[tor-bugs] #26137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon May 21 03:22:04 UTC 2018


#26137: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection
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 Reporter:  cypherpunks                          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client traffic-   |  Actual Points:
  analysis path-selection                        |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > Also, our experience of research code is that it often needs significant
 work to be suitable for long-term use on millions of tor clients.

 That's very true. Luckily, the code is not ''too'' convoluted.

 > In particular, the "Eliminate path restrictions entirely" section of
 proposal 291 is relevant, because it conflicts with adding AS path
 restrictions:
 > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013057.html

 Wait, is this section advocating for allowing a single relay to be used as
 both a guard and exit in a single circuit? Or does it just mean that the
 second (unused) guard would be allowed to act as a middle or exit? Anyway,
 it would not necessarily conflict with that as it could be entirely
 optional and controlled by the configuration file (just like the use of a
 limited number of guards itself is technically optional).

 > We get a lot of proposals that are someone's first proposal.
 >
 > You could read proposal 291, and use it as a model to write a draft
 proposal. Then you can send it to the tor-dev mailing list, and ask for
 help improving it.

 That sounds like a good idea. I think I will consider doing that.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26137#comment:4>
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