[tor-commits] [tor/master] More unit tests for old TAP onion handshake.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Fri Mar 1 19:07:16 UTC 2013
commit f6697d5b3bbd4fbb18362158b01346aab8915254
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Fri Mar 1 14:06:09 2013 -0500
More unit tests for old TAP onion handshake.
The test coverage for onion_tap.c is now at 89%, up from 67%.
---
changes/onion_tap_tests | 2 +
src/test/test.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/onion_tap_tests b/changes/onion_tap_tests
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f982433
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/onion_tap_tests
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ o New unit tests:
+ - Unit tests for failing cases of the TAP onion handshake.
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index 6c64d35..41ab421 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -821,43 +821,130 @@ test_onion_handshake(void)
crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL;
char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
char c_keys[40];
-
/* server-side */
char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
char s_keys[40];
-
+ int i;
/* shared */
- crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL;
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL;
pk = pk_generate(0);
+ pk2 = pk_generate(1);
/* client handshake 1. */
memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf));
- /* server handshake */
- memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
- memset(s_keys, 0, 40);
- test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
- s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+ for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i) {
+ crypto_pk_t *k1, *k2;
+ if (i==1) {
+ /* server handshake: only one key known. */
+ k1 = pk; k2 = NULL;
+ } else if (i==2) {
+ /* server handshake: try the right key first. */
+ k1 = pk; k2 = pk2;
+ } else {
+ /* server handshake: try the right key second. */
+ k1 = pk2; k2 = pk;
+ }
- /* client handshake 2 */
- memset(c_keys, 0, 40);
- test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+ memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
+ memset(s_keys, 0, 40);
+ test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, k1, k2,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
- if (memcmp(c_keys, s_keys, 40)) {
- puts("Aiiiie");
- exit(1);
+ /* client handshake 2 */
+ memset(c_keys, 0, 40);
+ test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+
+ test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40);
+ memset(s_buf, 0, 40);
+ test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40);
}
- test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40);
- memset(s_buf, 0, 40);
- test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40);
+ done:
+ crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk2);
+}
+
+static void
+test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg)
+{
+ char junk_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+ char junk_buf2[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+ /* client-side */
+ crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL;
+ char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+ char c_keys[40];
+ /* server-side */
+ char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
+ char s_keys[40];
+ /* shared */
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL;
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ pk = pk_generate(0);
+ pk2 = pk_generate(1);
+
+ /* Server: Case 1: the encrypted data is degenerate. */
+ memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf));
+ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
+ junk_buf, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1);
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* Server: Case 2: the encrypted data is not long enough. */
+ memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf));
+ memset(junk_buf2, 0, sizeof(junk_buf2));
+ crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, sizeof(junk_buf2),
+ junk_buf, 48, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* client handshake 1: do it straight. */
+ memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
+ test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf));
+
+ /* Server: Case 3: we just don't have the right key. */
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk2, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* Server: Case 4: The RSA-encrypted portion is corrupt. */
+ c_buf[64] ^= 33;
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+ c_buf[64] ^= 33;
+
+ /* (Let the server procede) */
+ tt_int_op(0, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* Client: Case 1: The server sent back junk. */
+ s_buf[64] ^= 33;
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+ s_buf[64] ^= 33;
+
+ /* Let the client finish; make sure it can. */
+ tt_int_op(0, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+ test_memeq(s_keys, c_keys, 40);
+
+ /* Client: Case 2: The server sent back a degenerate DH. */
+ memset(s_buf, 0, sizeof(s_buf));
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
done:
- if (c_dh)
- crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
- if (pk)
- crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk2);
}
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
@@ -1991,6 +2078,7 @@ static struct testcase_t test_array[] = {
ENT(buffers),
{ "buffer_copy", test_buffer_copy, 0, NULL, NULL },
ENT(onion_handshake),
+ { "bad_onion_handshake", test_bad_onion_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL },
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
{ "ntor_handshake", test_ntor_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL },
#endif
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