[tor-dev] prop224: Ditching key blinding for shorter onion addresses
desnacked at riseup.net
Sat Jul 30 13:36:14 UTC 2016
bancfc at openmailbox.org writes:
> [ text/plain ]
> On 2016-07-29 17:26, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Hello people,
>> this is an experimental mail meant to address legitimate usability
>> with the size of onion addresses after proposal 224 gets implemented.
>> meant for discussion and it's far from a full blown proposal.
>> Anyway, after prop224 gets implemented, we will go from 16-character
>> addresses to 52-character onion addresses. See here for more details:
>> This happens because we want the onion address to be a real public key,
>> and not
>> the truncated hash of a public key as it is now. We want that so that
>> we can do
>> fun cryptography with that public key. Specifically, we want to do key
>> as specified here:
> Speaking out of turn here:
> Why not integrate kernelcorn's OnioNS project and keep all the current
> security properties?
> OnioNS addresses are much more user friendly than even the shorter
> .onion addresses.
AFAIK, the OnioNS project was never actually finished nor deployed.
It also has various engineering/deployment issues that have not been addressed
and it requires a whole infrastructure/community to work.
In general, I'm open to DNS-like approaches for hidden services, but if we can
also improve the UX situation on the protocol layer, that seems like a win to me :)
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