[tor-talk] tails_htp: exit node can fingerprint Tails users until exit node is changed

adrelanos adrelanos at riseup.net
Mon Jul 23 01:36:26 UTC 2012

Because Tails doesn't use stream isolation and uses tails_htp over Tor,
the exit node can see "Hello, this is a Tails user!". (Who else uses
tails_htp over Tor.) The problem persists until the exit node is changed.

Proposed solution: use stream isolation, run tails_htp/wget over a
different SocksPort.

It's not a serious issue, not using Tor Browser is the much bigger
fingerprinting issue.

It depends on your goals, if you want to switch to Tor Browser some day
and share the same Tor Browser fingerprint (whatever that is), you
should probable fix it.


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