[tor-relays] new relays

[tor at t-3.net]

A mechanism which empowers detecting and
stopping what you and I consider to be
'evil' could be harnessed and used to
target non-evil things, and that's
where the problem is.

Let's pretend that tomorrow, Tor gained
the ability to filter out evil images.
Shortly thereafter, governments might
start making demands upon the Tor
designers to utilize the underlying
technical components of that system
according to their own designs and
demands.

Such a scenario could be dangerous
for everyone, including the designers
personally. What happens to them
if/when they refuse a demand like that,
or potentially do a Lavabit?

What if the existence of such a
function can be corrupted and used
in a rogue sort of relay to track
things it wasn't intended to?

Not to mention, at the point where
anyone becomes able to note or affect
the content, the question of who is
in control of and responsible for
it comes into play. Assuming Tor could
exist in such a state, you may
personally choose to filter CP, but
then your government or ISP demands
that you also filter activists X, Y,
and Z, and list of topics A. Your line
at 'evil' would be forceably drawn by
other people, just like it is on the
public internet today.

Btw our exit node blocks random unknown
ports ('bittorrent') to aid the node's
longevity. It wasn't a moral stand.



On Tuesday 27/08/2013 at 12:09 pm, Jon Gardner  wrote:
> On Aug 22, 2013, at 11:56 AM, mick <mbm at rlogin.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>>
>>> The other thing that I am weighing is just a moral question regarding
>>> misuse of the Tor network for despicable things like child porn. I
>>> understand that of all the traffic it is a small percentage and that
>>> ISPs essentially face the same dilemma, but I wonder if more can be
>>> done to make Tor resistant to evil usage.
>>>
>> Tor is neutral. You and I may agree that certain usage is unwelcome,
>> even abhorrent, but we cannot dictate how others may use an 
>> anonymising
>> service we agree to provide. If you have a problem with that, you
>> probably should not be running a tor node.
>
> Then why have exit policies? Exit nodes regularly block "unwelcome" 
> traffic like bittorrent, and there's only a slight functional 
> difference between that and using a filter in front of the node to 
> block things like porn (which, come to think of it, also tends to be a 
> bandwidth hog like bittorrent--so it doesn't have to be just a moral 
> question). If someone has a problem with exit nodes blocking things 
> like porn (or bittorrent, or...), then they probably should not be 
> using Tor.
>
> The very idea of Tor is based on moral convictions (e.g., that 
> personal privacy is a good thing, that human rights violations and 
> abuse of power are bad things, etc.). So Tor is most definitely not 
> neutral, nor can it be--because, if it is to exist and flourish, those 
> moral convictions must remain at its foundation. One cannot on the one 
> hand claim that human rights violations are "wrong" while on the other 
> hand claiming that pornography (especially child porn) is "right." If 
> one wants further proof that Tor has a moral component, one has only 
> to visit http://www.torproject.org, click the "About Tor" link, and 
> notice the discussion points. I doubt that anyone could convince the 
> Tor team to add "...for unfettered access to pornography..." as a 
> bullet point under "Why we need Tor."
>
> The Tor devs go to great lengths to try to keep "evil" governments 
> from using Tor against itself. Why not devote some effort toward 
> keeping "evil" traffic off of Tor? Given the fact that "we need more 
> relays" is the common mantra, it seems to me that if the Tor community 
> could come up with a technical answer to address at least some of the 
> most egregious abuses of Tor--things like child porn, or even porn in 
> general, that either have nothing to do with Tor's foundational 
> mission, or (like child porn) are antithetical to it--the result would 
> be greater public support for the technology, and a wider deployment 
> base.
>
> It's worth discussion.
>
> Jon
>
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