[tor-dev] [tor-assistants] Protocol grammars as probabilistic channels
zackw at panix.com
Sat Jul 28 17:24:27 UTC 2012
[I'm moving this from a giant cc: list to tor-dev, I hope that's okay.
I *think* everyone involved is already on that list.]
[I apologize for not picking up this ball for so long, I have been ill
and mostly without the brain.]
On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 2:26 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774 at gmail.com> wrote:
> Specifically, to obfuscate a ‘payload protocol’ data stream:
> * send it through an arithmetic-code encoder, using a model which
> contains a (low-probability) ‘pad’ symbol;
> * encrypt it with a stream cipher;
> * send it through an arithmetic-code decoder, using a model which
> matches the ‘cover protocol’ (the protocol you are trying to mimic).
I like this way of modeling the problem, but I see some practical
problems with it. The payload protocol in this case is Tor's link
protocol, which is already encrypted, so your first step would appear
not to do anything (well, except to TLS's cleartext record headers,
but I don't think that will gain you much). The stream cipher
provides no integrity protection for the message, which maybe we can
get away with since the higher level has it, and more importantly, no
sequencing. Several cover protocols of interest (most importantly
HTTP) break a session up into many short-lived TCP connections. That
means you have to allow for the possibility that cover-protocol
messages will arrive at the decoder out of order. You also need the
ability to send control messages at a level below the payload
protocol, for key agreement, reassociation of new connections with
ongoing sessions, and possibly other things we haven't thought of yet.
The "chopper" component of StegoTorus tackles these problems. Have
you seen the draft paper? It has its own problems -- the one I'm
wrestling with now is, the _amount of payload data_ sent in any given
message gets frozen the first time it is transmitted; if you need to
_re_transmit, you'd better be able to send at least that much data
right now! (Padding can of course be varied.)
I would be curious to know if you think your arithmetic-decoding
approach to cover generation could reasonably be made to work within
>> George turned me on to this paper,
>> "Provably Secure Steganography"
I have to say that I am very skeptical about the practical value of
this paper, because it requires one to characterize the probability
distribution of all possible messages in the cover protocol, which is
not practically possible for any nontrivial protocol. I could see an
approximation being good enough for our purposes, though.
> Don't hide information directly in the syntax -- it's easy enough for
> Them to rearrange protocol messages in ways that will not interfere
> with standard-conformant clients and servers, but will disrupt crappy
> protocol obfuscators that don't implement the cover protocol
> correctly. Use a semantic model of the cover protocol instead.
vmon and I have been wrestling with this one a bit in the context of
HTTP and we've pretty much come to the conclusion that we need an
actual implementation of HTTP, into which we plug data. Fortunately
there is no shortage of HTTP implementations.
> ‘Blocking resistance’ is *very* different from ‘detection resistance’
> (i.e. ‘indistinguishability from normal traffic’ for some value of
> ‘normal traffic’).
> * ‘Blocking resistance’ does not require that a cover protocol be
> ‘indistinguishable from X’ by the adversary, only that the adversary
> be unable to block it. For example, an adversary which can only
> ‘block’ communications by disrupting a connection using extra (forged)
> packets will not be able to block a UDP-based protocol.
The adversary we're concerned with has control of all the border
routers between the client and the server, so they can do things like
blackhole all packets with a particular source or destination. I
would argue that detection resistance is in fact required for blocking
resistance against this adversary.
> * A protocol which is ‘indistinguishable from’ some protocol which the
> adversary wants to not block may not provide ‘blocking resistance’.
> For example, a crappy obfuscator which uses a syntactic model of HTTP
> instead of a semantic model can be blocked by just about any
> off-the-shelf HTTP proxy.
That effect also provides a distinguisher from real HTTP, doesn't it?
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