[tor-dev] Should cloud-hosted relays be rejected?

[Sharif Olorin]

> Does anyone know which attacks were carried out via relays running on cloud
> platforms?

The Lizard Squad thing from last year was substantially Google Cloud
(GAE/GCE), if I recall correctly (there's a list from consensus-health
here[0]). Lots of research takes place on EC2, but it doesn't seem to
be a sybil-magnet - after all, there are cheaper providers who will
ask fewer questions (e.g., OVH, which has a much bigger consensus
fraction).

[0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-December/005381.html

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