[tor-talk] on the topic of tor's weaknesses

Chris Wheeler grintor at gmail.com
Sat Feb 25 17:06:23 UTC 2012

I have been reading a lot about end-to-end correlation attacks on tor. I am
writing a paper on the subject and have a question which I can't seem to
find an answer to. I understand these attacks rely on the attacker being
able to view the traffic of the first relay a client is connecting to and
the exit server. At this point they could make a correlation of what exit
traffic is specific to that client based on statistical analysis. My
question is: since bridges are just entry-point relays, If one could be
certain that they were connecting to a bridge that is not compromised (for
instance, if they themselves controlled the bridge), would they then be
protected from such an attack?

Thank you for your help

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