[tor-talk] New paper : Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries

Roger Dingledine arma at mit.edu
Mon Sep 2 02:10:56 UTC 2013

On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 11:35:22AM +1000, Erik de Castro Lopo wrote:
> Hi all,
> Heads up on a new paper suggesting that its possible to unmask
> Tor users using traffic correlation:
>     http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
> Code here:
>     http://torps.github.io/
> Would be interested in hearing the opinions of the core Tor
> develpoment team on this stuff.

Yep. They're part of the Tor research community. I have plans for writing
a blog post about the paper, to explain what it means, what it doesn't
mean, what we should do about it, and what research questions remain
open. Stuff keeps catching fire with bigger flames though.

The extremely short answer is "Yes, a big enough adversary can screw Tor
users. But we knew that. I think it's great that the paper presents the
dual risks of relay adversaries and link adversaries, since most of the
time when people are freaking out about one of them they're forgetting the
other one. And we really should raise the guard rotation period. If you
do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated every nine months,
they look way different."



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