[tor-relays] max TCP interruption before Tor circuit teardown?

krishna e bera keb at cyblings.on.ca
Sun Oct 27 21:49:48 UTC 2013


On 13-10-27 05:32 PM, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
>> Also, to what extent would/could the Tor network (or a small group
>> of nodes) count as a "high availability cluster" for entry
>> firewalling purposes?  Would clustering help protect against timing
>> attacks on relays or hidden services?
> 
> You mean, if you have a circuit, sending some bytes of I/O over entry
> node A, some over entry node B, etc?  Not quite sure what you're asking.

Yes, essentially load balancing.
I noticed someone was working on bonding tcp connections at the back
end, so why not the opposite as well.

>> (I lack expertise or resources to answer any of the above, but
>> reading Gordon Morehouse's project got me searching and curious.)
> 
> I'm glad it's doing somebody some good, or taking up time that
> could've been otherwise wasted on Buzzfeed or something ;) Not that
> you'd do that. ;)

Never heard of Buzzfeed but i will check it out, thanks!

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 547 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20131027/ee547c7a/attachment.sig>


More information about the tor-relays mailing list