[tor-project] Arranging new default obfs4 bridges

nusenu nusenu at openmailbox.org
Mon Apr 17 10:00:00 UTC 2017

David Fifield:
> On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 11:00:37PM -0500, Matt Traudt wrote:
>> I've expressed interest in the past about running default obfs4 bridges
>> and am still willing to do so.
>> I'd like to hold off actually setting them up till its close to the time
>> that Tor Browser will integrate them. I hear it's better for the default
>> bridges to not advertise and I'd rather they didn't sit paid for but
>> idle for too long.
>> You can find me on IRC as pastly.
> Matt says he can get some new bridges running quickly--say, in time for
> the next release of Tor Browser.

Since Matt also runs exit relays [1], would it make sense to add a logic
to torbrowser that *IFF* the user choose to use default bridges these
exits get excluded in that torbrowser's tor instance?

That would also be a possible workaround for isis's ticket about
noisebridge bridges? [2]


[2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21864
> NoiseTor would like to run high-capacity
> default bridges for Tor Browser, but they are nervous about simultaneously
> running exits without being able to direct people not to use both.


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