I had asked that question before and somebody provided a script, search
the archives. I would also like to add that the "great firewall of
China" is not very centralized and as a result such an attack would
prove fatal. Does anybody have any information about how censorship in
other countries works?<br><br><div><span class="gmail_quote">On 11/13/06, <b class="gmail_sendername">Kees Vonk</b> <<a href="mailto:keesvonk@gmail.com">keesvonk@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</span><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Paul Syverson wrote:<br>> On Mon, Nov 13, 2006 at 06:55:06PM +0800, RMS wrote:<br>>> I am a political blogger in a sensitive country and I would like to<br>>> try out TOR to make my blogging anonymous, as recommended by Reporter
<br>>> Without Borders (RSF) in their handbook. I understand that with TOR,<br>>> there is little chance of the government tracing my original IP<br>>> address when blogging. However, I have reasons to believe that my
<br>>> Internet connection is under constant surveillance and since my<br>>> "blogging" from my PC to <a href="http://blogger.com">blogger.com</a> is sent in clear text, what would<br>>> TOR help me in this case? Is RSF assuming that the government has no
<br>>> access to its citizen's connection?<br>>><br>><br>> Note that your protection depends on what you mean by "surveillance".<br>> I realize you may not know, but here is a quick description of the cases.
<br>><br>[ .. snip .. ]<br>> - If an adversary monitors the traffic pattern of your traffic where<br>> you connect to the internet, and monitors the traffic pattern where<br>> you exit the Tor network, e.g., is observing the internet link of
<br>> <a href="http://blogger.com">blogger.com</a> or the internet link of the last node in your Tor<br>> connection to <a href="http://blogger.com">blogger.com</a>, and if the adversary does simple analysis<br>> on those patterns, it is likely to confirm that this is indeed your
<br>> traffic. (That is, with high probability, you are the source of that<br>> post to <a href="http://blogger.com">blogger.com</a>. I have no idea what sort of official deniability<br>> remains. IANAL in any country.)
<br>><br><br>This reminded me of question I was toying with the other day: If the<br>exit node of a circuit was in the same country as the computer of<br>origin, it would seemingly be relatively easy to match traffic send to
<br>the circuit entry node with the traffic emerging from the exit node (I<br>realise that the amount of traffic would still make this very hard). Is<br>it therefore possible to exclude exit nodes in certain countries?<br>
<br>Kees<br><br></blockquote></div><br>