April 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Do not try to download descriptors for bridges in ExcludeNodes.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit b59a289365169cca228566826f19838403320cb2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:12:26 2011 -0400 Do not try to download descriptors for bridges in ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 714d636..4832cae 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4539,6 +4539,24 @@ bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, char *digest) smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); } +/** Return true iff routerset contains the bridge bridge. */ +static int +routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset, + const bridge_info_t *bridge) +{ + int result; + extend_info_t *extinfo; + tor_assert(bridge); + if (!routerset) + return 0; + + extinfo = extend_info_alloc( + NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port); + result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo); + extend_info_free(extinfo); + return result; +} + /** If digest is one of our known bridges, return it. */ static bridge_info_t * find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest) @@ -4557,6 +4575,7 @@ static void launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) { char *address; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose( CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, @@ -4564,7 +4583,13 @@ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; /* it's already on the way */ address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr); - /* XXX022-1090 if we ExcludeNodes this bridge, should this step fail? -RD */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr))); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, 0, 0, /* does not matter */ @@ -4605,6 +4630,12 @@ fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now) if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now, IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD)) continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr))); + continue; + } /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */ download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 84f0e87c6a6629d047a39f658b7f7c96767219ca Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:20:19 2011 -0400 If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit We could probably do something smarter here, but the situation is unusual enough that it's okay to just fail the circuit. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +++++-- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4832cae..c58509f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4130,15 +4130,18 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) need_capacity = 0; goto retry; } +#if 0 + /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the + same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win + here. */ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ - /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose - * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; } +#endif /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */ }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Simplify calls to routerset_equal
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 128582cc1f9fd363f3fb2a96b61fde1701a56970 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:13:36 2011 -0400 Simplify calls to routerset_equal The routerset_equal function explicitly handles NULL inputs, so there's no need to check inputs for NULL before calling it. Also fix a bug in routerset_equal where a non-NULL routerset with no entries didn't get counted as equal to a NULL routerset. This was untriggerable, I think, but potentially annoying down the road. --- src/or/config.c | 14 +++++--------- src/or/routerlist.c | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 404e648..44cde85 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1260,15 +1260,11 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check for transitions that need action. */ if (old_options) { if ((options->UseEntryGuards && !old_options->UseEntryGuards) || - (options->ExcludeNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes)) || - (options->ExcludeExitNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes, - options->ExcludeExitNodes)) || - (options->EntryNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes)) || - (options->ExitNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes)) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes, + options->ExcludeExitNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes) || options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Changed to using entry guards, or changed preferred or " diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index a9a216b..d5e8a6b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5473,14 +5473,12 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) return set && smartlist_len(set->country_names); } -#if 0 /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ static int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; } -#endif /** Helper. Return true iff set contains a router based on the other * provided fields. Return higher values for more specific subentries: a @@ -5659,10 +5657,15 @@ routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *set) int routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new) { - if (old == NULL && new == NULL) + if (routerset_is_empty(old) && routerset_is_empty(new)) { + /* Two empty sets are equal */ return 1; - else if (old == NULL || new == NULL) + } else if (routerset_is_empty(old) || routerset_is_empty(new)) { + /* An empty set is equal to nothing else. */ return 0; + } + tor_assert(old != NULL); + tor_assert(new != NULL); if (smartlist_len(old->list) != smartlist_len(new->list)) return 0;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 6afad6b691d577fba2fe88f2fe9ed76a2f80002d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:58:28 2011 -0400 When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it This could happen if StrictNodes was 0 and we were forced to pick an excluded node as the last hop of the circuit. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 42073fb..ce324ca 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -923,6 +923,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int need_uptime = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; int need_capacity = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; int internal = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) != 0; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* Make sure we're not trying to create a onehop circ by * cannibalization. */ @@ -933,11 +934,6 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); - /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it - * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and - * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory - * operation.) -NM */ - for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && @@ -966,6 +962,19 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, hop=hop->next; } while (hop!=circ->cpath); } + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* Make sure no existing nodes in the circuit are excluded for + * general use. (This may be possible if StrictNodes is 0, and we + * thought we needed to use an otherwise excluded node for, say, a + * directory operation.) */ + crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath; + do { + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + hop->extend_info)) + goto next; + hop = hop->next; + } while (hop != circ->cpath); + } if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime)) best = circ; next: ;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad78bafb71fbd66e83b29aba612d17f7d03e575b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:59 2011 -0400 Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc. ExcludeExitNodes foo now means that foo.exit doesn't work. If StrictNodes is set, then ExcludeNodes foo also overrides foo.exit. foo.exit , however, still works even if foo is not listed in ExitNodes. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1f5eb70..f435976 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1497,9 +1497,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, hostname_type_t addresstype; or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct in_addr addr_tmp; + /* We set this to true if this is an address we should automatically + * remap to a local address in VirtualAddrNetwork */ int automap = 0; char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN]; time_t map_expires = TIME_MAX; + /* This will be set to true iff the address starts out as a non-.exit + address, and we remap it to one because of an entry in the addressmap. */ int remapped_to_exit = 0; time_t now = time(NULL); @@ -1610,18 +1614,24 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, /* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit * node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */ char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.'); + + /* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */ + routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ? + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion : options->ExcludeExitNodes; + /*XXX023 make this a node_t. */ + routerinfo_t *router; + tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { + /* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */ if (s[1] != '\0') { - /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's - * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, - * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business - * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; *s = 0; } else { + /* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit. That's not okay. */ log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", safe_str_client(socks->address)); control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s", @@ -1630,23 +1640,33 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, return -1; } } else { - routerinfo_t *r; + /* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); - r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); - *socks->address = 0; - if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || - !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, - r))) { - strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); - } else { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", - r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", - safe_str_client(socks->address)); - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); + if (router) { + *socks->address = 0; + strlcpy(socks->address, router->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } } + /* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */ + if (!router) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */ + if (routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* XXXX022-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and + Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch + implies no. */ } if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add a big changelog entry for bug 1090 fixes
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit c49f660c1a9f196c8cbb4863bb377bdb6e642539 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:33:38 2011 -0400 Add a big changelog entry for bug 1090 fixes --- changes/bug1090-general | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-general b/changes/bug1090-general new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4656315 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-general @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ + o Major features and bugfixes (node selection) + + - Revise and unify the meaning of the ExitNodes, EntryNodes, + ExcludeEntryNodes, ExcludeExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, and + StrictNodes options. Previously, we had been ambiguous in + describing what counted as an "exit" node, and what operations + exactly "StrictNodes 0" would permit. This created confusion + when people saw nodes built through unexpected circuits, and + made it hard to tell real bugs from surprises. We now stipulate + that the intended behavior is: + + . "Exit", in the context of ExitNodes and ExcludeExitNodes, + means a node that delivers user traffic outside the Tor + network. + . "Entry", in the context of EntryNodes and ExcludeEntryNodes, + means a node used as the first hop of a multihop circuit: + it doesn't include direct connections to directory servers. + . "ExcludeNodes" applies to all nodes. + . "StrictNodes" changes the behavior of ExcludeNodes only. + When StrictNodes is set, Tor should avoid all nodes listed + in ExcludeNodes, even when it will make user requests + fail. When StrictNodes is *not* set, then Tor should + follow ExcludeNodes whenever it can, except when it must + use an excluded node to perform self-tests, connect to a + hidden service, provide a hidden service, fulfill a .exit + request, upload directory information, or fetch directory + information. + + Collectively, the changes to implement the behavior are a fix for + bug 1090. + + - ExcludeNodes now takes precedence over EntryNodes and ExitNodes: + if a node is listed in both, it's treated as excluded. + + - ExcludeNodes now applies to directory nodes: as a preference if + StrictNodes is 0, or an absolute requirement if StrictNodes is 1. + (Don't exclude all the directory authorities and set StrictNodes + to 1 unless you really want your Tor to break.) + + - ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes now override exit enclaving. + + - ExcludeExitNodes now overrides .exit requests. + + - We don't use bridges from ExcludeNodes. + + - When StrictNodes is 1: + . We now apply ExcludeNodes to hidden service introduction points + and to rendezvous points selected by hidden service users. + This can make your hidden service less reliable: use it with + caution! + . If we have used ExcludeNodes on ourself, do not try self-tests. + . If we have excluded all the directory authorities, we will + not even try to upload our descriptor if we're a server. + . Do not honor .exit requests to an excluded node. + + - Remove a misfeature that caused us to ignore the Fast/Stable flags + if ExitNodes was set. Bugfix on 0.2.2.7-alpha. + + - When the set of permitted nodes changes, we now remove any + mappings introduced via TrackExitHosts to now-excluded nodes. + Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. + + - We never cannibalize a circuit that had excluded nodes on it, + even if StrictNodes is 0. Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. + + - Improve log messages related to excluded nodes. + + - Revert a change where we would be laxer about attaching streams to + circuits than when building the circuits. This was meant to + prevent a set of bugs where streams were never attachable, but our + improved code here should make this unnecessary. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.7-alpha. +

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8f6cb933b6a8ee63f2e208ec43933ad27afa2af0 Merge: c49f660 2ac768e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:44:55 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed doc/tor.1.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] explain an argument in a function comment
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0c40dda3ad824d8a782dafae4c4233a949837df3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:43:11 2011 -0400 explain an argument in a function comment --- src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d444611..65e632f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -764,7 +764,8 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) } /** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set - * iff strict is true. + * iff strict is true. If warnings is false, don't complain + * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true. */ static extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Instead of checking whether we have unremoved intro points, check for usable ones
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 748350ace11fa55758fb8bafe5e5556867dd9c23 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 20 16:49:41 2011 -0400 Instead of checking whether we have unremoved intro points, check for usable ones --- src/or/rendclient.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/rendclient.h | 1 + src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 90304c3..d444611 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ #include "routerlist.h" static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( - const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query, + const int strict, const int warnings); /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ @@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, } } - if (smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) { + if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(ent)) { log_info(LD_REND, "No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.", escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); @@ -708,7 +709,7 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn), now); if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry) == 1 && - smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) > 0) { + rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) { /* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a * valid entry from before which we should reuse */ log_info(LD_REND,"Rend desc is usable. Launching circuits."); @@ -743,13 +744,22 @@ extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { extend_info_t *result; + rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { + log_warn(LD_REND, + "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", + safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + return NULL; + } + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ - if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 1, 1))) return result; /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node */ if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) - return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 0, 1); return NULL; } @@ -757,23 +767,18 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) * iff strict is true. */ static extend_info_t * -rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, - const int strict) +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, + const int strict, + const int warnings) { int i; - rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *usable_nodes; int n_excluded = 0; - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { - log_warn(LD_REND, - "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", - safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); - return NULL; - } /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, * no nodes are usable. */ usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); @@ -781,7 +786,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, again: if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { - if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes && warnings) { /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise * we're just about to retry anyways. */ @@ -822,6 +827,15 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } +/** Return true iff any introduction points still listed in entry are + * usable. */ +int +rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry) +{ + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + entry, get_options()->StrictNodes, 0) != NULL; +} + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of onion address to * rend_service_authorization_t*. */ static strmap_t *auth_hid_servs = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 56ccde1..3f2e58e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query); extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query); +int rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry); int rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, origin_circuit_t *rendcirc); diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index f4c8888..9d6a89e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e) tor_assert((*e)->parsed && (*e)->parsed->intro_nodes); /* XXX023 hack for now, to return "not found" if there are no intro * points remaining. See bug 997. */ - if (smartlist_len((*e)->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(*e)) return 0; return 1; }

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