[tor-dev] prop224: Ditching key blinding for shorter onion addresses
burdges at gnunet.org
Thu Sep 29 07:19:22 UTC 2016
On Wed, 2016-09-28 at 19:45 -0400, Jesse V wrote:
> I am curious, what is your issue with the subdomains? Are you
> referring to enumerating all subdomains, or simply being able
> to confirm that a particular subdomain exists?
Yes, confirmation of subdomans can become a problem in some contexts
where GNS gets discussed as a possible solution.
If I know that blabla.onion exists as a website, then it's good that I
can learn that www.blabla.onion exists as a website.
If otoh I know that blabla.zkey is a GNS record representing a Bob's
contact list, then it's bad that I can learn that alice.blabla.zkey
p.s. In my message, I suggested roughly : Let P = p G be a elliptic
curve point so that P.onion is a hidden service with abbreviated URL x.
If y is a domain name element string, then y.P.onion and y.x point to
Q.onion where Q = H(s,P) * P for some hash function H mapping into the
scalars. And q = H(s,P) p is the private key for that HS record. Now
this Q.onion HS record could simply forward users to another HS record
with a private key not controlled by p. This means the owner of x & p
can make the HSDirs forward requests in a verifiable way. The downside
is more HS records. This could help create a diversity of naming
solutions whose TLDs (x above) are controlled by different authorities.
It's not helpful if you want x to be controlled in some distributed way
though. In fact, I suppose most Tor name service proposals would be
distributed, giving my idea only very limited usefulness.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Size: 819 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
More information about the tor-dev