[tor-relays] tor relay - impact on e-mail system reputation

[starlight.2018q2 at binnacle.cx]

On Nov 25 10:21:06 UTC 2018, Artem Dziubenko wrote:
>
>The one thing which is coming to my mind is to write some
>article in the internet about RBL Services - that some of them
>are against privacy or they do not understand what they are doing
>and how big stupid impact they generate on the communication
>in the internet.

Have to point out you are arriving *very* late to the debate
about DNSBLs / rDNSBLs.  Has been settled for years the
operators of these services have the freedom of speech to
publish the lists and individual MTA operators have the
right to use them if they wish.  Zero chance anyone will
change their mind at this stage of the game.

I misread the original post and see you are running a
non-exit.  Generally this should be no problem since
critical lists (no more than five exist, is more
like three) do not include non-exit relays.  My long
running guard node is on just seven BLs (out of 226)
of no consequence.

   ubl.nszones.com (fake)
   rbl.rbldns.ru
   fulldom.rfc-clueless.org
   postmaster.rfc-clueless.org
   all.s5h.net
   netblockbl.spamgrouper.to
   dnsbl.spfbl.net

No one has heard of any of these and nobody uses them.

To the extent a small BL appears to be impacting your
mail delivery, usually you can ask them (nicely) to
remove the IP in question explaining in technical terms
why the IP should not be included.  Some of the above are
concerned about improper reverse DNS and certainly if
you run an MTA the single biggest thing that can be done
to obtain decent delivery is configure proper matching
forward and reverse DNS entries with a not-stupid domain
(e.g. no IP address information coded in it).

If an IP is not on Spamhaus and not on Barracuda it
should have no problem obtaining a decent reputation,
notwithstanding Microsoft's Outlook service.  M$ has
idiotic filtering criteria: essentially "guilty until
proven innocent and give us money while you are at it."