[tor-talk] New paper : Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries

Andreas Krey a.krey at gmx.de
Thu Oct 17 08:46:57 UTC 2013

On Wed, 16 Oct 2013 19:42:41 +0000, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
> One thing jumps out, Tor doesn't know for sure who's running Guard or 
> exit nodes - & can't unless they start doing (regular, repeated) 
> extensive personal interviews, background checks, giving polygraph 
> tests, injecting sodium pentathol  to those wanting to run nodes.

I think you slightly disregard who is actually interested in a
trustworthy tor network. What you describe makes the tor operators
a cabal, and the problem is that the ones who actually want to
trust tor (the users) are outside that.

Besides, many attacks don't require to *run* the nodes, just to
monitor its traffic. And a TLA can do that without the honest
operator even suspecting.


"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@*.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800

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