[tor-dev] Scaling tor for a global population

[Mike Perry]

Mike Perry:
> 5. Invest in the Tor network.
> 
>    Based purely on extrapolating from the Noisebridge relays, we could
>    add ~300 relays, and double the network capacity for $3M/yr, or about $1
>    per user per year (based on the user counts from:
>    https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html).
> 
>    Note that this value should be treated as a minimum estimate. We
>    actually want to ensure diversity as we grow the network, which may make
>    this number higher. I am working on better estimates using replies from: 
>    https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-September/005335.html
> 
>    Automated donation/funding distribution mechanisms such as
>    https://www.oniontip.com/ are especially interesting ways to do this
>    (and can even automatically enforce our diversity goals) but more
>    traditional partnerships are also possible.
> 
>    Result: 100% capacity increase for each O($3M/yr), or ~$1 per new user
>            per year.

Naif's point about there being 100Mbit residential uplinks out there
suggests that there may be a hybrid approach here.

If this vendor could detect super-high-speed client uplinks, they could
ask only these users if they wanted to be non-exit relays. But this is
complicated, as it also requires understanding if the user's ISP will
get upset at the traffic consumption or the fact that a listening TCP
service is running. For example, I know Comcast calls their residential
service "unlimited", but yells at you if you transfer more than 250GB in
a month, or if they discover any listening TCP ports on your IP address.

Even if we could figure these problems out by looking up ISP policy
based on client IP address, I think we still need to fund exit relays. I
don't think we can just enlist random home users connections to be exits
without giving them a wall of text explaining how to deal with issues
that may arise.

So this may be something to consider to reduce network expenditure, but
it won't completely eliminate it.

-- 
Mike Perry
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