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug1090-part1-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] When there is a transition in permitted nodes, apply it to trackexithosts map
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 80adb3de507db4cd67208396e1ea301f131c1228 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:43:47 2011 -0400 When there is a transition in permitted nodes, apply it to trackexithosts map IOW, if we were using TrackExitHosts, and we added an excluded node or removed a node from exitnodes, we wouldn't actually remove the mapping that points us at the new node. Also, note with an XXX022 comment a place that I think we are looking at the wrong string. --- src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/connection_edge.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/connection_edge.h | 1 + src/or/routerlist.c | 2 +- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 44cde85..f003e4d 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1271,6 +1271,7 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) "excluded node lists. Abandoning previous circuits."); circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(); circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(); + addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(options); } /* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge? diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index f435976..5f322ca 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -789,9 +789,6 @@ addressmap_ent_remove(const char *address, addressmap_entry_t *ent) static void clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) { - /* XXXX022-1090 We need a variant of this that clears all mappings no longer - permitted because of changes to the ExcludeNodes, ExitNodes, or - ExcludeExitNodes settings. */ char *suffix; size_t suffix_len; if (!addressmap || !exitname) @@ -802,6 +799,7 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) tor_strlower(suffix); STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) { + /* XXXX022 HEY! Shouldn't this look at ent->new_address? */ if (ent->source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT && !strcmpend(address, suffix)) { addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent); MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address); @@ -811,6 +809,56 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) tor_free(suffix); } +/** Remove all TRACKEXIT mappings from the addressmap for which the target + * host is unknown or no longer allowed. */ +void +addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) +{ + const routerset_t *allow_nodes = options->ExitNodes; + const routerset_t *exclude_nodes = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + + if (!addressmap) + return; + if (routerset_is_empty(allow_nodes)) + allow_nodes = NULL; + if (allow_nodes == NULL && routerset_is_empty(exclude_nodes)) + return; + + STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) { + size_t len; + const char *target = ent->new_address, *dot; + char *nodename; + routerinfo_t *ri; /* XXX023 Use node_t. */ + + if (strcmpend(target, ".exit")) { + /* Not a .exit mapping */ + continue; + } else if (ent->source != ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT) { + /* Not a trackexit mapping. */ + continue; + } + len = strlen(target); + if (len < 6) + continue; /* malformed. */ + dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + if (!dot) { + nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); + } else { + nodename = tor_strndup(dot+1, strlen(dot+1)-5); + } + ri = router_get_by_nickname(nodename, 0); + tor_free(nodename); + if (!ri || + (allow_nodes && !routerset_contains_router(allow_nodes, ri)) || + routerset_contains_router(exclude_nodes, ri)) { + /* We don't know this one, or we want to be rid of it. */ + addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent); + MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address); + } + } STRMAP_FOREACH_END; +} + /** Remove all entries from the addressmap that were set via the * configuration file or the command line. */ void diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index 0b08dd0..c4ae467 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ int connection_ap_process_transparent(edge_connection_t *conn); int address_is_invalid_destination(const char *address, int client); void addressmap_init(void); +void addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options); void addressmap_clean(time_t now); void addressmap_clear_configured(void); void addressmap_clear_transient(void); diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index d5e8a6b..d9f099b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5474,7 +5474,7 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) } /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ -static int +int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index 3bbdc42..fec1870 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int routerset_parse(routerset_t *target, const char *s, void routerset_union(routerset_t *target, const routerset_t *source); int routerset_is_list(const routerset_t *set); int routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set); +int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set); int routerset_contains_router(const routerset_t *set, routerinfo_t *ri); int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs);

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix a check-spaces complaint
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e03e90bf591f649f7883807f99354634e837ee48 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:16:26 2011 +0200 Fix a check-spaces complaint --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 5f322ca..1ee57ab 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) if (len < 6) continue; /* malformed. */ dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ - dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit or NULL */ if (!dot) { nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); } else {

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add a circuit_purpose_to_string() function, and use it
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8ee92f28e056fd32f1faef62ae1523ad4d553a64 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 13:27:25 2011 -0400 Add a circuit_purpose_to_string() function, and use it We had a circuit_purpose_to_controller_string() function, but it was pretty coarse-grained and didn't try to be human-readable. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 +++++--- src/or/circuitlist.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.h | 1 + src/or/circuituse.c | 22 ++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 681f524..b963f1a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2051,8 +2051,9 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) */ if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", timediff, - circ->_base.purpose); + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff, + circ->_base.purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose)); } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) { /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */ if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) { @@ -2890,8 +2891,9 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d)", - (int)purpose); + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d, %s)", + (int)purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); return; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index ce324ca..33dc8f0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -378,6 +378,62 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose) } } +/** Return a human-readable string for the circuit purpose purpose. */ +const char * +circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose) +{ + static char buf[32]; + + switch (purpose) + { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR: + return "Circuit at relay"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: + return "Acting as intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING: + return "Acting as rendevous (pending)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED: + return "Acting as rendevous (established)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: + return "General-purpose client"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: + return "Hidden service client: Connecting to intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: + return "Hidden service client: Waiting for ack from intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED: + return "Hidden service client: Received ack from intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: + return "Hidden service client: Establishing rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: + return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: + return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point (ack received)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: + return "Hidden service client: Active rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT: + return "Measuring circuit timeout"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO: + return "Hidden service: Establishing introduction point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO: + return "Hidden service: Introduction point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND: + return "Hidden service: Connecting to rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED: + return "Hidden service: Active rendezvous point"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: + return "Testing circuit"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: + return "Circuit made by controller"; + + default: + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose); + return buf; + } +} + /** Pick a reasonable package_window to start out for our circuits. * Originally this was hard-coded at 1000, but now the consensus votes * on the answer. See proposal 168. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index ef6fc3a..7b01ca3 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ circuit_t * _circuit_get_global_list(void); const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state); const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose); +const char *circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose); void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity); void circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, or_connection_t *conn); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 7b20f7f..530941c 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -392,10 +392,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN; if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->p_streams != NULL) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d) has timed out, " + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d, %s) has timed out, " "yet has attached streams!", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); tor_fragile_assert(); continue; } @@ -426,9 +427,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &extremely_old_cutoff, <)) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Extremely large value for circuit build timeout: %lds. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", (long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec), - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); } else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(&circ_times, first_hop_succeeded, victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) { @@ -794,12 +796,11 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Ancient non-dirty circuit %d is still around after " - "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d", + "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d (%s)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier, tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_created, &now), - circ->purpose); - /* FFFF implement a new circuit_purpose_to_string() so we don't - * just print out a number for circ->purpose */ + circ->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose)); TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient = 1; } } @@ -1136,8 +1137,9 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */ circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags); if (circ) { - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d", - build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose); + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d (%s)", + build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); circ->_base.purpose = purpose; /* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building * will see it and think it's been trying to build since it

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Explain the "using anyway" log message better
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 92ec36a061de17dd4e378d5ce34d82f91eee9f86 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:01:23 2011 +0200 Explain the "using anyway" log message better Also add a request to report any cases where we are not honoring StrictNodes to the developers: These should now all be bugs. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c58509f..681f524 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) return; - description = "Requested exit node"; + description = "requested exit node"; rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: @@ -2911,22 +2911,28 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: - description = "Chosen rendezvous point"; + description = "chosen rendezvous point"; domain = LD_BUG; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; - description = "Controller-selected circuit target"; + description = "controller-selected circuit target"; break; } if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { - log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "%s '%s' is in ExcludeNodes%s. Using anyway " - "(circuit purpose %d).", + /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ + if (options->StrictNodes) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using an excluded node with StrictNodes set. " + "Please report the following log message to the " + "developers."); + log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " + "ExcludeNodes%s, because no other options were available. To " + "prevent this, set the StrictNodes configuration option." + "(Circuit purpose is %d)", description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); - /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); }

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