[tor-dev] Hidden Service Scaling

Christopher Baines cbaines8 at gmail.com
Tue May 6 21:07:39 UTC 2014

On 06/05/14 15:29, Michael Rogers wrote:
> I'm interested in your work because the hidden service protocol
> doesn't seem to perform very well for hidden services running on
> mobile devices, which frequently lose network connectivity. I wonder
> if the situation can be improved by choosing introduction points
> deterministically.

Unfortunately, I don't really see how anything I have done could have
helped with this. Assuming that the mobile device has maintained
connectivity during the connection phase, and you now have the 6 hop
circuit through the RP, the behaviour from then on is unchanged, and
this is where I assume the problems with loosing connectivity occur?

> On 30/04/14 22:06, Christopher Baines wrote:
>> - multiple connections for one service to an introduction point is
>> allowed (previously, existing were closed)
> Does this mean that at present, the service builds a new IP circuit
> (to a new IP?) every time it receives a connection? If so, is it the
> IP or the service that closes the old circuit?

Not quite. When the service (instance, or instances) select an
introduction point, a circuit to that introduction point is built. This
is a long term circuit, through which the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cells
can be sent. This circuit enables the IP to contact the service when a
client asks it to do so.

Currently, any IP's will close any existing circuits which are for a
common purpose and service.

The modification I attempt to describe above, is the disabling of this
functionality. So a hidden service instance (or multiple instances of
the same hidden service), can connect to the same introduction point
through multiple circuits. There is also some additional modifications
needed to make the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 handling work with multiple

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 949 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20140506/8dbb8629/attachment-0001.sig>

More information about the tor-dev mailing list