[tor-onions] Connection to a hidden service with a RFC 6455 web-socket - advice on risks please

[Michael Jonker]

Thanks Tom and Alec,


I am working on a UX architecture for the Bisq Project 
[https://bisq.network/]. This is a decentralised P2P crypto / fiat exchange.


The threat model is two-fold:

1) A real time event driven MVC for a GUI front-end to a remote API over 
TOR hidden service. The client owns the server (it is their personal 
Bisq instance) , it is not a public web service model.

2)  Bisq 's infrastructural backbone runs as a P2P network over TOR 
network. Clients talk to each other and there are various hidden 
services providing network resources. I am hoping that websocket can 
improve network performance.




On 06/03/18 17:29, Alec Muffett wrote:
> On 6 March 2018 at 16:55, Michael Jonker <michael at openpoint.ie 
> <mailto:michael at openpoint.ie>> wrote:
>
>     I have connected to my hidden service with RFC 6455 web-socket and
>     feel like a kid in a candy store streaming API requests and return
>     data back and forth at good, reliable speeds. 
>
>
> Yay! Good to hear news of new successes.  I found websockets a bit 
> messy to approve (it seemed that one of the TBB security plugins got 
> in the way?) but once they were approved, it was fine.
>
>     My concern is that I am missing something here.....
>
>     My mental model is that, once the connection and http upgrade
>     request is established, TOR sees this as a long running http
>     request and will will not close the circuit or change the route
>     until the either side breaks the connection.
>
>
> That is my understanding, too.
>
>     I would appreciate if someone could comment:
>
>     1) Am I correct in my mental model?
>
>
> I have the same model.
>
>
>     2) Am I perpetrating a security anti-pattern by holding the
>     connection open indeterminately?
>
>
> I would say 'no', but then you have not stated a threat-model yet.  
> What are you trying to achieve, and what are the capabilities of your 
> threat actors?
>
>     -a
>
> -- 
> http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
>
>
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