[tor-relays] Is Kaspersky right to be concerned?
Tora Tora Tora
tor at allthatnet.com
Sun Mar 9 16:21:11 UTC 2014
I am pretty sure the answer is "NO", but is there a way to "enhance" Tor
in such a way that a relay that does not host hidden services can also
choose not to carry traffic for hidden services? That way those who want
to use hidden services can do so by using more limited subset of the Tor
network at the risk of less anonymity, I suppose. I am not sure how it
would work as it seems the client chooses the relays.
On 03/09/2014 11:17 AM, ra wrote:
> On Sunday 09 March 2014 14:02:39 Andrew Lewman wrote:
> Though you are right to some extent, I think one has to distinguish between
> Tor and Tor hidden services. While Tor has it's socially laudable
> applications, the vast majority of Tor hidden service usage are in fact not. I
> would even go one step further and say: If hidden service usage does not
> change drastically, it would be better for Tor's credibility to remove the
> hidden service code base. But I am open for discussion on that.
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