[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages

Lunar lunar at torproject.org
Tue Apr 1 01:20:43 UTC 2014


===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/13 ===
===========================================================================

version 53
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T21:12:08+00:00

   write about onionpy

--- version 52
+++ version 53
@@ -213,6 +213,13 @@
  [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9889
  [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt
 
+Lukas Erlacher announced the avaibility of OnionPy [XXX], “a Python wrapper for
+OnionOO with support for transparently caching OnionOO replies in memcached”.
+It should be useful to the on-going rewrite of the Tor Weather service [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
+ [XXX]: https://weather.torproject.org/
+
 The deadline for submissions to the Tails logo contest passed on March
 31st; you can review all of the proposed designs, from the minimalist to
 the psychedelic, on the Tails website [XXX].
@@ -297,4 +304,3 @@
 
 Possible items:
 
- * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html

version 52
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-03-31T21:07:51+00:00

   little things

--- version 51
+++ version 52
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@
 Mike Perry discovered [XXX] “that the Linux kernel appears to have a
 leak in how it applies transproxy rules to the TCP CLOSE_WAIT shutdown
 condition under certain circumstances”. Be sure to look at Mike’s email
-if you user Tor TransProxy feature. velope later improved [XXX] the
+if you use Tor’s TransProxy feature. velope later improved [XXX] the
 original mitigating firewall rule.
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032503.html
@@ -228,8 +228,8 @@
 This happens when the new Tor Browser version was installed over the
 previous one. Fortunately the underlying bug [XXX] will be fixed in the next
 Tor Browser release. We recommend extracting each Tor Browser update to an 
-empty directory rather than overwriting the old one to prevent similar 
-unexpected behaviors. The longer term solution for issues like this is an 
+empty directory rather than overwriting the old one, to prevent similar 
+unexpected behaviors. The longer-term solution for issues like this is an 
 auto-updating Tor Browser [XXX]. 
 
  [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11242
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1824/88
  [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/stats/bandwidth.csv
 
-Tor's Stackexchange site is doing a self-evaluation [XXX]. If you have an account,
+Tor’s Stackexchange site is doing a self-evaluation [XXX]. If you have an account,
 please log in and evaluate the questions as well as their answers. It helps to
 improve the answers and the site in general.
 
@@ -256,13 +256,6 @@
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/review/site-eval
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/unanswered
 
-Vulnerabilities
----------------
-
-XXX: Reported vulnerabilities [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: vulnerability report source
-
 Upcoming events
 ---------------
 
@@ -287,6 +280,7 @@
 Apr 10 10:00 EDT | Andrew speaking at F.ounders NYC
                  | New York City, New York, USA
                  | http://f.ounders.com/
+
 
 This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
 XXX.

version 51
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T21:04:33+00:00

   i'll publish the thing before going to vacation

--- version 50
+++ version 51
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ''39th issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from March 25th, 2014 to April 1st, 2014. To be released on April 2nd, 2014.''
 
-'''Editor:''' 
+'''Editor:''' Lunar
 
 '''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — April 2nd, 2014
 

version 50
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-03-31T21:02:01+00:00

   add link to sponsor page mock-ups

--- version 49
+++ version 50
@@ -18,11 +18,12 @@
 Andrew Lewman put out two calls for help with the ongoing Tor Project
 website redesign: one for the sponsor page [XXX], and another for the
 download area [XXX]. Both were immediately met with proposals and design
-suggestions from the www-team mailing list: Olssy produced a
-mock-up [XXX] of the sponsorship page as a model for further work, while
-William Papper and Lance Tuller have been working on a repository [XXX]
-for the download page, with comments from other list members on topics
-such as the use of Javascript and possible layout decisions.
+suggestions from the www-team mailing list: Olssy produced two
+mock-ups [XXX] of the sponsorship page as possible models for further
+work, while William Papper and Lance Tuller have been working on a
+repository [XXX] for the download page, with comments from other list
+members on topics such as the use of Javascript and possible layout
+decisions.
 
 If you’d like to give the website redesign further momentum, please see
 the dedicated project page on the wiki [XXX] for open tickets and
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/www-team/2014-March/000238.html
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/www-team/2014-March/000249.html
- [XXX]: [Mock-up no longer available, waiting until it or something else goes back up]
+ [XXX]: http://tor.harrytuttle.net/
  [XXX]: https://github.com/wpapper/tor-download-web
  [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/Website
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/www-team

version 49
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T20:58:51+00:00

   write about transproxy leaks

--- version 48
+++ version 49
@@ -193,6 +193,15 @@
 the Tor Browser, please look here for links and guidance.
 
  [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ways-get-tor-browser-bundle
+
+Mike Perry discovered [XXX] “that the Linux kernel appears to have a
+leak in how it applies transproxy rules to the TCP CLOSE_WAIT shutdown
+condition under certain circumstances”. Be sure to look at Mike’s email
+if you user Tor TransProxy feature. velope later improved [XXX] the
+original mitigating firewall rule.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032503.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032507.html
 
 As part of the ongoing project to rewrite the Tor Weather service,
 Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi and Karsten Loesing collaborated [XXX] to
@@ -293,5 +302,4 @@
 
 Possible items:
 
- * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
- * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html+ * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html

version 48
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T20:49:11+00:00

   write about hidden service client identification

--- version 47
+++ version 48
@@ -62,6 +62,27 @@
  [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11345
  [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/5096
  [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git
+
+Client identification in hidden service applications
+----------------------------------------------------
+
+Applications behind hidden services currently cannot easily
+differentiate between client connections. Tor will make a different
+local TCP connection for each connections it receives, but the software
+is unable to tell if they are coming from the same circuit. Harry
+SeventyOne felt [XXX] the latter would be useful to enable applications
+for diagnostic log analysis, identifying traffic trends, rate-limiting
+or temporarily blocking operations coming from the same client.
+
+Harry sent a very rough patch to the Tor development mailing which
+enables circuit distinction by using a different source IP address from
+the IPv4 localhost pool (127.0.0.0/8) for each circuit. Nick Mathewson
+liked the idea [XXX] and gave several comments about the preliminary
+patch. Hopefully this work will make the life of hidden service
+operators easier in the future.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006610.html
 
 Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
 -----------------------------------------
@@ -273,5 +294,4 @@
 Possible items:
 
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
- * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
- * Patch: Hidden service: use inbound bind-address based on circuit ID https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
+ * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
version 47
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T20:18:11+00:00

   write about BridgeDB 1.6

--- version 46
+++ version 47
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 
 Bridges are the standard tool for circumventing filters that prevent access to
 the Tor network. Users currently enter bridge addresses in Tor by copy/pasting
-from the BridgeDB web page [XXX] or email auto-responder. But manually giving
+from the BridgeDB web page [XXX] or auto-responder email. But manually giving
 IP addresses and fingerprints to Orbot on keyboard-less devices is an
 error-prone process.
 
@@ -97,6 +97,14 @@
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006563.html
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006575.html
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006570.html
+
+BridgeDB version 1.6 was deployed on March 26th [XXX]. Thanks to Isis
+Lovecruft, users should now be able to solve the CAPTCHA again [XXX].
+A custom solution is now used instead of Google's reCAPTCHA services
+which will give more flexibility in the future.
+
+ [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32
+ [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
 
 John Brooks presented [XXX] Torsion, “a ready-to-use hidden service
 instant messaging client” [XXX]. “I’m looking for people to try it out,
@@ -265,6 +273,5 @@
 Possible items:
 
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
- * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
- * Patch: Hidden service: use inbound bind-address based on circuit ID https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html+ * Patch: Hidden service: use inbound bind-address based on circuit ID https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html

version 46
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-03-31T20:03:27+00:00

   add tails logo item

--- version 45
+++ version 46
@@ -173,6 +173,12 @@
 
  [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9889
  [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt
+
+The deadline for submissions to the Tails logo contest passed on March
+31st; you can review all of the proposed designs, from the minimalist to
+the psychedelic, on the Tails website [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
 
 Tor help desk roundup
 ---------------------
@@ -261,5 +267,4 @@
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
  * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
- * Tails logo contest closed on March 31st https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
  * Patch: Hidden service: use inbound bind-address based on circuit ID https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
version 45
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-03-31T19:54:39+00:00

   add weather t-shirt item

--- version 44
+++ version 45
@@ -164,6 +164,15 @@
 the Tor Browser, please look here for links and guidance.
 
  [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ways-get-tor-browser-bundle
+
+As part of the ongoing project to rewrite the Tor Weather service,
+Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi and Karsten Loesing collaborated [XXX] to
+produce a Python script that enables it to determine whether or not
+relay operators have fulfilled the requirements [XXX] for a free Tor
+T-shirt.
+
+ [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9889
+ [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt
 
 Tor help desk roundup
 ---------------------
@@ -252,6 +261,5 @@
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
  * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
- * t-shirt eligibility script #9889
  * Tails logo contest closed on March 31st https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
  * Patch: Hidden service: use inbound bind-address based on circuit ID https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
version 44
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-03-31T19:39:05+00:00

   add sukhbir's blog item

--- version 43
+++ version 44
@@ -156,6 +156,14 @@
 could be improved for this use case.
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006572.html
+
+On the Tor Blog, Sukhbir Singh posted [XXX] a round-up of the various
+methods by which users can download and run the Tor Browser, covering
+download mirrors, GetTor, bridge address distribution, and pluggable
+transports usage. If you’re having trouble acquiring or using a copy of
+the Tor Browser, please look here for links and guidance.
+
+ [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ways-get-tor-browser-bundle
 
 Tor help desk roundup
 ---------------------

version 43
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-03-31T19:20:51+00:00

   language fixes

--- version 42
+++ version 43
@@ -39,20 +39,20 @@
 QR codes for bridge addresses
 -----------------------------
 
-Since most pocket computers (sometimes called “phones”) and laptop embed
-cameras, QR codes [XXX] became an ubiquitous way to enter short sequence
-of random data on our devices. URLs are the canonical example, but the process
-also apply to Bitcoin addresses or OpenPGP fingerprints [XXX].
-
-Bridges are the default answer to circumvent filters that prevent access to
+Since most pocket computers (sometimes called “phones”) and laptops began
+incorporating cameras, QR codes [XXX] have become a ubiquitous way to enter
+short sequences of data into our devices. URLs are the canonical example,
+but the process also works for Bitcoin addresses or OpenPGP fingerprints [XXX].
+
+Bridges are the standard tool for circumventing filters that prevent access to
 the Tor network. Users currently enter bridge addresses in Tor by copy/pasting
-from BridgeDB web page [XXX] or email auto-responder. But manually giving
+from the BridgeDB web page [XXX] or email auto-responder. But manually giving
 IP addresses and fingerprints to Orbot on keyboard-less devices is an
-error prone process.
+error-prone process.
 
 QR codes might be a solution to this problem. They could also enable peer-to-peer
-exchange among friends or circumvention strategies involving IPv6 addresses and
-paper. According to Isis Lovecruft, adding QR codes to BridgeDB web interface
+exchange among friends, or circumvention strategies involving IPv6 addresses and
+paper. According to Isis Lovecruft, adding QR codes to the BridgeDB web interface
 would be easy [XXX]. Would any reader feel like hacking Orbot [XXX] or the Tor
 Launcher [XXX] Firefox extension?
 
@@ -87,10 +87,10 @@
 
  [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking
 
-Nicholas Hopper followed up [XXX,XXX] on George Kadianakis' research on
-switching to a single guard. He used Aaron Johnson's TorPS simulator to
+Nicholas Hopper followed up [XXX,XXX] on George Kadianakis’ research on
+switching to a single guard. He used Aaron Johnson’s TorPS simulator to
 find out the “typical” bandwidth for a client. The conclusions match
-George's: a single guard and a bandwidth cutoff of 2 Mbit/s would
+George’s: a single guard and a bandwidth cutoff of 2 Mbit/s would
 improve over the current situation. George subsequently sent an initial
 draft proposal [XXX] to start the formal process.
 
@@ -176,20 +176,20 @@
 News from Tor StackExchange
 ---------------------------
 
-saurav wanted to know the added bandwidth of all guard nodes in the current
+saurav wanted to know the total bandwidth of all guard nodes in the current
 network [XXX]. gacar pointed to the bandwidth.csv file [XXX] and explained
 the format of the file.
 
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1824/88
  [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/stats/bandwidth.csv
 
-Tor's Stackexchange site does a self evaluation [XXX]. If you have an account
+Tor's Stackexchange site is doing a self-evaluation [XXX]. If you have an account,
 please log in and evaluate the questions as well as their answers. It helps to
 improve the answers and the site in general.
 
-Furthermore if you happen to visit the site check the list of unanswered
-questions[XXX]. If you know an answer please help the people with your
-knowledge.
+Furthermore, if you happen to visit the site, check the list of unanswered
+questions [XXX]. If you know an answer, please share your knowledge with the
+people.
 
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/review/site-eval
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/unanswered

version 42
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T19:10:16+00:00

   add report

--- version 41
+++ version 42
@@ -68,10 +68,10 @@
 
 The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
 month of XXX has begun. Georg Koppen released his report first [XXX],
-followed by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+followed by reports from Pearl Crescent [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000487.html
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000488.html
  [XXX]:
  [XXX]:
 

version 41
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T19:09:18+00:00

   add item

--- version 40
+++ version 41
@@ -246,3 +246,4 @@
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
  * t-shirt eligibility script #9889
  * Tails logo contest closed on March 31st https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
+ * Patch: Hidden service: use inbound bind-address based on circuit ID https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
version 40
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T18:56:14+00:00

   grammar

--- version 39
+++ version 40
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 IP addresses and fingerprints to Orbot on keyboard-less devices is an
 error prone process.
 
-QR codes might be a solution to this problem. It could also enable peer-to-peer
+QR codes might be a solution to this problem. They could also enable peer-to-peer
 exchange among friends or circumvention strategies involving IPv6 addresses and
 paper. According to Isis Lovecruft, adding QR codes to BridgeDB web interface
 would be easy [XXX]. Would any reader feel like hacking Orbot [XXX] or the Tor

version 39
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T18:48:22+00:00

   write about QR code for bridges

--- version 38
+++ version 39
@@ -35,6 +35,33 @@
  [XXX]: https://github.com/wpapper/tor-download-web
  [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/Website
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/www-team
+
+QR codes for bridge addresses
+-----------------------------
+
+Since most pocket computers (sometimes called “phones”) and laptop embed
+cameras, QR codes [XXX] became an ubiquitous way to enter short sequence
+of random data on our devices. URLs are the canonical example, but the process
+also apply to Bitcoin addresses or OpenPGP fingerprints [XXX].
+
+Bridges are the default answer to circumvent filters that prevent access to
+the Tor network. Users currently enter bridge addresses in Tor by copy/pasting
+from BridgeDB web page [XXX] or email auto-responder. But manually giving
+IP addresses and fingerprints to Orbot on keyboard-less devices is an
+error prone process.
+
+QR codes might be a solution to this problem. It could also enable peer-to-peer
+exchange among friends or circumvention strategies involving IPv6 addresses and
+paper. According to Isis Lovecruft, adding QR codes to BridgeDB web interface
+would be easy [XXX]. Would any reader feel like hacking Orbot [XXX] or the Tor
+Launcher [XXX] Firefox extension?
+
+ [XXX]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code
+ [XXX]: http://web.monkeysphere.info/monkeysign/
+ [XXX]: https://bridges.torproject.org/
+ [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11345
+ [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/5096
+ [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git
 
 Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
 -----------------------------------------
@@ -214,7 +241,6 @@
 
 Possible items:
 
- * QR codes for bridges? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5096
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
  * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html

version 38
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T18:19:46+00:00

   write about using HS for unlinkability

--- version 37
+++ version 38
@@ -120,7 +120,16 @@
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006592.html
  [XXX]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfsclient/archive/v0.0.2.tar.gz
- 
+
+Michael Rogers has been “working on a messaging app that uses Tor hidden
+services to provide unlinkability (from the point of view of a network
+observer) between users and their contacts”. But as “users know who their
+contacts are”, the mutual anonymity provided by hidden services is not
+a requirement. Michael asked [XXX] how hidden services performance
+could be improved for this use case.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006572.html
+
 Tor help desk roundup
 ---------------------
 
@@ -205,10 +214,9 @@
 
 Possible items:
 
- * Using the HS protocol for unlinkability only https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006572.html
  * QR codes for bridges? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5096
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
  * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
  * t-shirt eligibility script #9889
- * Tails logo contest closed on March 31st https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/+ * Tails logo contest closed on March 31st https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/

version 37
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T18:13:52+00:00

   add item

--- version 36
+++ version 37
@@ -211,3 +211,4 @@
  * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
  * t-shirt eligibility script #9889
+ * Tails logo contest closed on March 31st https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
version 36
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T18:08:14+00:00

   write about switching to a single guard

--- version 35
+++ version 36
@@ -59,6 +59,17 @@
 please take a look!
 
  [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking
+
+Nicholas Hopper followed up [XXX,XXX] on George Kadianakis' research on
+switching to a single guard. He used Aaron Johnson's TorPS simulator to
+find out the “typical” bandwidth for a client. The conclusions match
+George's: a single guard and a bandwidth cutoff of 2 Mbit/s would
+improve over the current situation. George subsequently sent an initial
+draft proposal [XXX] to start the formal process.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006563.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006575.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006570.html
 
 John Brooks presented [XXX] Torsion, “a ready-to-use hidden service
 instant messaging client” [XXX]. “I’m looking for people to try it out,
@@ -194,7 +205,6 @@
 
 Possible items:
 
- * Follow-up on the implications of switching to a single guard node https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006563.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006570.html
  * Using the HS protocol for unlinkability only https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006572.html
  * QR codes for bridges? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5096
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html

version 35
Author: lunar
Date:   2014-03-31T18:00:43+00:00

   mention mirrors

--- version 34
+++ version 35
@@ -82,9 +82,11 @@
 
 Amid the ongoing censorship of internet services in Turkey, there were
 reports that the Tor Project’s website was unavailable over connections
-supplied by some Turkish ISPs [XXX].
+supplied by some Turkish ISPs [XXX]. Feel free to try one of the
+mirrors [XXX]!
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032487.html
+ [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/mirrors.html
 
 Karsten Loesing published [XXX] a draft of a guide [XXX] to running a
 blog over a Tor hidden service using the Jekyll static site
@@ -198,4 +200,4 @@
  * transproxy leaks on Linux https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006596.html
  * bridedb 1.6 https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32 improve captcha https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
  * OnionPy, a Python wrapper for Onionoo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
- * t-shirt eligibility script #9889+ * t-shirt eligibility script #9889



-- 
Your friendly TWN monitoring script

      In case of malfunction, please reach out for lunar at torproject.org
          or for the worst cases, tell weasel at torproject.org to kill me.


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