[tor-talk] Verifying node operator identity (was: New paper : Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries)

mick mbm at rlogin.net
Thu Oct 17 18:30:42 UTC 2013

On Thu, 17 Oct 2013 09:52:23 +0200
Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> allegedly wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 08:18:59AM +0200, Felix Eckhofer wrote:
> > tried very hard to find any suggestion on how this might work in
> > your mail to no avail. Are you actually suggesting "extensive
> > personal interviews, background checks, giving polygraph tests,
> > injecting sodium pentathol to those wanting to run nodes" and expect
> > some form of serious feedback?
> It would be good if operators of fast exits were personally known,
> and had a history within the community. This still doesn't prevent
> deep cover moles or people turned through threats and/or bribes,
> and as soon as traffic exits it will be scrutinized, sliced and
> diced ten time to Sunday, anyway. But it would be good, yes.

I disagree. It sets a barrier to entry. Who decides when (or if) an
exit is "fast enough" to require any sort of vetting of the operator?
Who would do the vetting? How would it be done? (I set up a fast exit
in Pakistan, I live in Iceland, you live in Wisconsin.) 

If (fast) exits are only to be acceptable when set up by "good chaps"
known to "other good chaps" why should I trust all those "good
chaps" in the club when I am outside it?

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?



 Mick Morgan
 gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B  72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312


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