Anonymous Blogging

[Ringo Kamens]

I had asked that question before and somebody provided a script, search the
archives. I would also like to add that the "great firewall of China" is not
very centralized and as a result such an attack would prove fatal. Does
anybody have any information about how censorship in other countries works?

On 11/13/06, Kees Vonk <keesvonk at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Paul Syverson wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 13, 2006 at 06:55:06PM +0800, RMS wrote:
> >> I am a political blogger in a sensitive country and I would like to
> >> try out TOR to make my blogging anonymous, as recommended by Reporter
> >> Without Borders (RSF) in their handbook. I understand that with TOR,
> >> there is little chance of the government tracing my original IP
> >> address when blogging. However, I have reasons to believe that my
> >> Internet connection is under constant surveillance and since my
> >> "blogging" from my PC to blogger.com is sent in clear text, what would
> >> TOR help me in this case? Is RSF assuming that the government has no
> >> access to its citizen's connection?
> >>
> >
> > Note that your protection depends on what you mean by "surveillance".
> > I realize you may not know, but here is a quick description of the
> cases.
> >
> [ .. snip .. ]
> > - If an adversary monitors the traffic pattern of your traffic where
> > you connect to the internet, and monitors the traffic pattern where
> > you exit the Tor network, e.g., is observing the internet link of
> > blogger.com or the internet link of the last node in your Tor
> > connection to blogger.com, and if the adversary does simple analysis
> > on those patterns, it is likely to confirm that this is indeed your
> > traffic. (That is, with high probability, you are the source of that
> > post to blogger.com. I have no idea what sort of official deniability
> > remains. IANAL in any country.)
> >
>
> This reminded me of question I was toying with the other day: If the
> exit node of a circuit was in the same country as the computer of
> origin, it would seemingly be relatively easy to match traffic send to
> the circuit entry node with the traffic emerging from the exit node (I
> realise that the amount of traffic would still make this very hard). Is
> it therefore possible to exclude exit nodes in certain countries?
>
> Kees
>
>
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