[tor-relays] Is Kaspersky right to be concerned?

Andy Isaacson adi at hexapodia.org
Sun Mar 9 22:55:30 UTC 2014

On Sun, Mar 09, 2014 at 12:21:11PM -0400, Tora Tora Tora wrote:
> I am pretty sure the answer is "NO", but is there a way to "enhance"
> Tor in such a way that a relay that does not host hidden services
> can also choose not to carry traffic for hidden services?
> those who want to use hidden services can do so by using more
> limited subset of the Tor network at the risk of less anonymity, I
> suppose. I am not sure how it would work as it seems the client
> chooses the relays.

That would break sites such as DuckDuckGo which provide a hidden service
for searches.  Providing such a service is the most anonymous way to
offer service to Tor users; it defeats the malicious exit node problem
and many traffic analysis attacks.

Like TCP/IP or any other tool, hidden services can be used for malicious
purposes, but they can also be used for good.


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