[tor-relays] max TCP interruption before Tor circuit teardown?

[Gordon Morehouse]

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krishna e bera:
> On 13-10-27 05:32 PM, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
>>> Also, to what extent would/could the Tor network (or a small
>>> group of nodes) count as a "high availability cluster" for
>>> entry firewalling purposes?  Would clustering help protect
>>> against timing attacks on relays or hidden services?
>> 
>> You mean, if you have a circuit, sending some bytes of I/O over
>> entry node A, some over entry node B, etc?  Not quite sure what
>> you're asking.
> 
> Yes, essentially load balancing. I noticed someone was working on
> bonding tcp connections at the back end, so why not the opposite as
> well.

That is one for the folks who can develop proofs or theories about
anonymity to answer - and I hope they might at some point if they
haven't already in a paper they'll point out to us. :)

>>> (I lack expertise or resources to answer any of the above, but 
>>> reading Gordon Morehouse's project got me searching and
>>> curious.)
>> 
>> I'm glad it's doing somebody some good, or taking up time that 
>> could've been otherwise wasted on Buzzfeed or something ;) Not
>> that you'd do that. ;)
> 
> Never heard of Buzzfeed but i will check it out, thanks!

Oh, no, please don't.  :(

;)

- -Gordon M.


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