[tor-dev] Proposal: Capturing Traffic Statistics from Exit Relays

Zack Weinberg zackw at panix.com
Mon Mar 18 20:53:47 UTC 2013

On Monday, March 18, 2013, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> On 18.03.2013 12:05, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> >  * TCP port
> >  * "Public suffix" + 1 domain component of destination
> >    (example.com, example.co.uk)
> I am not sure I like this. Maybe we might want to limit it to popular
> destinations -- drop sites that only get few hits? And rougher access
> numbers (50 hits, 100, etc)?

The "differential privacy" sanitization algorithm discussed in the next
section is in fact a more systematic and theoretically grounded way of
doing just this. Sites that are rarely visited will have their true visit
rate overwhelmed by the added noise, which can either add to or subtract
from the number.  Sites that are frequently visited will simply have their
true visit count rendered uncertain.

I shall look into the possibility of adding completely fake visits to the
statistics as well.
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