[tor-dev] Is PublishServerDescriptor needed to collect metrics?

isis isis at torproject.org
Thu Oct 16 09:56:42 UTC 2014

Karsten Loesing transcribed 4.5K bytes:
> On 16/10/14 10:57, isis wrote:
> Having private bridges in public bundles is actually harmful, because it
> makes it look like bridges are not much used.  If we want to suggest
> bridge development or BridgeDB development to a sponsor and they look at
> estimated user numbers compared to directly connecting users, they might
> say that those few users are not worth their money.

Okay, you got me ― I'm totally on your side now. :)

Dear Tor Browser Team, I am willing to curate your bundled bridges for you to
ensure that they are public bridges.

> I'm fine with this inaccuracy.  The only thing that uses bridge pool
> assignments is Onionoo/Atlas/Globe, and providing the information which
> pool/ring BridgeDB picked for a bridge doesn't justify the effort.

Hooray! Less work!

> > Another thing to consider: should we allow a bridge operator to switch from
> > `BridgeDistribution https` to `BridgeDistribution email`? Allowing this would,
> > of course, decrease our potential to understand how bridges are being
> > harvested/blocked, as well as nullifying some of the security considerations
> > which influenced the separate-hashrings-for-separate-distribution-methods
> > design choice.
> I'd say it's up to the bridge operator to decide how their bridge is
> used, even if that makes it easier to enumerate/block their bridge.
> Worth a comment in torrc, but no reason to ignore their choice.

Fair enough.  And, now that I think about it more, the default should probably
be `BridgeDistribution any` to maintain consistent behaviour, meaning that
bridge operators would have some chance of altering their assignment anyway if
they manual set the option later.

 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
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