April 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.2] explain an argument in a function comment
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0c40dda3ad824d8a782dafae4c4233a949837df3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:43:11 2011 -0400 explain an argument in a function comment --- src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d444611..65e632f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -764,7 +764,8 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) } /** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set - * iff strict is true. + * iff strict is true. If warnings is false, don't complain + * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true. */ static extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] better user-facing warnings for unexpected last hops
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit b8b557dcb2bf719976858589345f08fffbab13e3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:48:00 2011 -0400 better user-facing warnings for unexpected last hops these still aren't perfect, but we won't know how to correct them until we start experiencing surprised users. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 6401e71..90572d5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2878,7 +2878,6 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerset_t *rs = options->ExcludeNodes; const char *description; - int domain = LD_CIRC; uint8_t purpose = circ->_base.purpose; if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) @@ -2914,7 +2913,6 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: description = "chosen rendezvous point"; - domain = LD_BUG; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; @@ -2924,18 +2922,24 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ - if (options->StrictNodes) - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using an excluded node with StrictNodes set. " - "Please report the following log message to the " - "developers."); - log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " - "ExcludeNodes%s, because no other options were available. To " - "prevent this, set the StrictNodes configuration option." - "(Circuit purpose is %d)", - description,exit->nickname, - rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", - (int)purpose); - circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); + if (options->StrictNodes) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in ExcludeNodes%s, " + "even though StrictNodes is set. Please report. " + "(Circuit purpose: %s)", + description, exit->nickname, + rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); + } else { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " + "ExcludeNodes%s, because no better options were available. To " + "prevent this (and possibly break your Tor functionality), " + "set the StrictNodes configuration option. " + "(Circuit purpose: %s)", + description, exit->nickname, + rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); + } + circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, LD_CIRC, circ); } return;

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] revert most of ef81649d2fc
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f962dda8c188ebe17be1ad7d6548f303b6425943 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 19:55:34 2011 -0400 revert most of ef81649d2fc Now we believe it to be the case that we never build a circuit for our stream that has an unsuitable exit, so we'll never need to use such a circuit. The risk is that we have some code that builds the circuit, but now we refuse to use it, meaning we just build a bazillion circuits and ignore them all. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ src/or/connection_edge.c | 19 ++----------------- src/or/connection_edge.h | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b963f1a..6401e71 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2728,7 +2728,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, { if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn)) continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */ - if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router, 1)) { + if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router)) { ++n_supported[i]; // log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.", // router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 530941c..cc4a739 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, return 0; } } - if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter, 0)) { + if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter)) { /* can't exit from this router */ return 0; } @@ -166,6 +166,10 @@ circuit_is_better(circuit_t *a, circuit_t *b, uint8_t purpose) return 1; if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(b) && TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(b)->build_state->is_internal) + /* XXX023 what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I + * think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already + * makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to + * be. -RD */ return 1; } break; @@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, if (exitrouter && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) { int ok; if (conn) { - ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter, 0); + ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter); } else { addr_policy_result_t r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy( 0, port, exitrouter->exit_policy); @@ -1291,9 +1295,10 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, * refactor into a single function? */ routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional; - if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router, 0)) { + if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) { log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.", + "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or " + "would refuse request. %s.", conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing"); if (opt) { conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; @@ -1611,9 +1616,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn) } return -1; } - if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router, 0)) { + if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) { log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.", + "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or " + "would refuse request. %s.", conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing"); if (opt) { conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1ee57ab..082cd5f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3044,15 +3044,9 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn) * to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it. * (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been * resolved.) - * - * If excluded_means_no is 1 and Exclude*Nodes is set and excludes - * this relay, return 0. - * XXX022-1090 This StrictNodes business needs more work, a la bug 1090. See - * also git commit ef81649d. */ int -connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, - int excluded_means_no) +connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit) { or_options_t *options = get_options(); @@ -3102,17 +3096,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, return 0; } if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion && - (options->StrictNodes || excluded_means_no) && routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, exit)) { - /* If we are trying to avoid this node as exit, and we have StrictNodes - * set, then this is not a suitable exit. Refuse it. - * - * If we don't have StrictNodes set, then this function gets called in - * two contexts. First, we've got a circuit open and we want to know - * whether we can use it. In that case, we somehow built this circuit - * despite having the last hop in ExcludeExitNodes, so we should be - * willing to use it. Second, we are evaluating whether this is an - * acceptable exit for a new circuit. In that case, skip it. */ + /* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */ return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index c4ae467..70d0dd2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ int connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ); int connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ); void connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *conn); int connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn); -int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, - int excluded_means_no); +int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit); void connection_ap_expire_beginning(void); void connection_ap_attach_pending(void); void connection_ap_fail_onehop(const char *failed_digest,

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Revise the manpage to contain the actual intended *Nodes behavior
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 2ac768e89f16230d9af1ea5dd84856568d4ceeef Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 10 18:25:51 2011 -0500 Revise the manpage to contain the actual intended *Nodes behavior This is a squashed version of my former desired_nodes_behavior branch that we used to specify the intended results wrt bug 1090. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index f1734d2..866a702 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -489,32 +489,74 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address - patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: - ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. + (Example: + ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + ++ + By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed + to override in order to keep working. + For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service, + but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points, + Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this + behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). + ++ + Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection + options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. + Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers + can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address - patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any + patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a + node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this - list. + list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below -**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address - patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are - treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address - patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These - are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. + patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a + node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. + ++ + Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit + nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example, + if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't + be able to browse the web. + ++ + Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of + the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those + used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, + those used for self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To + keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. + ++ + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. + ++ + The .exit address notation, if enabled, overrides this option. + +**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes + to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. (Country codes and + address patterns are not yet supported.) This includes all + circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge + option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and + UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. + ++ + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**:: - If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes - besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit. - If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes - besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit - circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits - such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits. + If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a + requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so + will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will + still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the + side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells + Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to + perform self-tests, connect to + a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit + request, upload directory information, or download directory information. + (Default: 0) **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**:: If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f7a5bc16d689e8b919285c66cd0f07a6694bcc69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:18:01 2011 -0400 warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream --- changes/bug1090-launch-warning | 5 +++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 ++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-launch-warning b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f3fbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle + a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency + between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our + "attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cc4a739..fd1cf6b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1409,7 +1409,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, extend_info_free(extend_info); - if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream. + * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's + * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */ + if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD && + ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched " + "%d circuits without finding one it likes.", + escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address), + conn->socks_request->port, + conn->num_circuits_launched); + } else { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 50a1223..7d354c8 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t { * already retried several times. */ uint8_t num_socks_retries; +#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10 + /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If + * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our + * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our + * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */ + unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4; + /** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */ unsigned int is_dns_request:1;

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Add a circuit_purpose_to_string() function, and use it
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8ee92f28e056fd32f1faef62ae1523ad4d553a64 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 13:27:25 2011 -0400 Add a circuit_purpose_to_string() function, and use it We had a circuit_purpose_to_controller_string() function, but it was pretty coarse-grained and didn't try to be human-readable. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 +++++--- src/or/circuitlist.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.h | 1 + src/or/circuituse.c | 22 ++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 681f524..b963f1a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2051,8 +2051,9 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) */ if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", timediff, - circ->_base.purpose); + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff, + circ->_base.purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose)); } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) { /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */ if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) { @@ -2890,8 +2891,9 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d)", - (int)purpose); + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d, %s)", + (int)purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); return; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index ce324ca..33dc8f0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -378,6 +378,62 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose) } } +/** Return a human-readable string for the circuit purpose purpose. */ +const char * +circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose) +{ + static char buf[32]; + + switch (purpose) + { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR: + return "Circuit at relay"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: + return "Acting as intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING: + return "Acting as rendevous (pending)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED: + return "Acting as rendevous (established)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: + return "General-purpose client"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: + return "Hidden service client: Connecting to intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: + return "Hidden service client: Waiting for ack from intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED: + return "Hidden service client: Received ack from intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: + return "Hidden service client: Establishing rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: + return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: + return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point (ack received)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: + return "Hidden service client: Active rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT: + return "Measuring circuit timeout"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO: + return "Hidden service: Establishing introduction point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO: + return "Hidden service: Introduction point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND: + return "Hidden service: Connecting to rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED: + return "Hidden service: Active rendezvous point"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: + return "Testing circuit"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: + return "Circuit made by controller"; + + default: + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose); + return buf; + } +} + /** Pick a reasonable package_window to start out for our circuits. * Originally this was hard-coded at 1000, but now the consensus votes * on the answer. See proposal 168. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index ef6fc3a..7b01ca3 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ circuit_t * _circuit_get_global_list(void); const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state); const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose); +const char *circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose); void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity); void circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, or_connection_t *conn); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 7b20f7f..530941c 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -392,10 +392,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN; if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->p_streams != NULL) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d) has timed out, " + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d, %s) has timed out, " "yet has attached streams!", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); tor_fragile_assert(); continue; } @@ -426,9 +427,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &extremely_old_cutoff, <)) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Extremely large value for circuit build timeout: %lds. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", (long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec), - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); } else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(&circ_times, first_hop_succeeded, victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) { @@ -794,12 +796,11 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Ancient non-dirty circuit %d is still around after " - "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d", + "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d (%s)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier, tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_created, &now), - circ->purpose); - /* FFFF implement a new circuit_purpose_to_string() so we don't - * just print out a number for circ->purpose */ + circ->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose)); TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient = 1; } } @@ -1136,8 +1137,9 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */ circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags); if (circ) { - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d", - build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose); + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d (%s)", + build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); circ->_base.purpose = purpose; /* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building * will see it and think it's been trying to build since it

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix a check-spaces complaint
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e03e90bf591f649f7883807f99354634e837ee48 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:16:26 2011 +0200 Fix a check-spaces complaint --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 5f322ca..1ee57ab 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) if (len < 6) continue; /* malformed. */ dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ - dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit or NULL */ if (!dot) { nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); } else {

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Check transition of circuit purpose from INTRO->GENERAL if nodes are constrained
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 79a3b3cd3719b3b87b0edbab62b256e42c7b42de Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 20:06:31 2011 -0400 Check transition of circuit purpose from INTRO->GENERAL if nodes are constrained This looked at first like another fun way around our node selection logic: if we had introduction circuits, and we wound up building too many, we would turn extras into general-purpose circuits. But when we did so, we wouldn't necessarily check whether the general-purpose circuits conformed to our node constraints. For example, the last node could totally be in ExcludedExitNodes and we wouldn't have cared... ...except that the circuit should already be internal, so it won't get user streams attached to it, so the transition should generally be allowed. Add an assert to make sure we're right about this, and have it not check whether ExitNodes is set, since that's irrelevant to internal circuits. --- src/or/rendservice.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 5b85394..cd8f9ea 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1347,17 +1347,26 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) } /* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service, - * redefine this one as a general circuit. */ + * redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending. */ if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) { - log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " - "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " - "general."); - /* XXX022-1090: This can wind up violating ExcludeNodes/ - * ExitNodes/ExcludeExitNodes restrictions. - */ - TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; - circuit_has_opened(circuit); - return; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is + allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now, + this case, we might as well close the thing. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " + "circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it."); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE); + return; + } else { + tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal); + log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " + "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " + "general; leaving as internal."); + TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; + circuit_has_opened(circuit); + return; + } } log_info(LD_REND,

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Explain the "using anyway" log message better
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 92ec36a061de17dd4e378d5ce34d82f91eee9f86 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:01:23 2011 +0200 Explain the "using anyway" log message better Also add a request to report any cases where we are not honoring StrictNodes to the developers: These should now all be bugs. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c58509f..681f524 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) return; - description = "Requested exit node"; + description = "requested exit node"; rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: @@ -2911,22 +2911,28 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: - description = "Chosen rendezvous point"; + description = "chosen rendezvous point"; domain = LD_BUG; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; - description = "Controller-selected circuit target"; + description = "controller-selected circuit target"; break; } if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { - log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "%s '%s' is in ExcludeNodes%s. Using anyway " - "(circuit purpose %d).", + /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ + if (options->StrictNodes) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using an excluded node with StrictNodes set. " + "Please report the following log message to the " + "developers."); + log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " + "ExcludeNodes%s, because no other options were available. To " + "prevent this, set the StrictNodes configuration option." + "(Circuit purpose is %d)", description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); - /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); }

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 6afad6b691d577fba2fe88f2fe9ed76a2f80002d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:58:28 2011 -0400 When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it This could happen if StrictNodes was 0 and we were forced to pick an excluded node as the last hop of the circuit. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 42073fb..ce324ca 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -923,6 +923,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int need_uptime = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; int need_capacity = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; int internal = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) != 0; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* Make sure we're not trying to create a onehop circ by * cannibalization. */ @@ -933,11 +934,6 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); - /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it - * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and - * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory - * operation.) -NM */ - for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && @@ -966,6 +962,19 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, hop=hop->next; } while (hop!=circ->cpath); } + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* Make sure no existing nodes in the circuit are excluded for + * general use. (This may be possible if StrictNodes is 0, and we + * thought we needed to use an otherwise excluded node for, say, a + * directory operation.) */ + crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath; + do { + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + hop->extend_info)) + goto next; + hop = hop->next; + } while (hop != circ->cpath); + } if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime)) best = circ; next: ;

1 0