[tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Karsten Loesing karsten at torproject.org
Thu Feb 8 11:53:50 UTC 2018

On 2018-02-08 12:19, nusenu wrote:
>> Possible advantages are:
> another advantage I can come up with:
> we will be able to analyze bridge shares (if most have contactInfo set), meaning
> is one or two entity running all bridges? How many operators are there?
> Obviously you could also see this as disadvantage.

Makes sense. I'd count that as advantage. We're not trying to hide who's
running a bridge. We're just trying to hide where bridges are located,
so that they're harder to block.

> When discussing bridge IP:port secrecy it is probably worth noting
> that IP:port information of about 2k bridges (that is most bridges) got published
> last Sept. 2017 (see metrics-team mailing list post from Oct. 2017).
> I'm not saying that we should not try to keep hiding that information.

Just to give enough context for folks on this list, it wasn't us who
published that information, it was a group of researchers.


All the best,

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