[tor-dev] Git hosting changes, git:// support discontinued

Sebastian Hahn sebastian at torproject.org
Mon Dec 1 04:49:35 UTC 2014

Hi Jason,

On 30 Nov 2014, at 23:32, Jason Cooper <tor at lakedaemon.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 06:48:09PM +0100, Sebastian Hahn wrote:
>> Access via https:// has been provided for years, and should continue
>> to work without any hiccups.
> No issue there for folks that prefer the extra layer.

My point is basically that there's no reason not to always use the extra

>> If there are questions or concerns, let's here them.
> My problem with cancelling access via git:// is that the alternative
> (https) trains new users to think they need to trust the server.  The
> fact is they don't.  They need to trust the person identifying himself
> as Nick Mathewson who holds the private key for 8D29319A.

We don't just have tor.git up there, a lot of repos don't include a
single signed commit or even tag. You're right that trusting the server
is nothing a good dev should do, but I'm also not worried about our
demographic here.

On a tangent, referring to keys by their short (or long, for that
matter) keyid is not a good idea. How to verify Nick actually has the
blessing of the Tor project (or any subset of people therein, etc) to
sign tags is yet another problematic area without a real solution.

In conclusion: Yes, don't trust the server. I sleep a lot better
pretending that people don't trust it.

> I'd much prefer they be taught not to trust the path *or* the server.
> Please consider restoring git:// access.

I have considered it, but my conclusion remains not to do it for now.
Further discussion is invited.


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