[tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?
aagbsn at extc.org
Sat Nov 24 15:44:48 UTC 2012
On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 4:24 AM, Moritz Bartl <moritz at torservers.net> wrote:
> On 24.11.2012 12:46, tagnaq wrote:
>>> Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an
>>> exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to
>>> prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the
>>> descriptor set?
> I don't think it's a good idea. People are always thankful when I can
> point them to the bulk exit list and torDNSel. I point out that Tor has
> a lot of users and not all of them are bad, and urge for a temporary
> block. Most admins seem to follow that advice.
But in the light of "an IP address is not identity" -- is it
reasonable to block every user of an IP because one person (or bot) is
up to no good? Why do people insist on "stopping" problem behavior at
the network layer?
> Moritz Bartl
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
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