[or-cvs] r10182: polish r9726-r9903 (in tor/trunk: . doc/design-paper doc/spec src/common src/or)
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Sun May 13 09:26:38 UTC 2007
Author: arma
Date: 2007-05-13 05:25:06 -0400 (Sun, 13 May 2007)
New Revision: 10182
Modified:
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex
tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt
tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt
tor/trunk/src/common/log.c
tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c
tor/trunk/src/or/config.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c
tor/trunk/src/or/control.c
tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c
tor/trunk/src/or/dns.c
tor/trunk/src/or/main.c
tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c
Log:
polish r9726-r9903
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@
eventdns code.
o Minor bugfixes (portability):
- - Even though windows is equally happy with / and \ as path separators,
- try to use \ consistently on windows and / consistently on unix: it
+ - Even though Windows is equally happy with / and \ as path separators,
+ try to use \ consistently on Windows and / consistently on Unix: it
makes the log messages nicer.
- Correctly report platform name on Windows 95 OSR2 and Windows 98 SE.
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
- When we are reporting the DirServer line we just parsed, we were
logging the second stanza of the key fingerprint, not the first.
- When we have k non-v2 authorities in our DirServer config,
- we ignored as many as k v2 authorities while updating our
+ we ignored the last k authorities in the list when updating our
network-statuses.
o Minor bugfixes (other):
@@ -152,15 +152,10 @@
- Fix a typo in an error message when extendcircuit fails that
caused us to not follow the \r\n-based delimiter protocol. Reported
by daejees.
- - The control spec described a GUARDS event, but the code
- implemented a GUARD event. Standardize on GUARD, but support people
- asking for GUARDS too. Reported by daejees.
- - Correct the control spec to match how the code actually responds
- to 'getinfo addr-mappings/*'. Reported by daejees.
- Actually set the purpose correctly for descriptors inserted with
purpose=controller.
- o Code simplifications and refactoring
+ o Code simplifications and refactoring:
- Stop passing around circuit_t and crypt_path_t pointers that are
implicit in other procedure arguments.
- Drop the old code to choke directory connections when the corresponding
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
unanticipated oppressive situations. In fact, by designing with
a variety of adversaries in mind, we can take advantage of the fact that
adversaries will be in different stages of the arms race at each location,
-so a server blocked in one locale can still be useful in others.
+so an address blocked in one locale can still be useful in others.
We assume that the attackers' goals are somewhat complex.
\begin{tightlist}
@@ -149,9 +149,9 @@
\item Complete blocking (where nobody at all can ever download censored
content) is not a
goal. Attackers typically recognize that perfect censorship is not only
- impossible, but unnecessary: if ``undesirable'' information is known only
+ impossible, it is unnecessary: if ``undesirable'' information is known only
to a small few, further censoring efforts can be focused elsewhere.
-\item Similarly, the censors are not attempting to shut down or block {\it
+\item Similarly, the censors do not attempt to shut down or block {\it
every} anti-censorship tool---merely the tools that are popular and
effective (because these tools impede the censors' information restriction
goals) and those tools that are highly visible (thus making the censors
@@ -1667,8 +1667,8 @@
and extent of censorship concurrently with the deployment of their
circumvention software. The easy reason for this two-pronged push is
to attract volunteers for running proxies in their systems; but in many
-cases their main goal is not to focus on actually allowing individuals
-to circumvent the firewall, but rather to educate the world about the
+cases their main goal is not to focus on getting more users signed up,
+but rather to educate the rest of the world about the
censorship. The media also tries to do its part by broadcasting the
existence of each new circumvention system.
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -289,8 +289,8 @@
1 if it is not present. Until 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev, this option was
not generated, even when eventdns was in use. Versions of Tor
before 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev did not parse this option, so it should be
- marked "opt". With some future version, the old 'dnsworker' logic
- will be removed, rendering this option of historical interest only.]
+ marked "opt". With 0.2.0.1-alpha, the old 'dnsworker' logic has
+ been removed, rendering this option of historical interest only.]
2.2. Nonterminals in router descriptors
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -465,24 +465,6 @@
[See also migration notes in section 2.2.1.]
- "eventdns" bool NL
-
- [At most once]
-
- Declare whether this version of Tor is using the newer enhanced
- dns logic. Versions of Tor without eventdns SHOULD NOT be used for
- reverse hostname lookups.
-
- [All versions of Tor before 0.1.2.2-alpha should be assumed to have
- this option set to 0 if it is not present. All Tor versions at
- 0.1.2.2-alpha or later should be assumed to have this option set to
- 1 if it is not present. Until 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev, this option was
- not generated, even when eventdns was in use. Versions of Tor
- before 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev did not parse this option, so it should be
- marked "opt". With some future version, the old 'dnsworker' logic
- will be removed, rendering this option of historical interest
- only.]
-
"caches-extra-info" 0|1 NL
[At most once.]
Modified: tor/trunk/src/common/log.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/common/log.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/common/log.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -104,8 +104,7 @@
t = (time_t)now.tv_sec;
n = strftime(buf, buf_len, "%b %d %H:%M:%S", tor_localtime_r(&t, &tm));
- r = tor_snprintf(buf+n, buf_len-n,
- ".%.3ld [%s] ",
+ r = tor_snprintf(buf+n, buf_len-n, ".%.3ld [%s] ",
(long)now.tv_usec / 1000, sev_to_string(severity));
if (r<0)
return buf_len-1;
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -1216,11 +1216,11 @@
consider_recording_trackhost(conn, circ);
/* fall through */
case SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT_DIR:
- if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn)<0)
+ if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
- if (connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(conn)<0)
+ if (connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(conn) < 0)
return -1;
}
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/config.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/config.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/config.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -899,8 +899,8 @@
if (options->DirServers) {
for (cl = options->DirServers; cl; cl = cl->next) {
if (parse_dir_server_line(cl->value, 0)<0) {
- log_err(LD_BUG,
- "Previously validated DirServer line could not be added!");
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Previously validated DirServer line could not be added!");
return -1;
}
}
@@ -912,15 +912,15 @@
if (options->Bridges) {
for (cl = options->Bridges; cl; cl = cl->next) {
if (parse_bridge_line(cl->value, 0)<0) {
- log_err(LD_BUG,
- "Previously validated Bridge line could not be added!");
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Previously validated Bridge line could not be added!");
return -1;
}
}
}
if (running_tor && rend_config_services(options, 0)<0) {
- log_err(LD_BUG,
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Previously validated hidden services line could not be added!");
return -1;
}
@@ -931,8 +931,8 @@
tor_snprintf(fn, len, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-status",
options->DataDirectory);
if (check_private_dir(fn, CPD_CREATE) != 0) {
- log_err(LD_CONFIG,
- "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", fn);
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", fn);
tor_free(fn);
return -1;
}
@@ -984,13 +984,13 @@
/* reload keys as needed for rendezvous services. */
if (rend_service_load_keys()<0) {
- log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading rendezvous service keys");
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading rendezvous service keys");
return -1;
}
/* Set up accounting */
if (accounting_parse_options(options, 0)<0) {
- log_err(LD_CONFIG,"Error in accounting options");
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Error in accounting options");
return -1;
}
if (accounting_is_enabled(options))
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
"Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers.");
if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) {
if (init_keys() < 0) {
- log_err(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting");
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting");
return -1;
}
ip_address_changed(0);
@@ -3689,7 +3689,7 @@
if (strncmp(d,"~/",2) == 0) {
char *fn = expand_filename(d);
if (!fn) {
- log_err(LD_CONFIG,"Failed to expand filename \"%s\".", d);
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Failed to expand filename \"%s\".", d);
return -1;
}
if (!options->DataDirectory && !strcmp(fn,"/.tor")) {
@@ -3719,7 +3719,7 @@
return -1;
tor_assert(options->DataDirectory);
if (strlen(options->DataDirectory) > (512-128)) {
- log_err(LD_CONFIG, "DataDirectory is too long.");
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "DataDirectory is too long.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@
static int connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(edge_connection_t *conn);
static int connection_ap_process_natd(edge_connection_t *conn);
-static int connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exit_conn,
- or_circuit_t *circ);
+static int connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn);
static int hostname_is_noconnect_address(const char *address);
/** An AP stream has failed/finished. If it hasn't already sent back
@@ -2226,7 +2225,7 @@
tor_assert(or_circ);
if (or_circ->p_conn && or_circ->p_conn->_base.addr)
n_stream->_base.addr = or_circ->p_conn->_base.addr;
- return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream, or_circ);
+ return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream);
}
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to start the dns_resolve().");
@@ -2393,57 +2392,57 @@
* bridge connection with a socketpair, create a new directory conn, and join
* them together. Return 0 on success (or if there was an error we could send
* back an end cell for). Return -(some circuit end reason) if the circuit
- * needs to be torn down. Either connects exit_conn, frees it, or marks it,
- * as appropriate.
+ * needs to be torn down. Either connects <b>exitconn<b/>, frees it,
+ * or marks it, as appropriate.
*
* DOCDOC no longer uses socketpair
*/
static int
-connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exit_conn,
- or_circuit_t *circ)
+connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
{
- dir_connection_t *dir_conn = NULL;
+ dir_connection_t *dirconn = NULL;
+ or_circuit_t *circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(exitconn->on_circuit);
log_info(LD_EXIT, "Opening local connection for anonymized directory exit");
- exit_conn->_base.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
+ exitconn->_base.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
- dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(connection_new(CONN_TYPE_DIR));
+ dirconn = TO_DIR_CONN(connection_new(CONN_TYPE_DIR));
- dir_conn->_base.addr = 0x7f000001;
- dir_conn->_base.port = 0;
- dir_conn->_base.address = tor_strdup("Tor network");
- dir_conn->_base.type = CONN_TYPE_DIR;
- dir_conn->_base.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER;
- dir_conn->_base.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT;
+ dirconn->_base.addr = 0x7f000001;
+ dirconn->_base.port = 0;
+ dirconn->_base.address = tor_strdup("Tor network");
+ dirconn->_base.type = CONN_TYPE_DIR;
+ dirconn->_base.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER;
+ dirconn->_base.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT;
- connection_link_connections(TO_CONN(dir_conn), TO_CONN(exit_conn));
+ connection_link_connections(TO_CONN(dir_conn), TO_CONN(exitconn));
- if (connection_add(TO_CONN(exit_conn))<0) {
- connection_edge_end(exit_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
- connection_free(TO_CONN(exit_conn));
- connection_free(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
+ if (connection_add(TO_CONN(exitconn))<0) {
+ connection_edge_end(exitconn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
+ connection_free(TO_CONN(exitconn));
+ connection_free(TO_CONN(dirconn));
return 0;
}
- exit_conn->next_stream = circ->n_streams;
- circ->n_streams = exit_conn;
+ exitconn->next_stream = circ->n_streams;
+ circ->n_streams = exitconn;
- if (connection_add(TO_CONN(dir_conn))<0) {
- connection_edge_end(exit_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
- connection_close_immediate(TO_CONN(exit_conn));
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exit_conn));
- connection_free(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
+ if (connection_add(TO_CONN(dirconn))<0) {
+ connection_edge_end(exitconn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
+ connection_close_immediate(TO_CONN(exitconn));
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exitconn));
+ connection_free(TO_CONN(dirconn));
return 0;
}
- connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
- connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(exit_conn));
+ connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(dirconn));
+ connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(exitconn));
- if (connection_edge_send_command(exit_conn,
+ if (connection_edge_send_command(exitconn,
RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED, NULL, 0) < 0) {
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exit_conn));
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exitconn));
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(dirconn));
return 0;
}
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/control.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/control.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/control.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
/**
* \file control.c
* \brief Implementation for Tor's control-socket interface.
- * See control-spec.txt for full details on protocol.
+ * See doc/spec/control-spec.txt for full details on protocol.
**/
#define CONTROL_PRIVATE
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
if (strlen(proxystring) + strlen(url) >= 4096) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
- "Squid does not like URLs longer than 4095 bytes, this "
+ "Squid does not like URLs longer than 4095 bytes, and this "
"one is %d bytes long: %s%s",
(int)(strlen(proxystring) + strlen(url)), proxystring, url);
}
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/dns.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/dns.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/dns.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
/**
* \file dns.c
* \brief Implements a local cache for DNS results for Tor servers.
- * This is implemetned as a wrapper around Adam Langley's eventdns.c code.
+ * This is implemented as a wrapper around Adam Langley's eventdns.c code.
* (We can't just use gethostbyname() and friends because we really need to
* be nonblocking.)
**/
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/main.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/main.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/main.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -515,8 +515,8 @@
if (!conn->marked_for_close) {
/* this connection is broken. remove it. */
log_fn(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,
- "unhandled error on write for %s connection (fd %d); removing",
- conn_type_to_string(conn->type), conn->s);
+ "unhandled error on write for %s connection (fd %d); removing",
+ conn_type_to_string(conn->type), conn->s);
tor_fragile_assert();
if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) {
/* otherwise we cry wolf about duplicate close */
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c 2007-05-13 09:04:08 UTC (rev 10181)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c 2007-05-13 09:25:06 UTC (rev 10182)
@@ -4344,7 +4344,7 @@
continue;
if (router_get_by_descriptor_digest(rs->descriptor_digest)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
- "We have a router descriptor, but need_to_mirror=1.");
+ "We have a router descriptor, but need_to_mirror=1.");
rs->need_to_mirror = 0;
continue;
}
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