[tor-project] Launching Ethics Guidelines

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 6 May 2016, at 19:30, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 6 May 2016, at 14:53, Virgil Griffith <i at virgil.gr> wrote:
>> 
>> I've received conflicting accounts as to whether the  ethics guidelines require onionsites are to be opt-in [no spec yet?] or the current opt-out [i.e., /robots.txt].
> ...
> There's one important exception to this general principle: Single Onion Services.
> To avoid creating one-hop proxies, tor2web should not allow access to a single onion service.
> We'e yet to arrive at a mechanism to make this happen, but I think we will end up adding a line to the onion service descriptor.
> We could make this a configuration parameter (AllowTor2Web?) that defaults to 1 for hidden services, and 0 for single onion services.
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945

After re-reading the ticket, there is another way to implement this feature without providing a generic method for onion services to block tor2web:

The rendezvous point (and possibly the introduction point) could terminate the connection if it has a single hop on both ends. However, this could result in false positives if the consensus gets out of sync.

Or is there a reliable way for a relay to detect non-relays without using the consensus?

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B
ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n



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