[tor-dev] Should cloud-hosted relays be rejected?

[isis]

Philipp Winter transcribed 2.6K bytes:
>
> The harm caused by cloud-hosted relays is more difficult to quantify.
> Getting rid of them also wouldn't mean getting rid of any attacks.  At
> best, attackers would have to jump through more hoops.
> 

Does anyone know which attacks were carried out via relays running on cloud
platforms?

The only one I remember was the "One cell is enough" [0] tagging attack in
2009, but IIRC, their malicious/colluding exit was run on PlanetLab (also, via
the nature of the attack, it probably wouldn't have caused any harm to real
users).  Were there any others?

[0]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough

-- 
 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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